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Abstract 
This thesis is a case study on participation in and decentralized management of 
Kangchenjunga Conservation Area (KCA) in north-eastern Nepal, with semi-
structured interviews as the main data collection method. It analyses the 
historical conditions for the emergence of new approaches to conservation 
globally and in Nepal, linking the paradigm shift in protected area (PA) 
management to the growth of sustainable development as the dominant 
developmental and environmental discourse, as well as to specific historic 
developments in Nepal.  
The thesis further provides a broad theoretical framework for the analysis of 
management practices in KCA and potential consequences for the balancing of 
conservation objectives and local development aspirations, with focus on 
participation, decentralization, common pool resource theory and a three-
dimensional approach to power analysis.  
Key findings are that KCA can be considered the most decentralized protected 
are in Nepal, but that it does not constitute a fully decentralized PA, as 
substantial powers and rights are withheld by the government conservation 
authority and the former implementing institution. Moreover, although broad 
popular participation is achieved in KCA, participation in the area does not 
amount to the highest forms or ladders of participation presented in theoretical 
contributions to participation. This is linked to the degree of devolution of 
power in the decentralized management framework.  
Finally, the thesis discusses the links between decentralized management 
framework and the balancing of conservation and development in the area. It 
identifies several potential challenges for reconciling conservation and 
development, and argues that it is too early to assess whether the system is 
sustainable in conservational, managerial and financial terms.  
 
Keywords: sustainable development, protected area management, 
conservation, decentralization, participation, power analysis, Nepal, 
Kangchenjunga Conservation Area. 
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1. Introduction 
Nepal is a landlocked country of about 26.5 million people in South Asia, 
bordering China in the north and India in the south, east and west (CBS 2013). 
Nepal’s Human Development Index rate ranked second lowest in Asia in 
2013, with Afghanistan as the sole Asian country further below on the ranking 
(UNDP 2013:146). 82.9% of the population still lives in rural areas (CBS 
2013). Of the rural dwellers, the majority are subsistence farmers who also 
rely on natural resources for their daily requirements (Khatri-Chhetri 
2008:260).  
The country is characterized by remarkable geographical variations, stemming 
from its location along the joint of two continental plates – that of the Indian 
subcontinent and the Tibetan Plateau of the Eurasian continental plate 
(Svensen 2011:156). Its lowest point is just 70 meters above sea level, while 
the highest is the peak of Sagarmatha (Mount Everest), the world’s highest 
mountain standing at 8848 meters above sea level (CBS 2013). The country 
can be divided into three distinct ecological zones, the plains of the Terai in 
the south, the middle hills, and the sparsely populated mountainous areas in 
the northern Himalayan area (Hunzai et al. 2011:42). This geo-biological 
variation has led to disproportionately high levels of biological diversity 
relative to the size of the country. The mountainous areas of Nepal are hosts to 
38 major ecosystems, and although relatively less diverse in flora and fauna 
compared to other areas of Nepal, they have a large number of endemic 
species (HMGN/MoFSC 2002).  
Kangchenjunga Conservation Area (KCA) in northeastern Nepal, the object of 
study in my case, is the first protected area (PA) in Asia and among the first in 
the world to adopt a completely decentralized and local management system 
(Parker and Thapa 2011, 2012). The area was declared to be a protected area 
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in 1997, and WWF Nepal ran the Kangchenjunga Conservation Area Project 
(KCAP) from 1998. In 2006, the Kangchenjunga Conservation Area 
Management Council (KCA-MC) took over the management responsibilities 
from KCAP, and the area is today managed through local institutions at area, 
local district and settlement level (Gurung 2006).  
In this case study on KCA, I investigate local participation in conservation 
management, as well as the decentralized institutional framework of 
management that enables and conditions such local participation. I analyze the 
links between local participation and decentralization through a focus on 
power, rights and accountability relations, with an additional aim to explore 
the balancing of conservation and development concerns within the 
decentralized institutional framework.  
At the broadest theoretical level, my thesis can be read in the tradition of 
social science research on human-nature relationships known as political 
ecology. Political ecology can be understood both as a study of the political 
economy surrounding and influencing environmental conflicts (Benjaminsen 
et al. 2009), and of policies, resource use and livelihoods or the political 
institutions influencing the same areas (Robbins 2004:5). It can also be 
understood to be about the social and political conditions that surround causes 
and management of environmental problems (Forsyth 2003:2). Political 
ecological thought has been used to challenge the former dominant position of 
conservation biology in the field of conservation (Guha 1997, Adams and 
Hutton 2007), and more generally “to treat the scientific “laws” and principles 
underlying environmental policy and debates” with concern (Forsyth 2003:1). 
Political ecology moreover challenges “Benign but uninformed hopes about 
common interests” among those concerned with poverty reduction and 
conservation (Adams and Hutton 2007:168). Although not as critical to 
protected areas in general as some political ecologists (e.g. Peluso 1993), I 
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find myself comfortable within this tradition as this thesis is concerned with 
human-nature relationships and the power struggles and politics that surround 
and frame such relationships.    
1.1 Research Questions and Rationale  
The thesis aims at answering the following research questions:  
1. How is the local population of KCA participating in the management of 
the area? 
2. How, and to what extent, is the management of KCA decentralized? 
3. How is the participatory and decentralized management framework 
influencing the balance of conservation and development in KCA? 
These three questions, despite seemingly targeting different issues, are closely 
interlinked. Participation in the management of KCA at least partly stems from 
the decentralized structure of management of the area. Thus, to answer the 
first question, one must also keep analysis stemming from the second question 
in mind. Democratic decentralization institutionalizes local participation 
(Ribot 2002), to a greater extent than what is achieved through for instance 
more ad-hoc participatory development programs. Furthermore, the balancing 
of conservation and development, which is the focus of question three, is to a 
large extent dependent on the management framework characterized by 
participation and decentralization. Thus, to find the level of “appropriate” 
decentralization can depend on how one wants to balance these concerns.  
The rationale for conducting a study on participation and decentralization of 
PA management in Nepal is manifold. First, it is the realization that 
biodiversity, the multiple varieties of life on Earth, is increasingly threatened 
by human activities (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(SCBD) 2004). Second, it is the realization that Nepal is among the least 
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developed countries in Asia, that the mountain communities in Nepal are 
among the poorest in that country, and moreover that the economic 
development of Nepal is closely bound to its natural resources 
(HMGN/MoFSC 2002, Hunzai et al. 2011:43, UNDP 2013). This is why 
sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity and natural resources is so 
critical in Nepal, and an reason why protectionist approaches to conservation 
have been found to be neither feasible nor justifiable there. Finally, Nepal is 
an interesting case for the investigation of innovative and integrated ways of 
managing protected areas and natural resources, as it has a long history of 
adaptive natural resource management (Ribot et al. 2006).   
Annapurna Conservation Area (ACA) was the first Nepali PA where 
community-based approaches to conservation were implemented (Baral et al. 
2007). However, there are three reasons why I find KCA to be a more 
interesting and appropriate case. Firstly, ACA is still controlled by an external 
organization, the National Trust for Nature Conservation (NTNC). In contrast, 
KCA has since 2006 been managed by local institutions, albeit with financial 
and technical support from the former implementing organization, WWF 
Nepal. Hence, KCA provides a more “extreme” case of decentralization, one 
possible rationale for conducting single-case studies (Yin 2009:47), and the 
“complete devolution of management authority to the local population” in 
KCA provides “an exceptional opportunity to assess integrated decentralized 
participatory conservation programs”, according to Parker and Thapa 
(2011:880). Secondly, KCA is comparatively understudied, and more research 
on the management institutions has been called for (Gurung 2006:145). 
Thirdly, KCA has been judged the most effective of the many protected areas 
covering the wider Kangchenjunga landscape, in a study assessing governance 
and management effectiveness in several protected areas in Eastern Nepal, 
India and Bhutan (Oli et al. 2013). This makes it especially interesting to 
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investigate KCA in the search for effective, efficient and equitable 
management regimes for protected areas.  
1.2 Outline of the Thesis 
To answer the research questions mentioned above, the thesis is organized in 8 
chapters. Chapter 2 explores the global shift in protected area management 
from a “fences and fines” approach to a new paradigm of inclusive and 
people-friendly conservation, linking the shift to the emergence of sustainable 
development as the dominant global discourse structuring debates and policy 
resolutions to environmental and developmental issues. Chapter 3 looks at the 
evolution of Nepali conservation policies and natural resource management. 
While relating this to the global developments outlined in Chapter 2, it also 
looks at country-specific political developments enhancing the national policy 
shifts that in turn enabled the establishment of KCA as a locally managed 
protected area. It also presents the study area itself, as well as the findings of a 
KCA-specific literature review. Chapter 4 outlines the methodological 
approach utilized in the research for the thesis, discusses relevant ethical 
considerations and describes the fieldwork conducted. Chapter 5 provides an 
outline of the theoretical framework I use in this study, focusing on 
participation, decentralization (with emphasis on natural resource and 
protected area management), and common pool resources theory. An overall 
framework for power analysis is also presented. In Chapter 6, I address the 
issue of decentralization and participation in KCA, based on an analysis of the 
data collected through interviews, and of the relevant legal documents, within 
the theoretical framework provided in Chapter 5. In Chapter 7, I discuss the 
balance of conservation and development as it relates to the management 
framework and degree of decentralization. Finally, some concluding remarks 
and prospects of further research are provided in Chapter 8. 
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2. Sustainable Development, Conservation 
and the New Paradigm 
In this chapter, I explore the origins of the term “sustainable development”, 
and show how it is linked to the concept of conservation. Through this 
exercise, I analyze how sustainable development and conservation have 
mutually informed each other and developed in concert over the last three to 
four decades. Within the field of conservation, a paradigm shift has happened, 
moving protected area management from a protectionist to an inclusive 
approach. I argue that the link between conservation and sustainable 
development has contributed to bring about this shift, dominated by a new 
paradigmatic concept of nature/biodiversity conservation fundamentally 
different from earlier conceptions of conservation among conservationists and 
policymakers. I also briefly look at the debate among conservationists that has 
followed this change. Conceptually linking sustainable development and 
conservation also enhances the understanding of what an Integrated 
Conservation and Development Project (ICDP) such as Kangchenjunga 
Conservation Area aspires to be. The account of the advent of sustainable 
development parallel and co-emerging with new approaches to protected area 
management provides an important backdrop for the establishment of KCA 
and the management regime there.  
2.1 Sustainable Development 
The origins of the term ”sustainable development” are not easy to discern, and 
Adams (2009:3) claims that ”its roots lie a long way back in the history of 
European and wider global thinking”, but that it became more widely adopted 
following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm in 1972. Sustainable development was from the start seen as an 
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unlikely idea, because conservation and development were seen as two 
directly opposing goals, and the term continues to be labeled an oxymoron 
(Sachs 1999, Adams 2009:2). At the Stockholm conference, this was evident 
in that many leaders from developing countries were skeptical towards the 
Conference’s aim of integrating environmental concerns in economic 
development. But the conference nevertheless stands out as one of the first 
international attempts to reconcile the development-environment conflict, 
although without demonstrating how to do so, according to Adams (2009:63). 
The conference can be considered a “watershed event” in the international 
approach to environmental issues (Andresen et al. 2012:3). 
A few years later, sustainable development became a central concept in the 
1980 World Conservation Strategy (WCS) (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980), an 
influential publication prepared by the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN), in Cooperation with the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)1. Sustainable 
development became mainstream jargon with the publication of the World 
Commission for Environment and Development (WCED)’s report Our 
Common Future (OCF), published in 1987, and has been a “buzzword” 
(Adams 2009:1, Scoones 2007) and perhaps the central concept of 
developmental and environmental thinking since then. This is illustrated by 
the influential United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, followed up by two “Earth Summits” on 
sustainable development in 2002 and 2012, in Johannesburg and Rio de 
Janeiro, respectively.  
It is widely acknowledged that the definition of sustainable development most 
prominently used today still is the one developed in Our Common Future. 
                                              
1 IUCN and WWF were then called International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and 
World Wildlife Fund, respectively. 
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Here, sustainable development is defined as ”development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs” (WCED 1987:Chapter 2 §1). The Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), opened for signature at the 1992 Rio Conference, 
does not define sustainable development as such, but is concerned with 
sustainable use of the components of biological diversity: “The objectives of 
this Convention (…) are the conservation of biological diversity, the 
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” (United Nations 
1992: Art.1). The Convention defines sustainable use thus:  
’Sustainable use’ means the use of components of biological diversity 
in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of 
biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs 
and aspirations of present and future generations (United Nations 1992: 
Art. 2).  
This closely resembles the OCF definition in its focus on the needs of both 
present and future generations, and as the stated objectives show, the 
convention is not uniquely concerned with conservation.  
Lafferty and Langhelle claimed already in 1995 that there “hardly exists a set 
of values having achieved a similar degree of political recognition” (1995:15, 
my translation). Lele frames the joining of environmental and developmental 
concerns in sustainable development like this: “The question being asked is no 
longer ‘Do development and environmental concerns contradict each other?’ 
but ‘How can sustainable development be achieved?’” (1991: 607). Lele 
predicted that sustainable development would become the development 
paradigm of the 1990s (ibid.). Today, one can add that its role as the dominant 
development paradigm is continued, not least through the on-going efforts in 
creating the new “post-2015” development goals to succeed the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) whose “deadlines” expire in 2015. At the United 
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Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (“Rio+20”) held in 2012, 
UN member states agreed to launch a new process to develop new Sustainable 
Development Goals (United Nations 2012:§246), Also, the Report of the 
High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda 
states that to “put sustainable development at the core” should be one of five 
transformative shifts to drive that agenda (United Nations 2013:8). 
The OCF was first and foremost concerned with people, “of all countries and 
all walks of life” (WCED 1987: Overview § 107). This is an important change 
from the focus of the WCS, and Lafferty and Langhelle (1995:17) argue that 
the people-centered approach in the OCF can be seen in the light of the 
criticism that the WCS received, especially its “anti-poor” profile. In the 
WCS, poor people’s behavior was identified as one main driver of 
environmental destruction. While linkages between poverty and environmental 
problems such as deforestation and desertification are acknowledged also in 
OCF2, the report uses this realization to argue that development and 
environmental concerns are inextricably linked, and that one cannot address 
one without addressing the other. Moreover, it does not put the bulk of the 
responsibility for the sorry state of affairs on the shoulders of the poor; 
acknowledging that serious environmental degradation is happening in many 
developing countries, the report points to the fundamental unequal global 
relationship between developing and “industrial” nations as the main problem, 
both environmental and developmental (WCED 1987: Overview §17). 
                                              
2 “Those who are poor and hungry will often destroy their immediate environment in order to survive: They will 
cut down forests; their livestock will overgraze grasslands; they will overuse marginal land; and in growing 
numbers they will crowd into congested cities. The cumulative effect of these changes is so far-reaching as to 
make poverty itself a major global scourge” (WCED 1987: Chapter 1 §8).  
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2.2 Diverse Sustainabilities  
Our Common Future has become the reference point for every debate on 
sustainable development, despite the fact that the report actually harbors 
several different definitions of the concept, according to Lafferty and 
Langhelle (1995:13-14). Hardly surprising, the popularity and wide use of the 
term sustainable development by a host of different actors have generated 
many meanings and values attached to it. The number of definitions of 
sustainable development is claimed to exceed one hundred (McNeill 
2006:335). Smith, discussing value pluralism within green movements and 
amongst those concerned with environmental protection, claims that 
“Nowhere is this clash and conflict of values more apparent than in the 
debates over the nature of sustainable development” (2003:3). The difficulty 
in joining environmental and developmental concerns was readily 
acknowledged in the WCS, which noted that “Conservation and development 
have so seldom been combined that they often appear – and are sometimes 
represented as being – incompatible” (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980:1).  
Despite the difficulties inherent in trying to join two formerly incompatible 
goals, the term’s ability to accommodate to the interests of widely different 
actors is one important reason for its prominence; the interpretative 
malleability of the concept is by one scholar regarded as one of the reasons for 
its success in the policy arena (McNeill 2006:348). But it also means that the 
term itself stands in danger of losing true meaning. Its plurality of meanings 
helps explain why there is “no general consensus over the societal goals that 
would count as sustainable development as a matter of definition, or would 
contribute to it in practice” (Connely 2007:259). Sustainable development can 
be termed an “essentially contested concept”, a concept “that combine[s] 
general agreement on the abstract notion that [it] represent[s] with endless 
disagreement about what [it] might mean in practice” (Cornwall 2007:427). 
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As I shall return to later in this thesis, participation might also be seen as such 
an essentially contested concept.  
A reason why so many definitions or understandings of sustainable 
development exist is precisely because sustainability has become the dominant 
environmental discourse, making it pertinent for everyone with interests at 
stake in the environmental and developmental field to try to influence how 
sustainable development is to be conceived and put into practice (Dryzek 
2005:146). A consequence of the tremendous spread of the use of the term is, 
of course, that sustainability can mean anything and everything. The 
understanding of sustainable development as an “essentially contested 
concept” might have different implications for how to treat the term in 
academic writing. One way of dealing with the ambiguity of the term can be, 
instead of searching most likely in vain for a definitive meaning, to “recognise 
the multiplicity of sustainabilities and to analyse in which these are shaped and 
mobilised in political discourse” (Haughton and Counsell 2004:73, cited in 
Connelly 2007:262)3.  
In this thesis, sustainable development will mostly be treated in relation to 
how its rise to prominence is linked to the paradigm shift of protected area 
management, and the subsequent international and national (Nepali) focus on 
ICDPs and IUCN Category VI protected areas (see Chapter 3 for an 
elaboration). I will not undertake a thorough analysis of all the different 
“sustainabilities” and their various political uses, but the reflections above are 
nevertheless important to keep in mind whenever the term is used.  
                                              
3 Another approach can be to leave behind the theoretical debates on what sustainable development ideally is to 
be, and instead look for practical examples in the real world of instances where political practice has come close 
to what can be deemed sustainable development. This is the approach of Parayil in his article about the ‘Kerala 
model’, where he argues that this model should be “counted as a possible idealisation of a sustainable 
development paradigm” (Parayil 1996:941).  
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2.3 Conservation and Sustainable Development 
Concerns about conservation of nature have been important to sustainable 
development because conservation is central to the idea of balancing human 
needs and development with nature’s capacity to provide services and sinks, 
and the importance of conserving biodiversity and natural resource pools for 
future consumption and innovations. But conservation has also been central 
due to the importance of conservation organizations like WWF and IUCN in 
the formation of the discourse of sustainable development itself, and for 
influencing meetings and publishing landmark publications such as the World 
Conservation Strategy and Caring for the Earth (Adams 2009). Concepts of 
conservation and sustainable development have been shaped in concert and 
mutually influenced each other.  
The WCS defined three broad objectives of conservation, of which at least the 
third one is clearly linked to sustainable development. These objectives are as 
follows: 1) maintenance of essential ecological processes and life-support 
systems; 2) preservation of genetic diversity; and 3) sustainable utilization of 
species and ecosystems (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980). It moreover provided a 
(perhaps surprisingly) broad definition of conservation: “the management of 
human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit 
to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and 
aspirations of future generations” (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980:1). The strategy 
also noted that “Conservation, like development, is for people; while 
development aims to achieve human goals largely through use of the 
biosphere, conservation aims to achieve them by ensuring that such use can 
continue” (ibid.). From the citations above, one can draw a link both to the 
CBD and to Our Common Future’s definition of sustainable development, 
thus showing the influence of the World Conservation Strategy on later 
important documents and treaties. The similarities between the WCS 
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definition of conservation and the WCED definition of sustainable 
development coined seven years later are striking. 
In the Preface to the WCS, the Director General of IUCN wrote that the 
intention of the strategy was for it to represent a “consensus of policy on 
conservation efforts in the context of world development” (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 
1980:ii, emphasis added). It is thus clear that the strategy aimed at reconciling 
conservation with development, and go beyond a narrower and purely 
conservationist approach. The strategy can be seen as a compromise between 
various actors having contributed in the consultation processes that led to its 
drafting, such as “conservationists and the practitioners of development, who 
may differ in their emphasis on maintenance on the one hand and production 
on the other” (ibid.). The overall aim of the documents was “to help advance 
the achievement of sustainable development through the conservation of living 
resources” (ibid:iv). It is however clear that, despite the joint efforts of 
powerful actors in the field of conservation such as IUCN, UNEP and WWF, 
there is still no definite consensus on best conservation practices in the context 
of global development, as dissenting voices from the conservation community, 
such as Locke and Dearden (2005), Oates (1999) and Terborgh (2004) 
illustrate. I return to the critics of the new approaches to conservation 
management at the end of next section, after presenting an account of this 
shift. 
2.4 Conservation Models – A Paradigmatic Change? 
Nature conservation has a history that goes much further back than the 1980 
World Conservation Strategy, and it is a fruit of Enlightenment thinking 
(Adams and Hutton 2007:154). Strict nature conservation in the modern sense, 
with a focus on protected areas and the protection of species and ecosystems, 
can be said to have started in the USA in the latter half of the 19th century, 
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notably with the establishment of the world’s first national park, Yellowstone, 
in 1872 (Adams 2009:30). In his historic overview of environmentalism, Guha 
(2000) describes three distinct historic antecedents of modern environmentalist 
thinking: the ”back to the land” movement of British romanticism; scientific 
conservation, with roots in German forestry that spread for instance to colonial 
India; and the growth of the American ”wilderness idea” that led to the early 
establishment of American national parks. With scientific forestry an 
conservation came early notions of ”sustainable yield”, which at least 
conceptually can be linked to modern ideas about sustainable development, 
while the American national parks model became the dominant model for 
parks creation globally (Adams 2009:280). 
For the first century of nature conservation, the practice was dominated by the 
idea of preserving pristine nature without human intervention (at least 
intervention from other than scientists and tourists). “Nature as wilderness” 
(Adams 2009: 280) was an important concept of wildlife conservation in the 
United States and elsewhere. The result was often eviction of indigenous 
people that did not fit in the narrative of the pristine wilderness created in the 
US and other settler countries such as Australia (ibid.). A model of fortress 
conservation developed, with a more or less complete separation of humans 
and the “natural world” or the “wilderness” (Adams and Hulme 2001a:10, 
Kollmair et al. 2005, Adams and Hutton 2007, Adams 2009:278).  
This separation of humans and natural systems has tended to ignore the 
different ways in which human-systems and natural systems are interlinked, 
the consequences being that humans often are evicted in order to protect the 
very same “wilderness” they have contributed to the creation of (Peluso 
1993:201, Jeanrenaud 2002:17, Robins 2004:149, Adams and Hutton 
2007:155). For example, it has been argued that the East African savannah 
ecosystems have emerged in co-evolution with the residing pastoralists, whose 
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cattle have helped shape the open grazing land the wild animals depend on 
(Pimbert and Pretty 1997:306, Pretty 2002:66). To acknowledge the 
“dialectical, historically derived and iterative relations” between resource use 
and political relations on the one hand, and landscapes and “physiographic 
processes” on the other hand, is a central feature of political ecology (Blaikie 
1999:132).  
As a consequence of the increasing recognition of the problematic aspects of 
traditional conservation practices, a new approach to more people-friendly 
parks gradually emerged in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (Adams 2009:285). A 
range of more or less similar terms exists to describe two broad and 
conflicting conservation paradigms; e.g. “people-centered” (Gurung 2006:1), 
“people-oriented” (Jeanrenaud 2002), “people and parks” (Schild 
2008:Foreword), “participatory conservation” or “bottom-up conservation” 
(Khadka and Nepal 2010), on the one hand, and “protectionist” (Gurung 
2006:1, Adams and Hulme 2001b), “fortress conservation”, “people or parks” 
(Schild 2008:Foreword) or “fences and fines” (Adams 2009:278, Heinen and 
Shrestha 2006) on the other hand.  
Adams and Hulme (2001a) use the term “community conservation” to 
encompass a range of different conservation models, among them integrated 
conservation and development programs, which the Kangchenjunga 
Conservation Area Project’s (KCAP) strategy is one example of (Gurung 
2006). They define it to be “those principles and practices that argue that 
conservation goals should be pursued by strategies that emphasize the role of 
local residents in decision-making about natural resources” (Adams and 
Hulme 2001a:13). They identify community conservation as a counter-
narrative to the older narrative of fortress conservation, while Locher (2006) 
sees ICDPs to be part of the “New Conservation” having emerged since the 
1980s. ICDPs are viewed as one policy solution in the “conservation and 
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development narratives” developed in the 1980s and influenced by debates on 
sustainable development (Jeanrenaud 2002).  
Sustainable development united two different broad policy goals and 
practitioners working to achieve these goals, conservation and development, 
by opening up for the integration of environmental issues in development 
planning (Adams 2009:6)4. One can perhaps say that the dominant paradigm 
of conservation management today tries to do the same thing, but the other 
way around – namely to integrate development concerns and human needs 
into biodiversity conservation and environmental policy, planning and 
practice. Earlier conservationists beliefs have held that there was an inverse 
relationship between the wellbeing of nature and human actions (Pimbert and 
Pretty 1997:297); with the emergence of for instance ICDPs, this is no longer 
the case, as this approach explicitly aims at combining both development and 
conservation in the same projects (Adams 2009:290).   
Two distinct elements make up the community conservation counter-narrative; 
the participation in management of conservation resources by people living in 
or around the protected areas; and the linkage of conservation and local 
development needs (Adams and Hulme 2001a:13). These are central features 
of the conservation model used in the conservation areas of Nepal generally, 
and in KCA specifically (Gurung 2006). As such, this thesis seeks to shed 
light on one effort to combine conservation and development interests in 
Nepal.  
Adams claims that “By the 1980s, the dominant conservation paradigm had 
changed to feature social inclusion rather than exclusion” (2009:276). Not 
coincidentally, the 1980s was also the decennium that marked the larger shift 
in developmental and environmental thinking towards the joining of the two in 
                                              
4 Notably, “the failure to integrate conservation with development” was listed as one major obstacle to achieve 
conservation in the WCS (IUCN-UNEP-WWF 1980:VI). 
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sustainable development. Other observers see the conservation paradigm shift 
as a more recent phenomenon (Schild 2008). IUCN’s policy on the matter has 
certainly evolved since the publication of the World Conservation Strategy in 
1980. One important change in the context of community inclusion and the 
conservation areas of Nepal that is the focus of this study was the 
establishment of new Protected Area categories at the fourth IUCN Park 
Congress held in 1992 (Locke and Dearden 2005:3). At this congress, 
Category V and VI were introduced, as “protected landscape/seascape” and 
“protected area with sustainable use of natural resources”, respectively. The 
IUCN itself announced the beginning of “A new era for protected areas” in its 
summary of the fifth Parks Congress a decade later (IUCN 2003:3), and some 
perceive this congress to mark the definitive paradigm shift with regard to 
protected areas (Paudel et al. 2011:8).  
The counter-narrative of community conservation is taking over for a number 
of reasons, according to Adams and Hulme (2001a). Undoubtedly, its appeal 
as “win-win” discourse (c.f. Lerkelund 2011 for an elaboration) has been 
helpful; community conservation’s “win-win”- appeal draws on the same 
rhetorical strength as the core argument of sustainable development thinking, 
namely that “We can have it all: economic growth, environmental 
conservation, social justice; and not just for the moment, but in perpetuity” 
(Dryzek 2005:157). The same appeal of sustainable development was also 
apparent in the enthusiasm for ICDPs from both development and 
conservation organizations:  
Conservation organizations were enthusiastic about ICDPs because the 
title contains the word conservation, and bilateral aid agencies liked 
them because the title contains the word development. Each side could 
frame projects in their own image (Terborgh 2004:165).   
According to Adams and Hulme, “community conservation equates 
conservation with sustainable development, and hence captures the huge 
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upwelling of policy commitment arising from the Brundtland Report” 
(2001a:15). Moreover, it can be argued that the focus on and funding support 
for “community” approaches to conservation, starting in the 1990s, also was 
due to these approaches’ links to sustainable development (Adams and Hutton 
2007:151). Conservation organizations could tap into huge financial resources 
when development became part of their projects. This could in turn happen as 
major donors such as the World Bank and USAID were under pressure to 
adopt “greener” policies in the 1980s (Terborgh 2004:164). Terborgh (ibid.) 
argues that ICDPs are the result as the self-interests of development and 
conservation organizations converged, under the banner of sustainable 
development.  
According to Adams (2009:5), the longevity of the famous formulation 
defining sustainable development in OCF is due to its appeal both to 
biodiversity conservationists and to those concerned with poverty and 
development. I attribute the strength of the community conservation discourse 
to the same merging of previous incompatible interests; biodiversity 
conservation and local level development/improved livelihoods, the two main 
goals of the Integrated Conservation and Development Projects in Annapurna 
Conservation Area, (NTNC/ACAP 2009), and in Kangchenjunga 
Conservation Area (Gurung 2006:3). In other words, both terms gain strength 
from the appeal as “win-win” solutions.  
It can perhaps be argued that the paradigm shift from protectionist to inclusive 
conservation in conservation management was inevitable due to the increased 
popularity of the sustainability discourse, the political and financial power of 
the actors that came to support it, and its links to poverty reduction as the 
emerging overarching goal of global development efforts. The last factor 
became even more evident with the agreement on the Millennium 
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Development Goals (MDGs) following the Millennium Summit at the UN 
General Assembly in 2000).  
2.4.1 Critical Voices 
The shift towards more inclusive and development-friendly conservation has 
not happened without opposition. Locke and Dearden (2005) do not want 
IUCN Category VI areas to be recognized as protected areas at all, because 
their objectives go beyond the preservation of biodiversity, which by 
definition is the objective of PAs, according to these authors (ibid:3). They 
lament the paradigm shift away from the stricter protectionist approaches, and 
they opine that it has led to a “devaluation of biologists” (ibid:5). They argue 
that all PAs should put the needs of non-human organisms above those of 
humans - more than anything they fear that the “vision of humanized PAs 
presented by the new paradigm will lead to a biologically impoverished 
planet” (Locke and Dearden 2005:9).  
Oates (1999), a primatologist focusing on West Africa, argues that new 
approaches to conservation, linking development and conservation and 
emphasizing the communities’ role in conservation are seriously flawed, and 
can lead to decreasing chances of longtime survival of wildlife populations. In 
his ominously titled book Requiem for Nature (2004), conservation biologist 
John Terborgh provides a fledging critique of much current conservation 
practice, and specifically the reliance on community involvement and local 
development prevalent in ICDPs. He argues against promoting improving 
rural standards of living at the margins of park boundaries, because it will 
stimulate increases in population density. Terborgh is also skeptical of the 
reliance on bottom-up approaches and voluntary mechanisms for conservation, 
and he argues that “active protection of parks requires a top-down approach 
because enforcement is invariably in the hands of police and other armed 
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forces that respond only to orders from their commanders” (ibid:170). In sum, 
ICDPs represent for Terborgh “little more than wishful thinking (ibid:165). 
It is also recognized by favorable observers that integrating conservation and 
development needs is a very challenging task. ICDPs are for instance, 
according to Adams, “highly complex and demand high level of skills on the 
part of project staff. They also demand substantial funds and a realistic (that is, 
slow) timescale. Their chances of success depend on local perceptions of the 
project” (2009:290). Terborgh (2004:166) depends partly on the issue of time 
in his critique of ICDPs; parks are intended to be permanent institutions, while 
projects like ICDPs are almost by definition time-bound. These concerns are 
undoubtedly relevant for this study of conservation practices in Nepal, but the 
last concern raised by Terborgh is less applicable to KCA, precisely because 
of the institutional set-up and reliance on local management. As I shall later 
discuss in more detail, KCA management has changed from being dependent 
on the externally managed (and time-bound) Kangchenjunga Conservation 
Area Project (KCAP) to a community managed conservation area, but that its 
financial sustainability can be questioned.  
In a critique of amongst others Oates’ and Terborgh’s works cited above, 
Wilshusen et al. (2002) comment that although many ICDPs are not working 
perfectly (for instance efforts in species protection are found to be lacking), 
that is not an argument in itself to thoroughly abandon the approach and 
resurge to top-down, protectionist approaches to nature conservation. In fact, 
they find that “the authors’ conclusions calling for strictly enforced protection 
are operationally unrealistic and morally questionable” (ibid:18). For example, 
the resurgence to the use of armed forces put forward by Terborgh (2004) is 
questionable, considering the history of military abuse of power in many 
tropical countries (Wilshusen et al. 2002), as well as in Nepal during the civil 
war (Thapa 2011). Neumann (2001) and Ferguson (2006) provide disturbing 
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examples of militarized protected area management in Tanzania and the 
Central African Republic, respectively. As I shall show in Chapter 6, the 
perceived prospect of army deployment in KCA was one reason why many 
inhabitants in what was to become the conservation area were initially so 
skeptical.  
Guha (1997:14) laments the hostility of conservation biologists, park 
managers and conservation organizations towards “farmers, herders, 
swiddeners and hunters who have lived in the “wild” from well before it 
became a “park” or “sanctuary”. In his comment to Locke and Dearden’s 
article, Martino (2005:195) writes that instead of fearing that category VI (and 
V) PA’s will exclude conservation biologists, they should be viewed as “an 
invitation for them to participate in the world outside ‘pristine’ land”. 
Wilshusen et al. (2002:35) sum up their critique with a rhetorical question 
asking whether rural people should be treated as potential allies or enemies, 
and conclude:  
In the end, we have to broad choices. We can promote a policy shift 
toward authoritarian protectionism that would most likely alienate key 
allies at local, regional and national levels and thus precipitate 
resistance and conflict. Alternatively, we can build on past experience 
and constructively negotiate ecologically sound, politically feasible, 
and socially just programs in specific contexts that can be legitimately 
enforced based on strong agreements with all affected parties (ibid:35-
6). 
In the next chapter, I give a brief recount of the history of conservation in 
Nepal, a country that has tried to move from the former to the latter choice in 
the citation above. As we shall see, Kangchenjunga Conservation Area is one 
outcome of this shift.  
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3. Conservation in Nepal 
In this chapter, I outline the development of nature conservation in Nepal, 
describing how the international change in conservation practices has been 
reflected in Nepali policy changes, while also paying heed to the specific 
Nepali political and historical context. The purpose of this exercise is to 
provide a thorough background for the study and understanding of the 
Kangchenjunga Conservation Area and the decentralized management 
structure practiced there. Towards the end of the chapter, I present the study 
site itself, the history of its formation and current management system, as well 
as the results of a KCA-specific literature review. 
3.1 Nepali Conservation: A Brief History 
Similar to European imperial5 conservation efforts in Africa and India 
(Wilshusen et al. 2002), nature conservation in Nepal was initially projects of 
the Nepali Royal family to protect their hunting grounds from human 
encroachment (Thapa 2009:98). Formal nature conservation in Nepal started 
in 1973, when the government enacted the National Parks and Wildlife 
Conservation Act (NPWCA) (Budhathoki 2011:3), although conservation 
initiatives by King Mahendra had been implemented in earlier years as well, 
for instance the establishment of a rhino sanctuary in 1964 in present-day 
Chitwan National Park (Heinen and Shrestha 2006:44). The Department of 
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC) was also established in 
1973, with the power to declare national parks and wildlife reserves (Baral et 
al. 2007:2905), as was the Chitwan National Park (DNPWC 2014a).  
                                              
5 Nepal has never been colonized, but the country’s present day boundaries were settled when Nepal lost a war 
with British India in 1814-16. Several concessions were later made to please the British, among them inviting the 
British Royal family on tiger and rhino hunting trips in the Terai (Mahat 2010:3). 
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The initial approach to nature conservation and protected area management 
falls within the category of “protectionist” conservation, and the establishment 
of protected areas in these early years often led to evictions of local people, 
subsequent loss of livelihood opportunities and thus conflict (Baral et al. 2007, 
Phuntsho and Chettri 2008, Budhathoki 2011:3, Paudel et al. 2012). Heinen 
and Shrestha (2006:45-6) label the early years of the NPWCA as the “fences 
and fines” period of nature conservation in Nepal, as it gave the park wardens 
extensive police and judicial powers, usurped local control and removed many 
customary rights in establishing protected areas. According to one 
commentator, the establishment of Chitwan National Park led to the eviction 
of 22 000 people (Thapa 2009:99)6. Another feature of early conservation 
policies in Nepal was the lack of involvement of local communities or NGOs 
in management and conservation work: “Three decades ago, the involvement 
of NGOs/CBOs in conservation was not in existence and largely unthinkable” 
(Budhathoki 2011:4).  
The Royal family’s tight grip on conservation policy was challenged following 
the democratic revolution in Nepal in 1990, the first “People’s Movement”. 
The hitherto unchallenged authority of state officials saw competition from 
Western conservation ideology, international aid workers, NGOs, and the 
interests of politicians, according to Bhatt (2003:247). Analyzing the 
development of conservation policies in Nepal, Budhathoki claims that the 
subsequent move towards more inclusive conservation management practices 
in the country was influenced both by national development priorities and 
international conservation discourses (2011:4). One explanation for the shift 
from coercive to inclusive conservation in Nepal is simply that the former was 
seen by the Royal Nepali government as unsuccessful (Agrawal and Ribot 
                                              
6 John Terborgh, a proponent of protectionist approaches to conservation discussed in Chapter 2, puts Chitwan 
National Park forward as an example to follow, as “one of the brightest success stories in Asian conservation” 
(Terborgh 2004:88). Specifically, he applauds the deployment of 800 soldiers of the Nepali army to guard the 
Park’s rhinoceros from poachers and the rigorous enforcement of park regulations against firewood gathering and 
cattle grazing.  
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1999:483).  Moreover, the shift in protected area management and promotion 
of participatory conservation policies in Nepal coincide to a large extent with 
the democratic and decentralization movements in the country that came with 
the multiparty parliamentary system introduced after the 1990 revolution and 
the fall of the totalitarian rule of the king (Gurung 2006:40, Budhathoki 
2011:4). These political changes have allowed for a rapid increase in civil 
society activities (Ojha and Timsina 2008:63).  
Table 1: Important events in Nepal’s conservation and political history  
Year Event 
1964 Establishment of a rhino sanctuary in present-day Chitwan National 
Park 
1973 Passing of the NPWCA, establishment of DNPWC and Chitwan 
National Park 
1989 Third amendment of NPWCA, incorporating conservation areas in 
national legislation 
1990 1st “People’s Movement” leading to dissolution of the Panchayat 
political system and legalizing of political parties  
1992 Establishment of Annapurna Conservation Area, managed by King 
Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation (KMTNC), now the National 
Trust for Nature Conservation (NTNC) 
1993 Fourth amendment of NPWCA, incorporating buffer zones in national 
legislation 
1997 Establishment of KCA, managed as a WWF Nepal project 
2002 Dissolution of local elected bodies in Nepal 
2006 Handover of management responsibilities to the Kangchenjunga 
Conservation Area Management Council. The ceremony on 22 
September was overshadowed by a deadly helicopter accident in 
which 23 participants in the ceremony were killed 
2006 2nd “People’s Movement”; Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed 
between Maoist insurgents and the Seven-Party Alliance 
2008 Constituent Assembly elections held, Maoists enter government, 
monarchy abolished 
 
Sources: HMGN 1973; Gurung 2006, Heinen and Shrestha 2006, Whelpton 2005, Dhungel 
et al. 2011, von Einsiedel et al. 2012. 
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However, a gradual acknowledgment of the unfeasibility and unjustifiability 
of the initial approach to protected area management was evident already 
before the revolution, and in 1986, the pilot project of what today is 
Annapurna Conservation Area (ACA) was created in Ghandruk (Baral et. al 
2007:2905). The pilot project was initiated to test a new concept of protected 
area management, namely conservation with economic development, local 
management and popular participation. In 1992, ACA was legally recognized 
as a protected area after an amendment of the NPWCA (Baral et. al 
2007:2905). ACA is today considered a model for conservation and 
development both nationally in Nepal7, and internationally8 (Gurung 2006:40, 
Locher and Müller-Böker 2007:1114, Khatri 2010:35-36).  
Interestingly, ACA was gazetted as a conservation area in the very same year 
as IUCN’s Category VI protected area was established in the organization’s 
PA regime, in 1992. ACA was the first conservation area to be established in 
Nepal, but conservation areas were vested in national legislation already in 
1989, with the third amendment of the NPWCA. The four amendments of 
NPWCA show an effort on behalf of the Nepali government to adapt the 
management of protected areas in Nepal to changes both of international 
conservation policy and domestic developments, with increasing concessions 
towards resource extraction for local communities and a diversified system of 
PAs, such as opening for buffer zones and conservation areas (Paudel et al. 
2011). One important paragraph in the Act has however remained unchanged 
since 1973, namely the unilateral power of the Government, through the 
DNPWC, to declare new protected areas in the country or dissolve established 
ones, with no legal provisions of consultations, let alone free, prior and 
                                              
7 Through establishment of for instance Kangchenjunga and Manaslu Conservation Areas 
8 The significance accorded internationally to Nepal’s innovative approaches to conservation is witnessed by the 
prevalence of Nepali historical events on the “History” section on WWF US’ webpage; here, both the 
establishment of ACA (mistakenly denoted as a national park) and the KCA are mentioned as key events in the 
1980s and 1990s, respectively (WWF US 2014) 
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informed consent (HMGN 1973:§3 (1) and (2)). According to the Country 
Representative of IUCN Nepal, this signals that the government only 
welcomes changes that suit the government (Malla: interview 30.03.2012).     
The third amendment defines a conservation area as “an area to be managed 
according to an integrated plan for the conservation of natural environment 
and balanced utilization of natural resources” (HMGN 1973:§2e1). 
Comparatively, the 1994 IUCN guidelines on Protected Area Categories 
defines the Category VI PA thus:  
Area containing predominantly unmodified natural systems, managed 
to ensure long term protection and maintenance of biological diversity, 
while providing at the same time a sustainable flow of natural products 
and services to meet community needs (IUCN 1994:23).  
The primary objective of Category VI PAs, according the new IUCN 
guidelines, is “To protect natural ecosystems and use natural resources 
sustainably, when conservation and sustainable use can be mutually 
beneficial” (Dudley 2008:22)9. The category was established as a means of 
linking conservation and development (Locke and Dearden 2005). KCA and 
other conservation areas of Nepal are recognized as category VI PAs 
(DNPWC 2014b). Today, there are six CAs in Nepal, covering a total of 15 
425.95 km2, making this category the geographically most prevalent in the 
Nepali PA system (DNPWC 2012). In total, PAs cover 23.23% of the total 
land area of Nepal (ibid.). Please refer to Map 1 for a graphic overview. Nepal 
is today regarded a leader among developing countries in the field of 
conservation and natural resource management, especially due to the country’s 
progressive programs and legislation related to these issues (Ribot et al. 
2006:1871). 
                                              
9 For a summary of protected area categories, see “IUCN Protected Area Categories System” (IUCN 2014) and 
Dudley (2008).  
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Nepal’s shift in its conservation management towards more people-inclusive 
policies happened parallel to an important change in the country’s forestry 
sector. This change can be summarized as a shift from privatization to 
nationalization, and then to decentralization and local community management 
(Khatri-Chhetri 2008:263). Most forested areas of Nepal became nationalized 
with the enactment of the 1957 Forest Nationalization Act (Harper and 
Tarnowski 2008:36). But the nationalization of Nepal’s forests proved a 
failure, because it undermined already existing local management systems and 
in fact led to increased deforestation as people began to view the forests as 
state property (Ribot et al. 2006:1871) and lost their sense of ownership and 
responsibility for the forests (Malla: interview 30.04.2012). It also lacked 
effective monitoring and enforcement systems (Agrawal and Ostrom 
2001:499) and the Forestry Department’s enforcement was susceptible to 
corruption and inefficiency (Whelpton 2005:144). Deteriorating forest 
conditions and livelihoods of the poor rural population was the result, as the 
local people did not support the nationalization reform (Khatri-Chhetri 
2008:263).  
The subsequent move towards community forestry, which started in the late 
1970s, was according to Harper and Tarnowski prompted by international 
influences from for instance the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) (2008:37), and these scholars also claim that the 1990s “witnessed an 
unprecedented increase” in donor agency influence over forest policy in the 
country (ibid:41). The Forest Act (HMGN 1993) and the Forest Rules (HMGN 
1995) opened up for local communities to claim parts of government forest 
and manage them under the community forestry program (Baral and Stern 
2011). Ribot et al. (2006:1871) write that international donor NGOs and their 
available funds were crucial also for the latter decentralizing efforts. But 
international influence on Nepali conservation policy started already before 
the enactment of the NPWCA. The Act was the outcome of a project led by 
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UNDP and FAO, and FAO was requested by the Government of Nepal to 
develop a system of protected areas in 1971 (Paudel et al. 2011:4).  
In this section, I have showed how both national and international trends and 
influences have shaped Nepali conservation policy since the late 1960s. In the 
next section, I present the study area of this thesis, focusing on both human 
and natural features of the Kangchenjunga Conservation Area as well as the 
development of its management system. 
3.2 Study Area: Kangchenjunga Conservation Area 
Kangchenjunga Conservation Area (KCA) is located in the remote 
northeastern mountains of Nepal, bordering Sikkim, India, and the 
autonomous region of Tibet, China (see Map 2). The area is named after the 
third highest mountain in the world, Kangchenjunga, which at 8586 meters 
above sea level also marks the highest point of the conservation area (the 
lowest being approximately 1200 meters) (Locher and Müller-Böker 2007). 
The area predominantly consists of rocks, ice and rivers (65% of the surface) 
as well as different forest types (14%), shrub (10%), alpine meadows (9%) and 
agricultural land (only 1.6%) (Müller et al. 2008:367). The population was in 
2004 recorded to be 5254 people, an increase from the 4941 recorded in 2001 
(ibid:368). Sherpa/Bhote (including Tibetan refugees), Limbu and Rai are the 
main ethnic groups, representing 86% of the population. The remaining 14% 
are divided between Gurungs and Tamangs, as well as the caste groups 
Chettris, Brahmins and Dalits (ibid.). The people in KCA live in 35 widely 
scattered villages (Gurung 2006:60). The population is fairly homogenous in 
economic terms; most people are quite poor (Parker and Thapa 2011:895). 
34% fall below the national poverty line, while another poverty measure based 
on subsistence requirements and farm income measures the poverty rate to be 
as high as 75% (Müller at al. 2008:370-1).  
  
29 
KCA was established in 1997, first declared a “Gift to the Earth” by the 
Government of Nepal on 29 April in support of WWF’s global “Living Planet 
Campaign”, and then designated as a Conservation Area on 21 July the same 
year. The initial gazetted area of 1650 km2 was expanded in 1998 to today’s 
2035 km2 (Gurung 2006:49). KCA encompasses four Village Development 
Committees (VDCs), Lelep, Yamphudin, Olangchung Gola and Thapetok, all 
part of Taplejung district10. While the first designated area was based on 
ecological boundaries, it was expanded to facilitate community involvement in 
management, and today’s boundaries correspond with the political boundaries 
of the four VDCs (Müller et al. 2008:370). KCA was initially managed by the 
Kangchenjunga Conservation Area Project (KCAP), a project officially 
implemented by the DNPWC, but on the ground jointly run by the DNPWC 
and WWF Nepal, with substantial funding from WWF US and WWF UK 
(Gurung 2006:79). It became operational in November 1998 (Müller-Böker 
and Kollmair 2000:326).  
The main goal of the project was to “safeguard the biodiversity of the area, 
and improve the living conditions of the local residents by strengthening the 
capacity of local institutions responsible for making decisions, which will 
effect the long-term biodiversity conservation and economic development of 
the area” (KCAP 1999 cited in Müller-Böker and Kollmair 2000:326). 
Specifically, the conservation reasons for protecting the area as stated by 
WWF (according to Müller et al. 2008:369) are the unique environmental 
characteristics of the Kangchenjunga area – with high biodiversity indices, 
high density of glaciers, extensive forest areas of the endangered Himalayan 
larch, as well as presence of endangered wildlife such as snow leopards, red 
pandas and blue sheep. Other mammals of conservation significance are gray 
wolf, Himalayan black bear, Himalayan tahr and musk deer (Parker and Thapa 
                                              
10 The VDC is the local governance body, while the DDC is the district-level local body. VDCs consist in turn of 
nine wards each (HMGN 1999).  
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2011:883). The conservation area also covers parts of two global ecoregions, 
the Eastern Himalayan Alpine Meadows and the Eastern Himalayan 
Broadleaf and Conifer Forests (GoN/MoFSC 2006:11) The global ecoregions 
is “a science-based global ranking of the Earth’s most biologically outstanding 
(…) habitats” developed by the WWF international network (WWF 
International 2014). The representation of habitat from these regions makes 
the wider Sacred Himalayan Landscape in which KCA is part contribute 
“significantly towards global conservation targets” (GoN/MoFSC 2006:11).    
Biodiversity conservation as a main motivation for the designation of KCA 
follows a global trend in PA establishment rationale (Kollmair et al. 
2005:184). 
The area was handed over to be managed by the local population through a 
complex system of local institutions headed by the KCA Management Council 
(KCA-MC) in September 2006, and is managed as an ICDP (Gurung 2006, 
Parker and Thapa 2011) and recognized as a Category VI PA (DNPWC 
2014b). The management of the area is today regulated by the Kanchanjangha 
Conservation Area Management Rules, enacted by the Government of Nepal 
in 2008 (GoN 2008). The Category VI designation is arguably compatible 
with the dual goal of KCA as stated in the 2004-2009 Management Plan: “The 
biodiversity of the KCA is managed by local communities to ensure the 
ecological integrity and to bring socio-economic benefits” (Gurung 2006:187).  
Although the ICDP approach to conservation management was pioneered by 
ACA in Nepal, the more substantial devolution of management responsibilities 
to the local communities of KCA added a new dimension to this approach in 
Nepal. KCA is today regarded as the “perhaps the most progressive 
arrangement of community governance of PAs in Nepal and South Asia” 
(Paudel et al. 2011:18). This shows evolution of the conservation paradigm in 
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Nepal, and a willingness to adopt new strategies to cope with a changing 
context (Bajracharya and Dahal 2008:1). 
3.2.1 Literature Review of Kangchenjunga Conservation Area 
Despite the considerable attention awarded KCA, due to the innovative 
approach and far-reaching decentralization management system, the area is 
still not widely studied, especially if one compares it to academic writing 
about Annapurna Conservation Area and community forestry institutions and 
practices in Nepal. The most extensive research publication on KCA I have 
found is Gurung’s (2006) PhD-thesis on conservation and livelihoods in KCA. 
Several studies of the biodiversity properties in the area were done by WWF 
Nepal both before and after its establishment, and the organization has also 
investigated livelihood opportunities of the local population. Unfortunately, I 
have not had access to these resources as they have not been available online.  
Apart from these studies, I have through review of the available online 
literature11 found two recent studies by Parker and Thapa on natural resource 
dependency in KCA (2012) and on the links between participation and 
distribution of benefits in KCA (2011). I have found one study on the 
livelihood strategies and local perceptions on the KCA, conducted shortly 
after KCA establishment (Müller-Böker and Kollmair 2000), two studies on 
gender issues in KCA (Locher 2006, Locher and Müller-Böker 2007), and one 
case study on initial successes and challenges in KCA in terms of biodiversity 
conservation and livelihood needs published in 2008 (Müller et al. 2008). I 
have moreover found an evaluation on management and governance efficiency 
in several PAs in the wider Kangchenjunga landscape, including the KCA (Oli 
et al. 2013). The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development 
                                              
11 It should be noted that several different spellings of Kangchenjunga is used in the literature, and I have hence 
used different wordings in my searches. WWF and the Management Council have used the Kangchenjunga 
spelling since 1999, as I do in this thesis. This spelling is in line with the Sherpa/Bhote word for mountain; kung 
(Gurung 2006:49). 
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(ICIMOD) published an edited volume on biodiversity conservation in the 
Kangchenjunga landscape in 2008 (Chettri et al. 2008), but this volume has 
limited KCA-specific emphasis. Overall, the literature review I have 
conducted showed that further research into the innovative management of 
KCA is of great value. In the next chapter, I outline the methodological 
approach, before I in Chapter 5 discuss several theoretical contributions I 
apply in the analysis. 
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4. Methodology, Research Ethics and 
Fieldwork 
In this chapter, I describe the methodology used in the thesis, and reflect upon 
the potential ethical implications and dilemmas related to the type of research I 
have conducted. I moreover describe the fieldwork I have done, noting 
difficulties I met in the field and potential consequences of these on my data 
and its subsequent analysis. My methodology can be summarized as a single 
case study with semi-structured interviews conducted in a fieldwork setting as 
the main method.  
4.1 Case Studies and Research Design 
Overall, I have chosen a flexible research design for my research project 
leading up to this thesis. This fits well with the case study’s emphasis on 
methodological flexibility and the importance of being open for getting data 
from various sources in order to get as full a picture of the case as possible 
(Yin 2009). It is also in line with Kvale and Brinkmann’s views on how to 
conduct interview studies, viewing research interviewing more as a craft than 
a mechanistically applied method (2009:82-88), and as a less standardized 
procedure than survey studies (ibid:100). At the outset, it is also worth noting 
that field-based case study research is a common approach amongst political 
ecologists interested in the politics of biodiversity conservation (Adams and 
Hutton 2007:149).  
Yin (2009) argues that a dual or multi-case study if possible almost always is 
preferable to a single-case study. A comparative study of two or more PAs in 
Nepal could provide insights into differences and similarities between various 
management regimes and their consequences for local participation, 
conservation and development. However, given the short time-frame and the 
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lack of financial resources typical for research to master theses, I chose to 
limit the scope of the project to a single case study. Moreover, this enabled me 
to spend more time and effort on the single case I chose, and provided me in-
depth understanding of the case. 
This does not hinder me in drawing on research done for instance in 
Annapurna Conservation Area in my analysis of my own case. As Gerring 
writes, to do a case study implies that the researcher at least has to think about 
a broader set of cases; “Otherwise, it is impossible for an author to answer the 
defining question of all case study research: what is this a case of?” (2007:13). 
As Chapter 1 of this thesis outlines, the study is about local participation in 
and decentralization of a specific Integrated Conservation and Development 
Project (ICDP). It is a case study of the KCA and its management framework. 
Although the findings have limited generalizable value to other ICDPs or to 
decentralized protected area management regimes, my research provides 
insights that can be used to enlighten the academic debate concerning the field 
of decentralization and participation in PA management, as well as the broader 
debate about sustainable development.   
Yin writes that case studies can be used for instance to understand complex 
social phenomena and to increase our knowledge about political, group and 
organizational phenomena (2009:4). Yin notes further that “case studies are 
the preferred method when (a) “how” and “why” questions are being posed, 
(b) the investigator has little control over the events, and (c) the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context” (2009:2). Thus, the 
choice of method can be determined by three conditions: The type of research 
questions posed, the degree of control over actual behavioral events, and the 
degree of focus on contemporary versus historical events (ibid:8). My research 
questions consist of “how” questions; I am interested in how a decentralized 
ICDP with extensive emphasis on local participation work, and how 
  
35 
conservation and development is balanced within such a framework. I have no 
control of the events whatsoever12, and I focus on contemporary events13.  
Moreover, case studies can also be used to develop theory (George and Bennet 
2005) and disprove deterministic hypotheses (Poteete et al. 2010:33). The field 
of natural resource management is one that historically has been shaped by 
many such theories, perhaps most notably the idea of the “Tragedy of the 
Commons” (e.g. Hardin 1968). Case studies of common pool resource (CPR) 
management have helped reshape how social scientists think about these 
issues (Ostrom 1990, Poteete et al. 2010), and I believe case study research 
can be useful to address problems and assumptions related to decentralization 
of protected area management as well. Specifically, my research combines 
several theoretical contributions and investigates the links between 
participation and decentralization, through the focus on devolution of powers 
important for both decentralization and participation to have value.  
Finally, a case study can be conducted for its own sake, for the intrinsic value 
of the particular knowledge produced from the case, “in all its particularity 
and ordinariness” (Stake 1994:237). The KCA is indeed a unique case, as it is 
the most decentralized conservation area project in Nepal, and according to 
Gurung innovative because it is the first project of such size and importance 
where management has been entrusted fully to a community-based 
organization (2006:80). In fact, it is precisely the specific and unique 
characteristics of KCA that makes it a worthwhile subject for a single-case 
study that simultaneously inhibits generalization of the findings to other 
ICDPs in Nepal or elsewhere (as opposed to representative or typical cases, to 
                                              
12 My study is thus as far from a laboratory experiment that can be – to quote Clifford Geertz as he denounces the 
notion of a “natural laboratory” in ethnographic research: “what kind of laboratory is it when none of the 
parameters are manipulable?” (Geertz 2000 [1973]:22). 
13 Although I touch upon the establishment phase of the conservation area, and although the longer history of 
conservation in Nepal will be taken into account in the analysis, my main period of interest is from 2006 until 
present 
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use Yin’s (2009:48) parlance, which would be more prone to generalization).  
In sum, my research project with KCA as the subject and with the research 
questions outlined in Chapter 1 as the foci of inquiry is well suited for a 
research design centered on a case study.   
4.1.1 Defining Case Study Research 
A plethora of definitions of case studies and case study research exists in the 
literature, corresponding to the many uses it can have. Gerring (2007) and Yin 
(2009) lists many. I focus here on those that seem relevant for my own 
research; that its method is qualitative (small-N); that the research is holistic 
and thick; that it utilizes specific types of evidence (e.g. ethnographic, 
participant-observation, non-survey-based, field research); that the research 
investigates properties of a single phenomenon (Gerring 2007:17); that 
evidence is gathered in a “real-life context”; that it employs triangulation; and 
that it is difficult to distinguish between the case and the context (Yin 
2009:18).  
All these definitions can be applied to my case study. I have not conducted a 
cross-case study in the sense of analyzing and synthesizing data and findings 
from a large number of case studies conducted by others, as described for 
example in Potetee et al. (2010). Moreover, my within-case data is also small-
N (I conducted 14 open-ended interviews inside KCA). I aim to provide 
readers with a holistic description of KCA and the participation of local 
inhabitants in the management of KCA, although my description and analysis 
of the case will be framed by the theoretical and subject choices I have made 
in narrowing down the case. I use different sources of evidence similar to the 
list Gerring (2007) makes, and I thus strengthen my arguments and the validity 
of my findings. For example, my analysis of the interviews is enhanced by a 
close reading of the Kangchanjangha Conservation Area Management Rules 
(GoN 2008), which to a large extent conditions the management and 
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institutional behavior in KCA. I collected evidence in a “real-life” context – in 
people’s homes, shops, and fields. It was even difficult to do the actual 
interviews without the real-life toils and joys affecting the collection of raw 
data (more on this in the sub-chapter on fieldwork experiences). And finally, it 
was difficult to separate the case from the context.  
The last point above is a central feature of case studies distinguishing them 
from e.g. an experiment or a statistical analysis (Yin 2009:18). However, 
limiting the case to a certain extent is absolutely necessary, or one would end 
up with much more data than one can handle. One must thus try to distinguish 
data about the subject of the case study (the phenomenon one wants to 
investigate) from data external to the case (the “context”) (Yin 2009:32). I am 
setting a time frame for my case. I focused my interviews on people directly 
involved in the management of KCA. Before I entered the field, I tried to pin 
down which aspects of KCA I was to focus on in the interviews, and my 
priorities (participation, decentralized management and decision making, and 
balancing conservation and development) are reflected in the interview guide 
(please refer to Appendix III) as well as in the actual interview transcriptions. 
More important still, in narrowing the scope of the case study and the amount 
of primary and secondary data to collect, are the theoretical choices I make 
when choosing points of focus for my research (Yin 2009:18). My theoretical 
approach is explained in Chapter 5. Here, it suffices to note that my theoretical 
focus on decentralization, participation, and power also framed my focus 
during the fieldwork process, although my theoretical understanding of the 
issues at hand has been greatly enhanced since I conducted the fieldwork 
nearly two years ago.  
The separation of case and context is also a matter of definitions; what is the 
context of the KCA if not the conservation area itself – with its people, 
landscapes, and wildlife? But these units of analysis also constitute my case. 
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Some of the choices I have made are consequences of my academic 
background and training: I have not focused on the wildlife and natural 
properties of the area itself (as I am no biologist). The wildlife and the 
conditions for the thriving of wildlife in KCA are thus part of the context in 
which my case study is situated. However, the natural surroundings 
profoundly affect the lives and opportunities of the people living in the area, 
and thus in turn my findings related to attitudes towards the conservation of 
biodiversity, human-wildlife conflicts, and the balancing of conservation and 
development interests. I am also not trained in agrarian studies, so livelihood 
options and consequences of these on land use and natural resource 
management are part of the context within which my case takes place, rather 
than part of the case to be studied itself. Thus, in addition to the theoretical 
choices I make, my academic disciplinary background (interdisciplinary 
development and environmental studies) inevitably frames my perspective 
when I study the case, and helps draw the line between case and context.  
4.1.2 Challenges of Case Study Research 
According to Yin (2009:2), a major challenge for case study researchers is that 
the researcher has more interesting variables than data points. This “weak 
empirical leverage” is a common critique of case studies from methodologists 
preferring other methods as well (Gerring 2007:6). According to Yin 
(2009:15): “the case study…does not represent a “sample”, and in doing a 
case study, your goal will be to expand and generalize theories (analytical 
generalization) and not enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)”. The 
aim of analytical generalization is to strengthen or weaken theoretical 
assumptions (in my case for instance links between the management 
framework and balancing of development and conservation concerns) through 
the application of case study findings, according to Yin (2009:39). George and 
Bennett (2005:17) point to the same feature of case studies when they reject 
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the “degrees of freedom problem” raised by a number of quantitatively 
inclined scholars having suggested that the main difference between case 
studies and statistical methods is the number of cases studied. They claim that 
a major advantage of case studies is the potential to derive new hypotheses, by 
not having to stick to a certain number of quantifiable variables (ibid:20-1).  
A response to the challenge of lack of data points can be to use triangulation to 
investigate the question at hand from different angles with different sources of 
evidence. Triangulation makes case study research hard, not soft, according to 
Yin (2009). My main method14 and the focus of my data collection efforts 
have been interviews, but I also use documents such as conservation laws, 
management rules and international guidelines and recommendations on 
nature conservation to complement and challenge findings from my 
interviews. Before I went to the field, I was also hoping to do non-participant 
observation of meetings in the Management Council of KCA, but this turned 
out to be unfeasible, as there were no council meetings during my fieldwork 
period. It would moreover have been a difficult task due to language issues. In 
addition to “formal” interviews, I have also talked with many inhabitants in 
the villages I have visited. Field notes based on these conversations and other 
observations in the field are also part of my data material. Although I see 
triangulation as something one should aspire to achieve, it is very demanding 
to conduct a study by using a wide range of different data collection methods. 
My focus has been on cross-checking facts, anecdotes and statements about 
practices as much as possible, but I did not aspire to spend equal time and 
effort on three different methods throughout the study.  
                                              
14 Yin (2009:11) categorizes case study as a method, and interviews and direct observations as “sources of 
evidence”. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) categorize interviews as part method, part craft, depending on the type. I 
prefer “method” over Yin’s “sources of evidence”, and will henceforth write about interviews and document 
analysis as methods within the larger framework of the case study. The latter denotes in my view the research 
project as a whole, more than a specific research method. This is also in line with Stake’s view that the “Case 
study is not a methodological choice, but a choice of object to be studied” (1994:236). 
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A final criticism directed at case studies is the assumption that it implies little 
attention to data collection, management and analysis (Gerring 2007:6). I meet 
this criticism by ensuring a thorough methodological consciousness and by 
describing carefully my data collection and analytical approaches throughout 
my thesis, thus enhancing the transparency and reproducibility of the study.   
4.2 Interviews 
The main research method I have employed to collect data is semi-structured 
interviews. The key focus areas of the interviews are reflected in the interview 
guide presented in Appendix III. I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews 
as this research method enables a structured conversation that nevertheless 
opens for improvisation and allows the interviewee to shed light on topics that 
are important to them. Thus, each interview is shaped by the interests, 
personality and organizational affiliation of the interviewee, as well as by my 
foci of interests; data is to a large extent produced in the interaction between 
interviewer and interviewee (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009:54).  
I used both snowball and purposive sampling to find interesting interviewees 
(Robson 2011:275-6). The purposive approach was used because I was 
predominantly interested in interviewing people involved in the management 
of KCA, and snowball sampling was necessary in order to physically locate 
potential interviewees in the area, especially in my search for KCA-MC 
members. Although convenient and in my case necessary, these sampling 
techniques are also potential sources of bias. Snowball sampling can for 
instance lead to bias if one is guided from one like-minded interviewee to 
another and so on. The purposive sampling of interviewees involved in 
management might moreover have led to a biased sample of overly positively 
(to conservation) inclined interviewees, for at least two potential reasons: 
those involved in management could initially be more in favor of the 
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establishment of KCA than those who have chosen not to participate; and 
those involved in management might have become more positive towards the 
project, regardless of their initial attitudes, for a variety of reasons such as 
more benefits received from the project (Parker and Thapa 2011) or exposure 
to management staff and conservation training. Thus, with regard to attitudes 
to the conservation area, it is likely that my sample of interviewees purely 
from those participating in management is not generalizable to the larger 
population. It should also be noted that the relatively powerful positions (as 
local conservation leaders) of those participating as interviewees in this study 
might affect the versions of reality they choose to present, so that representing 
such views in general terms as “local knowledge” might replicate dominant 
discourses (Gaventa and Cornwall 2006:126).  
Moreover, how representative a purposive sample depends to a large degree 
on the subjective judgments of the researcher (Overton and van Diermen 
2003:43). This is important to keep in mind when drawing conclusions and 
analyzing my findings, especially since analysis also might suffer from the 
researcher’s cognitive biases, for instance in favor of one’s causal analysis or 
initial theories (George and Bennet 2005:111), or the temptation to analyze 
events so that they favor a theory one wishes to “fit” the case with (Moses and 
Knutsen 2007:133). A final source of bias in this regard is the interaction 
between the interviewees and me – as an outsider, I could for instance be 
projected as someone involved in program planning, or at least as someone to 
whom it was important to portray KCA management in a positive light. I tried 
to counter such research-situation bias by underscoring my role as an 
independent master-student from Norway, with no leverage over donor 
support at all, in order to encourage straight, honest answers as best as I could.  
Evidently, one should strive to avoid bias and minimize errors when doing 
case studies (as in all other research), (Yin 2009:45). The reflections above are 
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an important first step. Moreover, I challenge or corroborate statements made 
by interviewees with information in the Management Rules (GoN 2008). Both 
corresponding and diverging evidence can provide useful insights enhancing 
the understanding of various aspects of the management of KCA.  
I interviewed 14 “non-professional” informants inside KCA (although one of 
them was the accountant of KCAP and KCA-MC), and I interviewed one 
female informant twice15. The gender, geographical location and management 
roles of these interviewees are summarized in Appendix II. I also conducted 
five interviews with a total of six “professional” informants, i.e. with 
informants working full-time with conservation and/or development issues. 
These interviews are summarized in Appendix I.  
The separation between professional and non-professional interviews in this 
case is not straightforward, and it is perhaps unfair to designate my informants 
in KCA as non-professional. All my informants were involved in the 
management of KCA in some way at some level or other, many had been so 
for many years, and many had also received conservation training either in 
KCA or elsewhere in Nepal. Seven of the informants were members of the 
Management Council at the time of research, although many of them saw their 
terms about to expire. The separation is however useful, as I will use the 
interviews conducted outside KCA primarily as background information, and 
treat those performed within KCA as the basis for my analysis. Moreover, the 
separation makes sense as all but one of my KCA informants were involved in 
KCA management on a voluntary basis, while all my informants from outside 
the area worked professionally with conservation and development in KCA or 
Nepal. Two of my professional informants also figure on my list of references 
                                              
15 I interviewed her both early and late in the research process, as I realized she was a key informant whom it 
would be useful to interview again after I had obtained a more comprehensive understanding of the management 
of KCA.  
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(Ghana Gurung and Nakul Chettri, from WWF Nepal and ICIMOD, 
respectively).  
A further difference between the professional and non-professional informants 
is that I expose the identities of my professional informants (I obtained their 
permission to do so). In fact, none of my KCA informants insisted on 
anonymity and were willing to be cited with names, but I have nevertheless 
chosen not to list their names in the tables or in any appendices. People 
knowing the area well might however be able to identify many of my 
informants, as for instance the membership in KCA-MC is quite narrow. Since 
my informants did not stress anonymity, I have not taken pains to disguise 
their identities. This has eased the presentation of data and most likely 
enhanced my analysis as well, since the geographical particularities of each 
village I visited have consequences for livelihood options and conservation 
challenges, and consequently for how the inhabitants have responded to my 
inquiries. It would have hampered my analysis if I, in order to further disguise 
informants’ identities, had had to omit coupling informant statements with 
their geographical origin. An option could have been to create artificial names 
for the villages I visited, but again due to the size and light population density 
of the study area, it would have been transparent for knowledgeable readers. 
It should be noted that all professional interviews were audio-recorded, and 
subsequently transcribed by myself. I also recorded and transcribed most of 
the interviews conducted inside KCA, except the first five interviews done in 
Lelep. I thought it should be possible to do these interviews without a recorder 
(since everything was being interpreted, the “pace” of these interviews was no 
doubt slower than those conducted in English without interpretation), and I 
was also concerned about how the presence of a recorder would influence my 
interviewees. I soon learned that I was in danger of losing parts of the answers 
without recording them, and also that most interviewees would not be put off 
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by having a recorder on the table, so I chose to conduct the rest of the KCA 
interviews “on the record”.  
About 92 different languages are officially recognized in Nepal (Yadava 
2007). Most members of the several ethnic groups residing in KCA also speak 
the official language Nepali, as did my guide-come-interpreter, but in KCA, it 
is usually their second language, the first being for instance Gurung, Limbu, 
Rai, Sherpa, Tamang or Tibetan (Gurung 2006:61). I, however, speak no 
Nepali languages, and this was of course a huge hindrance in the field. It made 
participant observation virtually impossible, and it was a huge challenge in the 
conducting of in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews as well. One 
motivation for doing in-depth interviews is to obtain so-called “thick 
descriptions”16 of the events or relationships one is studying (Brockington and 
Sullivan 2003:72). To do this through an inexperienced interpreter is however 
highly challenging. I quickly understood that much of what could have 
constituted thick descriptions, such as undertone, body language and other 
features of the context around the answers, as well as parts of the actual 
answers themselves, got lost in translation. It was also a challenge in the 
beginning to get acquainted with the different terms used in Nepali for central 
features of the management structure of KCA, such as User Groups and 
Mothers Groups. But the depth and coherence of the interpreted answers 
improved as both I and my interpreter got more experienced.  
A last issue related to language and interpretation is the role of the interpreter 
himself, and whether this can be a source of bias. I got in contact with my 
interpreter through a fellow acquaintance in Kathmandu. He is a resident of 
Kathmandu, of Newari origin, and with no prior interest in the geographical 
                                              
16 ”Thick description” as used by Geertz in his influential essay Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive 
Theory of Culture (in The Interpretation of Cultures (2000 [1973]), is a way of doing ethnographic research by 
paying extensive attention to the social or cultural context of the phenomenon one is studying, and not only the 
raw observable behavior.  
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area of study. The only obvious link between him and the focus of study is his 
past experience as an employee at one of the big tourist lodges in Chitwan 
National Park. I did not experience him interfering in the interview process 
itself, and I have no impression of him shaping the answers of my 
interviewees when he interpreted for me. I can of course not rule this out 
definitively, but there is on the other hand no reason to believe that the 
interpreter was a source of bias.  
4.2.1 Theoretical analysis of qualitative data 
In this thesis, I predominantly look at my data through a theoretical lens, 
aiming at increasing the theoretical understanding of participation, 
decentralization and power in conservation management through analysis of 
one particular case. It should be noted that the focus of my interviews when I 
conducted them was shaped by my initial interest in the practical arrangement 
of management of KCA after the handover to local communities in 2006. 
Therefore, many of my interview questions centered on practicalities such as 
how the management plan was put together, how often the meetings were 
held, and what was discussed. This came on top of questions related to how 
decisions are made, the role of external actors, balancing of development and 
conservation and so on. In my analysis I focus more on critical aspects of 
participation such as local people’s partaking in decision-making processes 
and the external conditions for the extent of decentralization. I do this while 
acknowledging the problems related to theoretical analysis of interviews when 
my theoretical understanding has developed since the interview phase of my 
research (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009:239). I conducted the interviews in the 
spring of 2012, while the thesis predominantly has been written during the 
spring of 201417. Naturally, my theoretical understanding and knowledge of 
                                              
17 I had a one-year temporary contract in-between. 
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the field have expanded quite substantially as I have learnt and read more 
theory.  
The above-mentioned concerns notwithstanding, my data collection was to 
some extent informed by two theoretical propositions I had before I conducted 
fieldwork. They are presented in sub-chapter 6.1, and part of my analysis 
center on these propositions. This is one of several general strategies of 
analyzing case study evidence put forward by Yin (2009:130). Yin also notes 
that the analytical stage of case studies is among the least-developed and most 
difficult aspects of the case study method; analysis of case study evidence has 
few fixed formulas that researchers can follow (ibid:127).  
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) discuss several different ways of analyzing 
qualitative data from research interviews, such as discourse analysis, narrative 
analysis, linguistic analysis and deconstruction, as well as those analytic 
approaches focusing on meaning and interpretation of meaning. Because of 
the issues related to translation discussed above, I find it difficult to see text- 
and language-oriented analysis as appropriate in this thesis. Discourse analysis 
on how interviewees understand “conservation”, “development” or 
“participation”, or on how nature is valued by the informants, could no doubt 
have been interesting, but such questions were not what I had in mind when I 
drafted the research questions. It would have required more in-depth 
interviews and a more direct word-by-word translation than what I had 
resources to obtain. Instead, I focus on what theoretical insights can be drawn 
from the interviews, and how the information provided in the interviews 
relates to and complements other sources such as the Management Rules, as 
well as to research conducted by other scholars. The overall aim will thus be 
to compare my findings to the broader theoretical and empirical literature on 
participation and decentralization of natural resource and conservation 
management.  
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George and Bennet (2005:116) write about the difficulty of theory-testing 
based on case studies, and how it partially depends on the causal assumptions 
in the theories. It is easier to test theories that posit simple causal relations; 
such theories can be falsified by a single case that does not fit the theory. The 
theories that are hardest to empirically test are those “that involve the most 
complex types of causal relations, or what might be called “enigmatic” 
causality: complex interactions among numerous variables, low-probability 
relations between variables, and endogeneity problems or feedback effects.” I 
am of the opinion that it is safe to argue that the theoretical propositions on 
decentralization offered in the next chapter are of the latter kind; the 
occurrence and extent of decentralization policies and reforms can be 
conditioned by a wide range of actors and factors, and their consequences for 
conservation and natural resource management are not straight-forwardly 
explained by the theory. To explore this complexity is one motivation for 
doing this study.  
4.3 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical considerations are an important aspect of all scientific research, 
especially when the research involves people (Robson 2011:194). Kvale and 
Brinkmann (2009:70) point out four main ethical issues confronting 
qualitative researchers, what they call fields of ethical uncertainty: Informed 
consent, confidentiality, consequences and the role of the researcher. They 
argue that “moral rules, guidelines, and principles should not be applied 
mechanically, for there are always situational factors that determine when and 
how they are morally relevant”. They view research ethics pragmatically, 
rather than something that should be governed by strict rules or guidelines or 
abstract theories. If one accepts this pragmatic view of ethics in research, 
where ethical dilemmas should be investigated contextually, it follows that 
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ethical behavior in interview-based research is something one has to learn, 
from practice and from colleagues.  
Reflections are however possible and necessary before one initiates a research 
project. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009:68-9) provide a list of questions one can 
ask oneself as a researcher before heading out to conduct interviews. Their list 
covers their fields of ethical uncertainty, and they hold that instead of viewing 
the list of questions as a checklist to go through and settle before interviews 
are conducted, they are “problem areas that should continually be addressed 
and reflected upon throughout an interview inquiry” (ibid:69). The questions I 
regarded as most relevant for my research before, during and after conducting 
fieldwork are as follows:  
1. What are the beneficial consequences of the study?  
The potential beneficial consequences of my study are indeed part of the 
rationale for the project in the first place. Scheyvens et al. (2003:139) claim 
that development studies research should be informed by a moral imperative 
that goes beyond the minimum to ‘do no harm’: “ethical research should not 
only ‘do no harm’, but also have potential ‘to do good,’ to involve 
‘empowerment’” (Madge 1997:114, cited in Scheyvens et al. 2003:139). I 
hope to through my research to contribute to the body of scientific knowledge 
about participatory conservation. Depending on the degree of dissemination of 
findings, and the findings themselves, one can hope that the study will better 
the management of conservation areas in Nepal and the model of Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP), and thus both enhancing the 
possibilities of local socio-economic development and bio-diversity 
conservation, as well as the meaningful involvement of and empowerment of 
the local communities of KCA. But even if my research findings are published 
internationally and read by involved policymakers or stakeholders, such as 
WWF Nepal workers (which, to be fair, is unlikely for a master thesis), it is 
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not very likely that it will have a huge effect on Nepali conservation policy 
and the management of KCA.  
2. How can the study contribute to enhancing the situation of the 
participating subjects, the group they represent, or the human condition 
overall?  
The participating subjects enhance their situation through awareness-raising of 
their own condition, and their role in conservation efforts in CAs in Nepal. 
This knowledge might empower them to take actions they otherwise would 
not have taken, such as trying to join the Management Council or other 
important management bodies of the KCA. But again, one should be modest 
when assessing potential benefits of the research for those involved in it. 
Scheyvens et al. (2003:155) claim that the research usually benefits the 
researcher much more than the informants. Prior to each interview, I also tried 
to stress that the interviewee should not expect any benefits arising from their 
participation in the study18, and I did not provide any gifts or the like to 
interviewees. This is a contested issue in research ethics in development 
countries (Scheyvens et al. 2003:157). 
3. How can informed consent from the participants be obtained? and 4. 
How much information about the study needs to be given in advance, 
and what can wait until the debrief after the interview? 
These are fundamental ethical questions important for all research involving 
human subjects. Prior to each interview, my interpreter explained the context 
of my topic, my role as a Norwegian master’s student, and why I wanted to 
talk to the interviewee. I also gained consent from the interviewee that he or 
she wished to take part in the study, and that I could use the data for my thesis 
                                              
18 When interviewing inhabitants in KCA, a recurring theme was the lack of tourism influx they felt hampered the 
development of the area, and many stressed that they hoped that getting information about Kangchenjunga out 
would help promote it as a tourist destination. I had again and again to underscore that I could not help them in 
promoting the area as a tourist destination through my thesis, but that I at least could tell friends and family in 
Nepal and Norway about the beauty of their homeland. 
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afterwards. Usually, towards the end of the interview, the conversation drifted 
off into more general talk about KCA, my project and other stories from the 
life of the interviewee, which provided a context and opportunity to explain in 
more depth what my project was about post-interviewing.  
5. How can the confidentiality of the interview subjects be protected? and 
6.  How important is the anonymity of the subjects?  
I transcribed all the interviews myself, and no one but me has seen my raw 
data, which has been securely kept on my personal computer and remote 
online hard drive. As explained in the sub-chapter on interviews, anonymity 
was not a concern for my interviewees, but despite this, I have chosen not to 
reveal the identities of my non-professional informants. This is in contrast to 
research done in the area a few years earlier, when the Maoist insurgency was 
still going on. For instance, Gurung writes that mistrust among villagers and a 
tendency to avoid contact with outsiders was observed when he conducted 
research in the area in 2004 (Gurung 2006:7). As a consequence of the 
security situation, he had to hire research assistants to conduct the interviews 
with informants residing within KCA. Clearly, the security situation now is 
very different from how it was until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was 
signed in 2006, and the Maoists entered parliamentary politics with the 
elections to the first Constituent Assembly in 2008. I also believe that the 
enhanced security situation in Nepal has minimized the potential risk of 
physical harm for the research subjects. 
7.  How will the role of the researcher affect the study?  
I am aware of the potential bias stemming from my initial optimistic attitude 
towards both ACAP and KCA (partly coming from my initial contact with 
WWF Nepal workers, “co-optation from above” as Kvale and Brinkmann 
(2009:74) call it), but I believe it can be countered as long as I am aware of it 
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and reflect upon it, and do not let it influence my analysis. I have no formal 
ties neither WWF Nepal nor other relevant organizations or actors in the area.  
4.4 Fieldwork 
During the spring of 2012, I was in Nepal from late March to mid-July, 
spending most of my time in Kathmandu, preparing for fieldwork and 
conducting a few interviews with informants in organizations based in 
Kathmandu (WWF Nepal, IUCN Nepal and ICIMOD). I tried several times to 
depart for Kangchenjunga Conservation Area in early May, but I was hindered 
by bandhs19 locking down the capital as well as parts of the countryside as the 
political situation in the country grew more intense in anticipation of the May 
26 deadline for the Constituent Assembly to agree on Nepal’s new 
constitution. This postponed my departure to May 18. It was unfortunate 
because it pushed the departure closer to the beginning of the monsoon season, 
which is both a period where mountain trekking naturally is less comfortable 
than in the dry season, and a very busy time for farmers in Nepal20.  
To reach KCA from Kathmandu, there are several options, but all require a 
long journey. I flew from Kathmandu to Bhadrapur, a border town in southeast 
Nepal. I met my interpreter-guide in the nearby district center of Birtamod, 
from where we boarded a jeep taking us to the Taplejung district capital, 
Taplejung Bazaar (240 km through Illam district up to the hilly regions). We 
reached the Bazaar early in the morning on the 19th. I spent two days there, 
interviewing the WWF officer at the district headquarters, together with the 
                                              
19 Bandhs are general strikes imposed by political parties or other groups, trying to stop travel and commercial 
activity in the area where the bandh is called for as a political protest related to one political development or 
other.  
20 Nepali author and essayist Manjushree Thapa explains in her essay ”Nepal’s Political Rainy Season” (Thapa 
2011) why most of the country’s big political events have taken place in the spring. This is because Nepal’s 
farmers, the biggest and thus politically most important group in the country, are too busy to be engaged in rallies 
and other political events in the monsoon and in the ”festival season” of the autumn. To avoid being a nuisance to 
my interviewees, I also wished to avoid the monsoon period.  
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warden stationed there from the Department of National Parks and Wildlife 
Conservation. Initially they would not let me conduct the study without a 
research permit21, but conceded to grant me permission to enter KCA on a 
normal trekking permit as long as I did not collect plant or animal samples. 
From Taplejung Bazaar it is one day’s walk to reach the border of the 
Conservation Area, and we had to stay overnight in the village of Sinwa 
before we reached Lelep on the 21st of May. Lelep is one of the biggest 
villages in KCA, the center of Lelep VDC, and it hosts the headquarters of the 
Kangchenjunga Conservation Area Project and the office of KCA-MC. We 
stayed several days in Lelep, also visiting the villages Lawajen and Lungthung 
in the vicinity. We then continued north along the main trekking route to the 
village of Ghunsa, one of the highest permanent settlements in KCA and one 
of the few where tourism is an important livelihood strategy (Gurung 
2006:66), before crossing a high-mountain pass to Olangchung Gola. 
Olangchung Gola is a Tibetan settlement close to the border with China 
(Autonomous Region of Tibet), and the biggest village in Olangchung Gola 
VDC. After several days in Olangchung Gola, we returned to Lelep, before 
spending a couple of days in Tapethok, the village center of Tapethok VDC at 
the outskirts of KCA and at lower elevations than the other villages we stayed 
in. Finally, we went back to Taplejung Bazaar for the return journey to 
Kathmandu.  
The two main challenges that influenced my fieldwork and data collection to a 
large extent were language and the geography and demography of the study 
area. I discussed the issue of interpretation in the previous subchapter on 
                                              
21 Trekking permits are requested from all tourists to enter most mountain areas in Nepal where trekking is 
common. I tried to obtain a research permit at the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation 
(DNPWC) in Kathmandu before I left for KCA, but after several enquiries both there and in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, I realized that a research permit would take about four months to acquire, and would probably 
not be needed as long as I went with a guide from a trekking company on a normal trekking permit. To this story 
I also need to add that the time I was in Nepal was a turbulent one, with many bandhs, which came on top of the 
already heavily burdened and little effective Nepali bureaucracy.  
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interviews. The other main challenge I encountered was the topography and 
demography of the study area itself. This is illustrated by the amount of time I 
spent walking from village to village during the 22 days of fieldwork inside 
KCA - my interpreter and myself walked some 60 hours in total between the 
different villages – sometimes spending a whole day on the trails to make a 
single interview. We spanned elevations between around 850 to 4900 meters 
above sea level. This challenge became even more profound as it could be 
difficult to get coherent and consistent information on where the intended 
interviewees actually resided at the time of my visit22, and whether or not they 
would be in KCA at all23. It was also virtually impossible to schedule 
interviews in advance, as there was no mobile phone reception in the area at 
the time of my visit.  
Before I made preliminary interviews with informants in the WWF 
headquarters in Nepal, I was of the impression that the Management Council 
members lived and worked at the KCA headquarters in Lelep, and I was 
therefore planning for and hoping to interview all MC members. This turned 
out to be impossible. As all positions in the Management Council and other 
bodies of KCA are voluntary, their members are also spread out living in their 
respective villages in the Conservation Area. I therefore had to change plans at 
short notice, and I had to be flexible and adaptive throughout the research 
period.  
When I conducted interviews, it only rarely happened that I was alone with the 
interviewee and the interpreter. More often, there was a gathering of people in 
the room or courtyard where we spoke – partly because most people I met 
                                              
22 An illustrating example of this was when I was supposed to interview an MC member who I was told lived in 
Lawajen, a village neighboring Lelep. When we reached Lawajen, we were told that there was no MC member 
currently living there, but that we could possibly meet another member in Lunghtung, further up the valley. We 
ended up conducting an interview in Lunghtung, albeit with another interviewee than intended, and returned to 
Lelep long after nightfall. This is a good example of convenient sampling (Overton and van Diermen 2003:43). 
23 Many of the more wealthy inhabitants of KCA now live part-time in Taplejung Bazaar or even in Kathmandu. 
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were curious about me and my project, and partly simply because we most 
often conducted interviews where many people live and work together. On 
several occasions, I was of the impression that this might have had an effect 
on the confidence of the interviewees, for instance if an authoritative person, 
such as the father-in-law or the village medical worker, was present. This 
could for example be noticeable through side-glances and hesitations during 
the answers. It is however hard to tell whether it actually influenced the 
answers, but sometimes it clearly did; when the other people in the room 
interfered in the interview and I had to struggle to clarify whether the answers 
I got through the interpreter actually originated from the interviewee, or from 
some of the bystanders. Sometimes it was just a nuisance that affected the 
flow of the interview and the quality of the audio recordings (if children or 
siblings were in the room, the interviewee had to breastfeed or attend to food 
in preparation etc.).    
As a final note on my fieldwork experiences, I want to point out that the 
realization that council members resided all around the conservation area 
forced me to visit many different villages, observing a much larger part of the 
KCA than initially intended. This gave me a more thorough understanding of 
the different physical conditions people in the area have to cope with in their 
daily lives, and the corresponding livelihood options they choose to pursue. It 
also gave me the opportunity to more fully enjoy the beauty of the 
Conservation Area, stretching from lush, thick temperate forests at lower 
elevations in the deep river valleys, to high-altitude pastures and mountain 
landscapes around Ghunsa and Olangchung Gola. I also witnessed firsthand 
the cultural diversity of the area, as I met, spoke with and stayed in the homes 
of Tibetan Buddhists, Limbus worshipping their ancient Kirat deities, as well 
as Sherpas trying to carve out a living based on tourism income. The totality 
of this experience has, perhaps obviously, been a huge inspiration for me 
throughout my time working with this thesis.  
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5. Participation, Decentralization and Power 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework on which I base my analysis. 
Just as scientific forestry managers in 18th century Germany looked at forests 
with a tunnel vision through a narrow fiscal lens (Scott 1998:11), so has 
conservation scientists tended to “perceive ecosystems through the narrow 
window of their own professional discipline (Pimbert and Pretty 1997:299). 
As my academic background is multidisciplinary, I use theoretical insights 
from various disciplines in this thesis, thus trying to broaden my field of 
vision, rather than narrowing it. The usefulness of an inter-or multidisciplinary 
approach in the development and environmental field has been defended by 
many scholars, despite the inherent problems of interdisciplinary research 
(McNeill 1999, Lele 2011).  
Because this case study is largely about participation in an integrated 
conservation and development program, with focus on management of natural 
resources, I find it useful to discuss theories on both participatory approaches 
to development and decentralized natural resource management. First, I look 
into theories on local participation in development projects (5.1), focusing on 
White’s (1996) four forms of participation and Arnstein’s (1969) levels of 
participation. I then analyze decentralization as a strategy in protected area and 
natural resource management (5.2), with emphasis on devolution of power, 
decision-making and accountability mechanisms. I also touch upon the theory 
of common pool resources (5.3) (Ostrom 1990), discussing whether it is a 
useful theory in the analysis of protected area management in contrast to 
general analysis of natural resource management institutions to which it is 
more often applied. Lastly, I present one contribution to power analysis (5.4) 
(Gaventa 2006), which adds the dimension of spaces to the more conventional 
dimensions of forms and levels of power. Towards the end of the chapter, I 
describe how I link these theoretical contributions together in later chapters. 
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Overall, my aim will not be to cover all aspects of the theories mentioned 
above, but rather extract those that are relevant to the analysis of my case.  
5.1 The Politics of Participation  
Participatory approaches to development became a widely adopted strategy of 
NGOs, donors and international organizations in the 1980s (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001:5). It has been promoted for different reasons, but its advocates 
can largely be separated into two different, but overlapping schools; those 
promoting participation for instrumental reasons of efficiency (due to the 
shortcomings of top-down approaches to development and ineffectiveness of 
external and expert-oriented research and planning (Cooke and Kothari 
2001:5)) and cost-reduction (White 1996, Pimbert and Pretty 1997:308); and 
those who view participation as a fundamental right (Pretty 1995:1251, 
Khadka and Nepal 2010:352) or as means to involve marginalized people in 
decision-making concerning their own lives (Cooke and Kothari 2001:5). 
Robert Chambers outlines three uses of participation; as a cosmetic label; as 
co-opting practice to mobilize local labor and reduce costs; and as an 
empowering process “which enables people to do their own analysis, to take 
command, to gain in confidence, and to make their own decisions” (Chambers 
1994:2). Involving more people in decision-making processes is moreover 
recognized as important in the context of scientific uncertainties in the field of 
environmental processes and people-environmental change (Jeanrenaud 
2002:17)24.  
Just as I described sustainable development as a “buzzword” and a malleable 
concept in Chapter 2, participation can also be described in similar terms (Leal 
                                              
24 This becomes even more pertinent if one accepts that the production and presentation of environmental 
scientific knowledge also are shaped by political processes (Forsyth 2003:266), or accepts, the perhaps less 
radical, argument that “Environmental issues do not only become so (if at all) because of ontologically real 
changes in nature, but because they are constructed by social processes, successfully represented and launched” 
(Blaikie 1999:133).  
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2007, Cornwall 2008:269), or perhaps even as an “essentially contested 
concept”. Since participation means different things to different people and 
actors, the term itself should not be accepted without appropriate 
qualifications (Pimbert and Pretty 1997:308). It is perhaps a too broad concept 
to be clearly defined in a meaningful or operational manner, but several efforts 
have been made to create different typologies of participation, focusing on for 
instance forms (White 1996), levels (Arnstein 1969) or types (Pretty 1995). I 
explore the two first ones more in depth because the aspect of power is 
explicitly featured in these. This makes them better suited for my analysis, and 
they also complement the other theoretical contributions in this chapter. A 
slightly different version of Pretty’s (1995) typology is presented in Pimbert 
and Pretty (1997); I comment briefly on this towards the end of this segment.  
White (1996) argues that participation must be seen as political. It can be a 
vehicle for empowerment and changing patterns of dominance, but it can also 
be used as means for entrenching or reproducing existing power relations. 
White describes four forms of participation, and links them to the interests of 
those promoting them, those participating in the projects, and the function they 
serve. The forms are nominal, instrumental, representative and transformative 
participation. White discusses the level less, but notes that involvement of 
local people in implementation of projects is not enough: “For a fully 
participatory project, they should also take part in management and decision-
making” (White 1996:7). In the table below, White’s forms are coupled with 
the interests of those engaging in the various forms of participation, as well as 
with the function such forms play. White (1996:8) notes that these forms 
rarely appear in the true forms of her analytical device, and that the interests of 
the participants and initiating institutions can be varied, mixed and changing.   
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Table 2: Interests in participation  
Form Top-Down Bottom-Up Function 
Nominal Legitimation Inclusion Display 
Instrumental Efficiency Cost Means 
Representative Sustainability Leverage Voice 
Transformative Empowerment Empowerment Means/End 
Source: White (1996)  
Nominal participation is mainly used for legitimation reasons on behalf of 
those promoting it, and participation in such schemes might be chosen for the 
sake of inclusion, and perhaps to gain some material benefits associated with 
for instance a user group. Pimbert and Pretty (1997:308) write that 
participation in conservation until the 1970s was “no more than a public 
relations exercise”, corresponding to White’s nominal form of legitimation for 
display. Instrumental participation is for the sake of efficiency, for example 
through reducing costs for the donor or implementing organization. This type 
of participation is according to White (1996:8) often seen as a cost for those 
participating – they have to provide time and labor. Representative 
participation provides the participants with a voice and leverage in shaping the 
project, and is pursued from the managers for sake of sustainability: to ensure 
that one does not try to implement a project its beneficiaries would be un-
interesting in maintaining, for instance. Transformative participation is the 
most profound type, aiming at empowering the participants. 
A much older typology of participation can be found in Arnstein’s (1969) 
article about citizen participation in city planning in the United States. In the 
article, she sets up a typology of eight levels of participation, ranging from the 
non-participatory practices of therapy and manipulation, through token forms 
of participation such as consulting or informing, to various degrees of citizen 
power in partnerships, delegated power and ultimately citizen control.  
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Table 3: A Ladder of Participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arnstein argues that participation is about power and power-sharing: 
“participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating 
process for the powerless. It allows the power-holders to claim that all sides 
were considered, but makes it possible for only some of those sides to benefit. 
It maintains the status quo” (Arnstein 1969:216). Arnstein writes that 
manipulation is used as “public relations vehicle” for those in power 
(ibid:218). This is similar to the function of display in White’s nominal form 
of participation, and to Pimbert and Pretty’s (1997) diagnosis of participation 
in conservation in the 1970s. Informing can according to Arnstein be an 
important first step on the way towards legitimate citizen participation, but it 
is one-way communication and not participation per se. Consultation is one 
step above informing on the ladder, but will still be “a sham” if not combined 
with other modes of participation, since there is no assurance that the input 
from and concerns raised by the citizens will be taken into account (ibid:219). 
Placation, the last step on the ladder before citizen power, can provide citizens 
with some influence, but it depends on the accountability relationships, 
according to Arnstein (1969:220). Lastly, there are three levels of citizen 
power, in participation characterized as partnerships, delegated power and 
citizen control, all differentiated by the degree to which power is redistributed. 
Steps on the ladder Characteristic 
Citizen control 
Delegated power 
Partnership 
 
Degrees of citizen power 
Placation 
Consultation 
Informing 
 
Degrees of tokenism 
Therapy 
Manipulation 
 Non - participation 
Source: Arnstein (1969) 
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Of these contributions, Pretty (1995) is perhaps the least political, and his 
article focuses specifically on participation and learning in agricultural 
development. His typology ranges from “manipulative participation” to “self-
mobilization”. Pretty has a less explicit focus on power than the other authors: 
even the most far-reaching type of participation in his typology, self-
mobilization, “may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and 
power” (1995:1252). This is in contrast to White’s view on participation as a 
political issue (White 1996:14), where her most radical form of participation, 
transformative participation, has empowerment of those involved as the 
motivation both for the institution backing the project in question and the 
beneficiaries (1996:9). In this regard she also notes the inherent contradiction 
in top-down commitment to other people’s empowerment; empowerment of 
the beneficiaries might challenge the power relationship between them and the 
donor organization, and turn projects in a direction that is against the will of 
the donor. She therefore claims that for such commitment to empowerment to 
be genuine, “the process must be transformative, not only for the ‘weaker’ 
partner but also for the outside agency and for the relationship between them” 
(ibid:13).  
Arnstein (1969) is also explicit in her view of power relationships at different 
levels of participation: the higher up on her ladder, the more power and 
decision-making authority in the hands of the citizens at the expense of the 
traditional power-holders in society. It is perhaps worth noting that Arnstein’s 
power analysis can seem a bit archaic today, with its simplistic dichotomy 
between those who hold power and those who do not. In such a situation, one 
can look at power-sharing and power redistribution as a zero-sum game, where 
the powerless take power from the powerholders as they move up the ladder. I 
still find her ladder useful in its clarity, and to Arnstein’s defense, beside the 
fact that she is an early theorist on the matter, she admits that “neither the 
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have-nots nor the powerholders are homogenous blocs”, and that have-nots 
and powerholders are simplistic abstractions (1969:217). 
Pimbert and Pretty (1997) provide a similar, but slightly different, typology to 
the one presented in Pretty (1995), which is explicitly used in the context of 
participation in conservation. Their seven-laddered typology ranges from 
passive participation to self-mobilization, and they hold that only beginning at 
the fifth type is meaningful in participatory conservation. The first four ones 
“can be employed, knowing they will not lead to action”, while “If the 
objective is to achieve sustainable conservation, then nothing less than 
functional participation will suffice” (Pimbert and Pretty 1997:308, emphasis 
added). In “functional participation”, people form groups “to meet 
predetermined objectives related to the project, which can involve the 
development or promotion of externally initiated social organization” 
(ibid:309). The next step, interactive participation, involves local people 
taking control over local decisions, which according to the authors means that 
these local actors have a stake in maintaining structures and practices (ibid.). 
Self-mobilization involves independent initiatives, but not necessarily 
challenges to existing power-distributions, similar to Pretty (1995).   
In sum, participatory approaches to development and conservation can both be 
viewed as an instrumental strategy to increase the efficiency and legitimacy of 
development and environmental policies and programs “on the ground”, and 
as a value in and of itself and a consequence of the spread of democratic 
ideals. The typologies provided in this section are at least implicitly normative 
in that they regard “higher” levels of participation, with or without power 
redistribution, to be better than “lower” levels. In the analysis, I will take 
Pimbert and Pretty’s (1997) advice not accept claims about un-specified 
participation at face value, and will make use of the typologies presented 
above in the analysis of what participation in KCA management entails and 
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means in the context of decentralized management. I now turn to the next 
central concept in this thesis, namely decentralization in natural resource and 
conservation management. As we shall see, this is a field informed by many 
different theoretical contributions.  
5.2 Decentralization of Natural Resource and 
Conservation Management  
Decentralization has emerged as a strategy of achieving development goals 
and providing public services in a large number of developing countries 
(Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). It can also be understood as institutional reforms 
in response to fiscal crisis in the 1980s and collapse of socialist economies 
since 1989 (Ribot et al. 2006:1864). Importantly for my case, decentralization 
has become a significant strategy of environmental decision-making in many 
countries (Ribot 2002, Fauchald and Gulbrandsen 2012). 
It is especially pertinent to look at decentralization when writing about 
development and natural resource management in Nepal, as the country is seen 
as an innovative leader in initiating decentralization reforms (Ribot et al. 
(2006:1867). Decentralization efforts in Nepal emerged as a central feature of 
the country’s development strategy already in the 1960s (Bienen et al. 
1990:63, Dhungel et al. 2011:39), and it became important in its forestry 
sector in the 1970s (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001:499). Decentralization in the 
conservation sector started in the 1980s, and continued in the 1990s with 
increased focus on local involvement in conservation management in 
Annapurna Conservation Area and the establishment of buffer zones around 
national parks (Heinen and Shrestha 2007, Budhathoki 2011, Parker and 
Thapa 2011).  
Decentralization is by Agrawal and Ribot defined as “any political act in 
which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at 
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lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy” 
(1999:475)25. They further refine the definition by distinguishing between 
deconcentration or administrative decentralization on the one hand and 
political or democratic decentralization on the other hand:  
Deconcentration (…) is said to occur when powers are devolved to 
appointees of the central government in the local arena. In contrast, 
political decentralization (…) involves the transfer of power to actors 
or institutions that are accountable to the population in their 
jurisdiction. Typically, elections are seen as the mechanism that ensures 
this accountability (Agrawal and Ribot 1999:475).   
Thus, deconcentration involves upwards accountability, while political 
decentralization involves downward accountability to local constituents. 
Privatization, although often carried out in the name of decentralization, 
cannot be regarded as decentralization, as it is based on the logic of exclusion, 
rather than the inclusionary logic of decentralization (Ribot 2004:9). A central 
theoretical proposition in favor of decentralization is that the decisions made 
by representative local authorities that are accountable to the local population 
and have discretionary powers are more effective and equitable than if the 
decisions were made by central authorities (Ribot 2004:1). Discretionary 
powers to take decisions without seeking approval from superiors are key to 
the responsiveness of local authorities. Lack of it is said to weaken the 
downward accountability (Ribot et al. 2006:1866).  
Agrawal and Ostrom (2001:488) define decentralization in the context of 
natural resource management as “any act by which a central government cedes 
rights of decision making over resources to actors and institutions at lower 
levels in a politico-administrative and territorial hierarchy”. They moreover 
argue that successful decentralization in this field usually results in the 
                                              
25 It is worth noting, that formal transfer of power might sometimes amount to centralizing if the powers devolved 
were earlier wielded informally by non-state actors (Ribot 2004:134).   
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creation of new commons, precisely the opposite development of what Hardin 
asked for in his (in)famous article (Hardin 1968)26. Their article analyzes 
different types of property rights over resource-use, focusing on withdrawal, 
management, exclusion and alienation as particularly important. The right to 
enter an area and withdraw physical resource units from it can be exercised 
individually if such a right is granted to the individual, but management rights 
to regulate use, exclusion rights over withdrawal, and alienation, e.g. the right 
to sell or lease the other above mentioned resource-use property rights, 
demand that the rights-holders operate at a collective-choice level of analysis, 
according to Agrawal and Ostrom (2001:489). The rules that in turn grant 
them the authority to take such decisions (i.e. the legislative powers around 
resource use) can be made by a central government or locally (ibid.). Agrawal 
and Ostrom provide an interesting framework for assessing the degree of 
decentralization, as well as for analyzing how different resource use property 
rights have consequences for the use and management of natural resources.  
In order to properly analyze the extent of decentralization reforms of natural 
resource management, Agrawal and Ribot (1999:476) suggest that one has to 
understand the underlying dimensions of actors, powers and accountability. 
They distinguish between four types of decision-making powers relevant in 
this context: 1) the power to create new rules or modify old ones (legislative 
power), 2) the power to make decisions about how to use a specific resource 
and 3) the power to implement and ensure compliance to the new or altered 
rules (executive powers), and 4) the power to adjudicate disputes related to 
these rules and compliance with them (judiciary power) (ibid.).  
                                              
26 Common pool resources (CPR) theory (explained in 5.3) can be described as counter-theory to the ideas of the 
“tragedy of the commons”, developed among others by the biologist Hardin (1968). The central thesis in that 
strand of thinking was precisely the inability of individual resource-users to take decisions about resource use that 
aggregated would produce a sustainable outcome. This thus would lead to depletion of commons that under other 
institutional arrangements could have been harvested ad infinitum. To avoid such an outcome, Hardin argues in 
favor either of public ownership with allocated user rights or private ownership, i.e. the opposite of what Agrawal 
and Ostrom (2001) argue in favor of.  Ribot (2002, 2004) also argues against privatization of public resources. 
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Ribot (2002) suggests that three elements are needed to ensure 
successful/effective decentralization reforms. As mentioned above, downward 
accountability mechanisms must be in place. Secondly, the powers devolved 
must be discreet powers; i.e., the actors wielding such powers must be allowed 
to take decisions without asking superiors for approval at every turn. A final 
condition for successful decentralization reforms is secure rights, as opposed 
to insecure privileges. The decision making powers of local decision makers 
must be viewed by them and the local population they represent as secure 
rights that cannot be taken away by central authorities with a whim (and they 
must be treated as such by those central authorities). If not, the local 
population and decision-making authorities will not invest in the responsible 
exercise of power (Ribot 2002:6).   
Interestingly, decentralization is often justified using similar arguments as 
those employed to argue for participation in development projects, and can 
also be organized in instrumental and intrinsic arguments. Just as 
“participation” can be heralded for public relations purposes and display 
(Arnstein 1969, Chambers 1994, White 1996, Pimbert and Pretty 1997), are 
acts of decentralization sometimes performed by governments to appease 
donors, NGOs or domestic constituencies (Agrawal and Ribot 1999:474). But 
political decentralization by definition involves transfer of power, and there is 
thus often an explicit aspiration of democratization in arguments in favor of it: 
“At its most basic, decentralization aims to achieve one of the central 
aspirations of just political governance: democratization, or the desire that 
humans should have a say in their own affairs” (Agrawal and Ostrom 
2001:487). Ribot (2002:4) boldly states that effective democratic/political 
decentralization “is local democracy”. Decentralization can moreover be 
viewed “as a strategy of governance, prompted by external or domestic 
pressures to facilitate transfers of power closer to those who are most affected 
by the exercise of power” (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001:487). In the field of 
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conservation, the spread of democratic political structures made centralist, 
unrepresentative conservation projects seem unattractive as well as impractical 
(Agrawal and Gibson 1999:632). 
There are several instrumental arguments in favor of decentralization as well, 
and they are more often put forward by decentralizing policy makers (Agrawal 
and Gupta 2005). The rationale for decentralization can be based on critiques 
of centralized, top-down management (Khatri-Chhetri 2008, Dahal et al. 
2014). Donors and governments often justify decentralization reforms as a 
means to increase efficiency and equity of development activities, as well as 
by the intrinsic arguments of promoting democracy and local participation 
(Ribot 2002:4). It is argued that moving decision-making authority to local 
actors improves efficiency, since such actors have better time- and space- 
specific information that in turn leads to better-targeted policies and lower 
transaction costs (Ribot et al. 2006:1866). It is also believed that moving 
decision-making closer to citizens might improve accountability and thus 
efficiency (ibid.). Moreover, in the field of conservation and protected area 
management, it has proven very difficult to coerce people into unpopular 
conservation programs, especially if these people depend on access to fodder, 
fuel wood, fish and wildlife for their livelihoods (Agrawal and Gibson 
1999:632). Protests against centralized regulations can force authorities to 
reconsider such regulation and concede powers to local communities, as 
happened in Kumaon in northern India in the 1920s (Agrawal 2005:85). 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999:483) understand legislative reforms of natural 
resource management in Nepali protected areas to come from the realization 
of the failure of coercive exclusionary conservation. 
Participation of stakeholders and inclusion of local communities in 
conservation or natural resource management can be a way of enhancing 
compliance and thus reducing costs related to enforcement of rules (Paudel et 
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al. 2011:17). In Nepal, the move towards increasing involvement of local 
people in forestry management came as the government realized that forests 
could not be managed without cooperation of the local communities (Khatri-
Chhetri 2008:264). Khatri-Chhetri (ibid.) moreover writes that there are 
parallel ‘pushes’ from governments and donors who wish to reduce costs in 
service delivery and ‘pulls’ from local communities who wish for increased 
control over local resources, both forces working in favor of increased 
decentralization. Baral and Heinen (2007) hold that efficiency, equity, 
effectiveness and sustainability of programs, donor influence and demands 
from local communities are all factors that partly explain why states choose to 
devolve managerial responsibilities to local communities, but that recent 
research on the matter is not conclusive.  
In Nepal, it has been claimed that justification for decentralization was to 
increase local participation in planning and implementation, to mobilize local 
resources, and to increase accountability of officials to the citizens (Bienen et 
al. 1990:65). Another motivation in the Nepali context can be the lack of 
capacity of the government authority to adequately manage protected areas 
(Baral and Stern 2010), a potentially increasingly important factor as the PA 
system in Nepal rapidly expands. A WWF officer told me in an interview that 
participatory approaches to conservation in Nepal are successful and also 
necessary simply because the government presence in mountainous areas is 
either weak or non-existent (Bhandari: interview 25.04.2012).  
Not surprisingly, criticism exists in the field of decentralization as well, both 
in terms of academic argument and because of implications for natural 
resource management. One reason for why many decentralization reforms 
have failed to deliver its promises is simply that the reforms often are 
incomplete. This can be because of resistance of central actors to relinquish 
their powers – due to fear of losing economic privileges and rent-seeking 
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opportunities, or more general concerns about for instance standards, social 
and economic wellbeing, or political stability (Ribot 2002:7). In the Nepali 
forestry sector, there is a clear geographical pattern in the extension of the 
community forest system: so far, the community forest system has mostly 
been limited to the middle hills, and has not been extended to the 
commercially more valuable forests in the lower Terai. This shows a limited 
willingness of the forest department to devolve powers when commercial 
interests are at stake (Ribot et al. 2006:1872).  
Agrawal and Ostrom (2001:486) are concerned with the lack of attention to 
the political motivation behind decentralization reforms and the nature of 
property rights in academic writing about decentralization of natural resource 
governance. Early calls for increased involvement of local communities in 
conservation and natural resource management were marked by their 
simplistic assumptions about the composition and internal coherence of 
communities. Communities were regarded as territorially fixed, small, and 
homogenous, while observes thus failed to pay attention to differences within 
them (Agrawal and Gibson 1999:636). Jeanrenaud (2002:22-24) notes that 
“Ideas about what constitutes a community in natural resource management 
are frequently disputed and are often tied to dominant political interests at 
local levels and beyond”. Agrawal and Gibson (1999:636) argue that paying 
attention to the detailed differences and diverse interests within communities 
is critical for sustainable and equitable outcomes of policy changes on behalf 
of the community.  
In Nepal, despite the long experience with community forestry, there are still 
concerns regarding the equity of distribution of benefits and burden-sharing 
and of marginalized communities not gaining as anticipated (McDougall et al. 
2007:50). Cornwall (2002:14-5) argues that it is important to situate the new 
spaces for participation opened through decentralization reforms within 
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existing power-relations, and also how the “rules of the game” delineate the 
boundaries of public involvement in decision-making and deliberation. 
Another assumption Agrawal and Gibson (1999:636) criticize for being 
simplistic is the idea that because local communities are dependent on the 
long-term sustainability of their resource-base, and because having more 
accurate knowledge about these resources than other potential actors, 
communities are regarded as the best managers of the resources in “their” 
area. This line of argument can be refined by adding the assumption that if 
communities are not involved in the management of their natural resources, 
then they will act destructively (Agrawal and Gibson 1999:633), or that 
communities are more likely to follow rules that they have had a say in 
making (Ribot 2004:24, Locher 2006:268). Interestingly, this assumption has 
some merit if one studies the historical developments in the Nepali forestry 
sector from nationalization of forest resources to community based 
management, as I touched upon in Chapter 3. Locher (2006:268) holds that 
local support for nature conservation is greater if more responsibilities are 
granted to the local actors, while Ostrom (1990:101) argues that users are 
more likely to manage commons (see next section) sustainably when their 
rights to devise institutions are not challenged by central authorities.   
The concerns over assumptions about local communities’ capabilities and 
interests in sustainable resource use and conservation management are linked 
to the debate over appropriate levels of decentralization, which is especially 
critical to address if national and local interests are diverging. The Fifth 
Conference of the Parties (COP 5) to the CBD, held in 2000, endorsed the so-
called “Ecosystem Approach” to biodiversity conservation and called upon 
States Parties as well as other governments and international organizations to 
apply this approach in implementation efforts (UNEP 2000). It is “a strategy 
for the integrated management of land, water and living resources that 
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promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way” (UNEP 
2000:103). The approach was acknowledged by the Johannesburg World 
Summit on Sustainable Development as an important instrument for 
enhancing sustainable development and alleviating poverty (SCBD 2004:34).  
Principle 2 of this approach is worth quoting at length:  
Management should be decentralized to the lowest appropriate level.  
Rationale: Decentralized systems may lead to greater efficiency, 
effectiveness and equity. Management should involve all stakeholders 
and balance local interests with the wider public interest. The closer 
management is to the ecosystem, the greater the responsibility, 
ownership, accountability, participation, and use of indigenous 
knowledge (UNEP 2000:105).  
The quote is illustrative in its defense of decentralization for both instrumental 
and intrinsic reasons, but it is also worth noting the qualifier may in the 
rationale. The decisive question is of course to decide on “the appropriate 
level”, especially as it relates to the balancing of local and wider public 
interests if they are assumed to be divergent. Fauchald and Gulbrandsen 
(2012:205) hold that in policy fields with high levels of conflict over policy 
design and implementation, more centralized control is needed to ensure 
compliance with international and national goals. An example of high levels of 
conflict can be the decision to establish a protected area itself, as witnessed in 
Nepal (Paudel et al. 2012) and elsewhere (e.g. Falleth and Hovik 2008, 
Zachrisson 2009).  
Ribot has argued for the use of so-called environmental subsidiarity principles 
as guiding principles of power transfers in decentralization of natural resource 
management (Ribot 2002, 2004). The principle of subsidiarity says that 
decisions are to be taken at the lowest possible level; as understood in EU 
policy-making, it means that the EU shall only take action when this is more 
effective than taking action on the national, sub-national/regional or local level 
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(Store norske leksikon 2013). Although Ribot (2004) does not refer to the 
ecosystem approach specifically, there are clear similarities between his notion 
of environmental subsidiary principles and the ecosystem approach to the 
CBD, but Ribot’s subsidiarity principles are more elaborate than the 
ecosystem approach’s “decentralization to lowest possible level” maxim. For a 
complete list of the proposed environmental subsidiarity principles, see Ribot 
(2004:81). Those principles most closely related to the ecosystem approach 
are creation of discretion, providing significant power, and matching powers 
to scale (the last point including the transfer of power to the most-local level).   
Ribot (2004:54) gives several examples of decentralization reforms that have 
led to detrimental environmental consequences, for instance in recent reforms 
in Indonesia or in Kumaon in India before the situation was stabilized there 
(cf. Agrawal (2005) for a historical analysis of local forest management in 
Kumaon). Ribot (2004:54) provides the perceived insecurity of user rights as 
one explanation for some negative consequences of decentralization; if people 
believe that their newly granted resource user rights might be taken away, they 
will tend to overexploit the resources in the window of opportunity that 
emerges after decentralization. Terborgh (2004:x) argues that the relaxation of 
central control following the fall of Suharto “unleashed a free-for-all on 
Indonesia’s remaining primary forests”, and that a succession of weak 
governments have been “unable to reassert central authority and has yielded to 
pressure to transfer administrative control over provincial lands to corrupt 
local officials, ensuring further degradation of remaining forests”. 
Lastly, it should be noted that even a staunch defender of decentralization such 
as Ribot acknowledges that certain regulatory limits must be in place, if there 
are values that the government or the society at large want to protect: “Nobody 
reasonably advocates devolution of all powers. Local discretion with a 
minimum regulatory infrastructure must be established to bound and protect 
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local freedom” (Ribot 2004:24). This is even more obvious in the context of a 
protected area – where there are clear established interests in the conservation 
of biodiversity, protection or restoration of forest cover and so on. Writing 
about Langtang National Park in Nepal, Fox et al. (1996) point out that even 
when rules and regulations are followed, securing both livelihood needs and 
biodiversity conservation might be incompatible, to the point that it “will be 
necessary to choose between farmer livelihoods and the preservation of 
biodiversity” (ibid:569). Commenting on the findings in the study by Fox et al. 
(1996), Locke and Dearden (2005:97) state that although the governance of 
Langtang National Park would achieve high marks for its participatory 
approach, it is failing in delivering biodiversity objectives. Besides, 
decentralization without capacity building can have negative consequences 
(Dearden et al. 2005:98). But as Ribot (2004:24) notes, the public good should 
not be used as an excuse to avoid decentralization. As discussed earlier in this 
sub-chapter, political decentralization is ultimately a political question, and so 
is the question of the regulatory boundaries of the powers devolved as well.   
5.3 Common Pool Resources 
The influential common pool resource (CPR) theory can provide insights into 
decision-making about natural resource management at the local level, and can 
thus be of interest when discussing decentralization in this field. The theory of 
common pool resources is most famously described by Ostrom in her seminal 
work Governing the Commons (1990). CPRs share two important 
characteristics: They are rival, and to some extent non-excludable; Ostrom 
(ibid:30) defines them to be large enough to make it costly to exclude potential 
beneficiaries of the resources. Typical CPRs can be fisheries, grazing land, 
community forests and groundwater basins, but also urban elements such as 
parking lots and bridges (Agrawal and Gupta 2005, Ostrom (1990:30). Ostrom 
(ibid.) further refines the definition of CPRs by distinguishing between the 
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resource systems (such as fisheries) and the flow of resource units (such as 
fish). It is the latter units that are rival, in the sense that for instance a given 
amount of firewood (a unit) from a forest (the system) cannot be used by one 
user once another has obtained it.  
There is a distinction in the literature between public goods and CPRs, as the 
former is characterized by its non-rival character (Fauchald and Gulbrandsen 
2012:205). Therefore, to assess the applicability of CPR theory on protected 
area management analysis, one must consider what type of goods or resources 
that are managed in protected areas. In the Norwegian context of decentralized 
PA management, Fauchald and Gulbrandsen write that  
The goods to be safeguarded through protected areas are more often 
public goods (…) than they are of a common pool type (…) 
Assessments of protected areas management must therefore take 
account of national and international protection objectives, including 
the protection of mankind’s common heritage (2012:205).  
Therefore, CPR theory is perhaps of less value in such a context than when 
discussing management of natural resources with closer resemblances to 
typical CPRs. Another contribution in the Nordic context has however 
adopted CPR theory as one framework for analysis of protected area 
management in Sweden (Zachrisson 2009). For the sake of analyzing PA 
management in Nepal, I would argue that CPR literature can be of use, 
because the recent trend of community involvement in conservation, 
especially through integrated conservation and development programs 
(ICDPs), is so prevalent in PAs in Nepal. KCA and other mountain 
conservation areas in Nepal such as ACA, Gaurishankar and Manaslu 
Conservation Areas are recognized as IUCN Category VI PAs, in contrast to 
the stricter protection and management regime of Norway’s mountain national 
parks, categorized as Category II PAs. Conservation management in Nepal is 
therefore to a large extent concerned precisely with common pool resources 
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like grazing land and community forests, and the significant emphasis on 
(sustainable) resource use within PAs underscores this. Notably, this is also an 
important aspect in the CBD, where sustainable resource use is one of three 
main objectives (United Nations 1992). This is in turn reflected in Nepal’s 
Biodiversity Strategy, in which a main goal is the “protection and wise use of 
the biologically diverse resources of the country” (HMGN/MFSC 2002:1).  
The management model in Kangchenjunga Conservation Area is a recent 
effort in the continuing search for an appropriate institutional framework for 
protected area management in Nepal. Moreover, the partial shift in academia 
from looking at the commons through the lens of tragedy (Hardin 1968), to the 
more positive outlooks provided by Ostrom and others, also coincides with 
major changes in natural resource management in Nepal (especially forestry), 
and the later move towards increasing local control over protected area 
management in the country. Regarding the global trend towards devolution of 
control over CPR to local users, Agrawal writes that “Although it would be 
hard to sustain a claim that research on common property by itself is 
responsible for policy shifts, it has surely informed how many policy makers 
think about resource management” (2001:1650). 
5.4 New Spaces of Power 
I showed in above sections of this chapter that earlier theorizing about 
participation in development projects and decentralization of natural resource 
management have been criticized for not paying heed to power dimensions at 
local, national and global scales. Associated with the inadequate 
understandings of power are problems of elite capture and continued 
marginalization. Therefore, it is pertinent to include a framework for power 
analysis in my theoretical chapter, which later will be used to complement my 
analysis of the decentralized structure of management of Kangchenjunga 
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Conservation Area and the local participation in this structure. I will focus this 
section on the work done by Gaventa (2006) on the different “spaces” 
available for participation and citizen engagement in policy processes.  
As Arnstein (1969), White (1996) and Cornwall (2008) underscored, power is 
(or should be) a central feature in all participatory approaches to development 
in particular, but also to governance in general. Political decentralization is 
about transfer of decision-making power and new accountabilities. Therefore, 
it is vital to investigate how power is wielded by whom in the “many new 
democratic spaces or opportunities for participation” (Gaventa 2007:xiii) that 
are created be it by NGOs or donors who support civil society in developing 
countries, or the movements towards “deepening” and more deliberative 
democracy in countries both north and south (Gaventa 2007). The 
management institutions in Kangchenjunga Conservation Area are arguably 
such new spaces for participation, but as Gaventa (2007:xv) writes, “we 
cannot assume that the institutional design of ‘new democratic spaces’ will in 
fact mean that these will automatically become ‘spaces for change’, especially 
in ways that normative democratic theory assumes”. Whether the creation of 
new institutional arrangements results in greater inclusion or pro-poor policy 
change depends on the nature of power relations that saturate and surround the 
new and potentially more democratic spaces (Gaventa 2006:23).  
Gaventa has developed a three-dimensional framework for analysis of power 
and “the potential for transformative change”, along axes of forms, levels and 
spaces (Gaventa 2006:25). He argues that that the forms (visible, invisible and 
hidden), levels (global, national and local) and spaces (closed, invited and 
claimed/created) of power are “separate but interrelated dimensions” (Gaventa 
2006:25).  
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Figure 1: Three dimensions of power 
 
Source: Gaventa (2009), see also www.powercube.net   
It is important to bear in mind the different levels in which power relationships 
are formed and executed also when one primarily discusses local participation 
and decentralization, as I do. Power relations at various geographical levels 
are according to Benjaminsen et al. (2009:425) an important focus for much 
current research in political ecology. Gaventa warns against an exclusive focus 
on the power dynamics at the local and national level, as globalization shifts 
“traditional understandings of where power resides and how it is exercised” 
(2006:26). In the case of nature conservation in Nepal, it could be argued that 
as Nepal ratifies international treaties like the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), the CITES convention against trade in endangered species, 
or for that matter the ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 
the places of decision-making and agenda-setting power shift towards the 
international or global arena, just as decentralization reforms shift power to 
more local levels. Paudel et al. (2011) hold that Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs) strongly influence PA management in Nepal. This is for 
instance witnessed in the current Interim Constitution, where language from 
the CBD has been incorporated in § 35, “Principles of the state”, article 5: 
“The State shall make arrangements for the protection of, sustainable use of, 
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and the equitable distribution of benefits derived from, the flora and fauna and 
biological diversity” (GoN 2007). Paudel et al. (2011:3) argue that Nepal has 
endorsed most MEAs “in order to present itself as a deserving and committed 
member of the UN and other international organizations, and of course to 
attract aid”, and moreover that the aid channel is the “major route through 
which international agenda enter into national policy and legal framework” 
(ibid:4). In the case of KCA, there is as well a strong link to international 
conservation interests through the influence of WWF Nepal, which is part of 
the international WWF network. Although WWF Nepal formally has 
relinquished their management powers in KCA, their influence as the major 
donor is arguably still strong and the organization has been instrumental in the 
current institutional set-up of the area. The global/international influence on 
environmental decision-making at the local level in Nepal can be interpreted 
as aspects of “the globalization of environmental discourses” (Benjaminsen et 
al. 2009:425).    
Gaventa distinguishes between three already mentioned forms of power. 
Visible power is the domain of observable decision making, and the formal 
rules, structures, authorities, institutions and procedures that make up this 
domain (Gaventa 2006:29). The hidden power is about controlling the political 
agenda, and who has access to the decision making being done in the visible 
world of power. Invisible power “shapes the psychological and ideological 
boundaries of participation” and influences “how individuals think about their 
place in the world” (ibid.).  
In the context of participation and citizen action, Gaventa sees spaces as 
opportunities, moments and channels through which citizens can act and 
potentially influence policies, discourses and decisions that affect their lives 
and interests. These spaces are moreover not neutral, but themselves shaped 
by power relations (Gaventa 2006:26). Gaventa distinguishes between closed 
  
78 
spaces, where decisions are taken behind closed doors out of reach of the 
ordinary citizen, invited spaces where citizens might be invited to participate 
in decision-making by various kinds of authorities, and claimed or created 
spaces, often created by social movements and community organizations and 
other less powerful actors autonomously from the power holders (2006:26-7).  
Although perhaps rather abstract, I believe also the last dimension of power 
can be valuable in the analysis of power in participation and decentralization 
of natural resource and conservation management in Nepal. The spaces that 
have opened up for the local inhabitants of KCA to participate in and 
influence decision-making that in turn affects their lives are arguably invited 
spaces created by actors external to the local communities. This has created 
both opportunities for empowerment, but also for unequal distribution of 
benefits and for elite capture of these new spaces, just as with the creation of 
forest user groups during decentralization of forest management in the 1970s 
(Whelpton 2005:144).  
5.5 Conclusion and Synthesis  
In this chapter, I have shown that both participation in development projects 
and decentralization in the field of natural resource management are defended 
using similar arguments, which in turn can be divided into instrumental and 
intrinsic defenses. I would argue that despite the similarities of the arguments 
in favor of both participation and decentralization, these are two different 
processes that depend on different actors to be successfully implemented. The 
arguments of White (1996) and Arnstein (1969) about the inherent political 
character of participation notwithstanding, political decentralization is, as the 
term suggests, more directly involving transfers of power, and will thus more 
often involve political struggles. Decentralization of natural resources is more 
complex than reforms of service provisions, as the former are sources of 
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revenue for the state and for livelihoods to the local people and it requires thus 
devolution of control over productive resources (Agrawal and Ribot 1999:474, 
Baral and Heinen 2007:521). Decentralization in natural resource 
management, although often promoted by actors external to the state such as 
international donors, development banks or specialized UN agencies, 
ultimately depend on the political will of those in central power positions to 
relinquish some of that power to other actors. The process must be endorsed 
by the central state. Decentralization will also often create new accountability 
mechanisms and property rights over common pool resources that have 
consequences for the efficiency and functioning of the new governance 
institutions.  
Participatory approaches, especially those on the less transformative side of 
the spectrum, can be promoted by NGOs or other actors working inside the 
boundaries of the nation-state to some extent regardless of national policies 
related to participation and decentralization27. This depends, however, on the 
policy field and degree or level of participation; participatory approaches in 
natural resource management would more often be depending on concessions 
by the state, and participatory approaches high up in the various typologies 
demand relinquishing of control by those in power, be they the central state, 
local government institutions or NGOs. Participation can, as the typologies 
presented in this chapter illustrate, be driven both from above and from below. 
This is in turn linked to the different spaces of power; participation taking 
place within claimed spaces will perhaps more often have empowering 
characteristics, in contrast to those participatory processes that are 
circumscribed by an externally set framework as seen in invited spaces.  
                                              
27 At least as long as the state in question has a friendly attitude towards civil society and national and 
international NGOs. Note the growth of non-state actors’ influence on conservation policy and management in 
Nepal following the “1st People’s Movement” in 1990, described in Chapter 3. 
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Ribot (2002) explicitly links participation in natural resource management to 
decentralization and democratization. He holds that democratic 
decentralization is an institutionalized form of community participation, 
because decentralization reforms ideally create a more lasting institutional 
framework for participation that goes beyond the spatially and temporally 
restricted experiments with community-based natural resource management. 
Bearing in mind the critical question of which powers to devolve to what level 
of management discussed earlier in this chapter, there seems to be a potential 
trade-off between the democratic potential of decentralization reforms and the 
need to safeguard national and international conservation interests, at least in 
cases where local resource use interests and national/international 
conservation interests are in conflict. This again relates to the broader 
balancing act of development and conservation discussed in Chapter 2, which 
also is the basis of one of the research questions posed in the introductory 
chapter.   
In this chapter, I have presented various bodies of research that are not often 
utilized together, especially research on participatory approaches to 
development on the one hand and decentralization of natural resource 
management on the other. KCA as an ICDP, with focus on development as 
well as resource use and conservation and with an institutional framework that 
emphasizes both of the above aspects, provides an interesting opportunity to 
jointly apply these theoretical strains. This is the focus in the next two 
chapters. 
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6. Decentralization and Participation in KCA 
Having established a theoretical framework for analysis, I shall in this chapter 
look further into the research questions established in the introduction. I start 
by laying out two propositions I had before I conducted the fieldwork, before 
looking into participation in KCA institutions, linking such participation to the 
typologies explored in the theoretical chapter. Further, rather than taking 
claims about the “complete devolution of management authority” (Parker and 
Thapa 2011:880) in KCA or KCA being “fully managed through participatory 
conservation approaches by local people” (Oli et al. 2013:29) at face value, I 
aim at critically discussing and analyzing the features of and conditions for 
decentralization in KCA and the nature of powers devolved. This is important, 
because as the theoretical deliberations in Chapter 5 showed, the nature of 
powers devolved and the ensuing institutional framework have consequences 
both for the efficiency and equity of management, as well as for the balancing 
of conservation and development concerns. In the next chapter, I discuss this 
balance and the conditions for a sustainable future in KCA.  
Arnstein stated in her article that “citizen participation is a categorical term for 
citizen power. It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not 
citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be 
deliberately included in the future” (1969:216, emphasis added). The citation 
shows how participation in conservation and decentralization are interlinked, 
if one recalls the definition of decentralization presented in Chapter 5 as 
transfer of power to lower-level actors or institutions or ceding of power on 
behalf of the central government (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Although I 
presented the theoretical contributions to participation and decentralization in 
separate sub-chapters in the theoretical framework, I will in this chapter pay 
closer attention to this important link. To meaningfully analyze the degree of 
participation, for example by placing participation in management of KCA in 
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the typologies presented in Chapter 5, I have to identify the powers of the 
participants and their institutions. This requires a thorough look both at the 
practice of and legal framework for decentralized management of KCA.  
In this chapter, I refer extensively to my two most important empirical 
sources, namely the interviews I conducted while doing fieldwork, and the 
Kanchanjangha Conservation Area Management Rules (GoN 2008) regulating 
the management of KCA. Where relevant, I also refer to other legal sources. 
When referring to anonymous interviews, I use #number to signify which 
interview the information or quote is taken from. Information on the role of 
the interviewee, gender, date and location is presented in Appendix II.  
An analysis of the legal and regulatory framework is important for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, analysis of the legal framework for protected area 
management in Nepal is relatively scant in the literature (Paudel et al. 2011:3). 
Secondly, and more importantly, the legal and regulatory framework is of 
great importance because it shapes the everyday practice of resource 
management, as well as the relationships between different actors and 
institutions involved in protected area management (ibid:5). Therefore, the 
analysis of participation in and decentralization of management in KCA would 
have been incomplete without it.  
6.1 Initial Propositions 
Before I visited KCA myself, two theoretical propositions had emerged based 
on my preliminary readings. The first was the assumption that conservation 
interests would be weakened as the management council took over. I expected 
to find this outcome because I presumed that conservation interests would not 
be sufficiently grounded in the local management institutions, notably the 
KCA-MC, to be preserved when external pressures on this subsided. For 
instance, Fauchald and Gulbrandsen (2012) hold that if there are conflicts of 
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interests between the national and local level, then the central decision-makers 
must keep some control over management to ensure that the national interests 
are protected. The assumption that conservation issues predominantly are of 
concern for national and global stakeholders is grounded in the literature (e.g. 
Müller et al. 2008:394, Fauchald and Gulbrandsen 2012). However, as we 
shall see, my findings suggest that the weakening of conservation priorities 
has not happened as predicted. I discuss several possible reasons for this in the 
next chapter.  
The other proposition I had was that the successful management of the area 
would be under threat as external agents and donors withdrew. This 
assumption stems from my reading of Gurung, who claims that past 
experience has shown that local institutions tend to fail to function when 
external project support diminishes or is depleted (2006:145). However, as 
WWF was still present at the time of research, it is not possible to draw any 
firm conclusions on this matter now. Also, the KCA-MC was working to 
broaden its donor base when I visited, and tap into more resources. One 
informant, although concerned about the potential consequences of WWF 
pulling out, was convinced that the institutional set-up would be strong enough 
to handle it: “In the beginning, it will be difficult, but they will manage to get 
more donors after a while and it will stabilize (…) The system has already 
been fixed, so even if WWF leaves and they have problems, they will work it 
out” (#14). But there is a concern that the projects are very much depending 
on continued external financial support, even as some of the locally managed 
funds are supposed to be financially sustainable (such as livestock insurance 
schemes). Thus, it could be argued that the findings presented in this thesis do 
not rule out the concerns about dependence of external support - but the state 
of affairs at the time of research inhibited investigations into the potential 
problem, as the proposition remains a forecast of future events.  
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A Note on Management Effeciency 
Before I initiate the discussion on participation in KCA institutions, some 
reflections on management efficiency is warranted. Oli et al. (2013) report 
KCA to have the highest management efficiency of the protected areas 
surveyed in the wider Kangchenjunga landscape, and also the management 
system most inclusive of local people. The PAs using “traditional” approaches 
of exclusionary management scored lower than the inclusive KCA model. In 
KCA, community based conservation and development initiatives have 
increased local people’s sense of ownership towards the CA (ibid:30). Several 
of my informants expressed that the management of KCA has become better 
after the locally based Management Council has taken over the responsibility. 
For instance, one informant told me “Before 2006, officers from outside the 
area were managing KCA. Now, there is better management because the 
officers come from the villages themselves” (#1). This was however contested 
by another informant, who told me that the Council is less effective than the 
former KCAP staff in working for the development of the area and addressing 
issues such as reconstruction of infrastructure after a recent earthquake (#7). 
6.2 Participation in KCA Management Institutions 
Popular participation in KCA institutions is certainly widespread – it follows 
from the management approach taken in KCA and the extensive capacity-
building undertaken by WWF Nepal in the early years of KCAP in 
anticipation of the management handover. WWF Nepal was according to the 
Conservation Director committed and worked towards the management 
handover since the establishment of KCA and the inception of KCAP 
(Gurung: interview 08.05.2012). Indeed, the management system is based 
almost exclusively on local managers and volunteers. This was by Müller et al. 
(2008) considered an important reason for the successes achieved in KCA, and 
its effectiveness is also reflected in Oli et al. (2013).  
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As discussed in the methodology chapter, I tried to interview as many 
management council members as I could, and I managed to interview seven of 
15 KCA-MC members, of which two of the four female members. I can thus 
assume that my sample of KCA-MC members fairly well represent the KCA-
MC in general, with the notable exception of views from members from 
Yamphudin VDC, as I did not visit that area. The total number of KCA-MC 
members has expanded from the 12 described in Gurung (2006) and Müller et 
al. (2008). The most important change in composition is that the quota of 
female members has doubled from two to four members. The composition of 
the management council is carefully described in the Management Rules, and 
the description corresponds to the information I received from my informants. 
There are seven members from each of the UCs in KCA, and there are four 
female nominees from MGs in each VDC. Moreover, the area’s Community 
Forest User Groups (CFUG) nominate one member to the Council, and there 
is also one person nominated from Taplejung District Development 
Committee (DDC). Finally, the elected Chairperson nominates two members; 
one from the “underprivileged caste, class”, and one that is “making special 
contributions or role for the conservation” (GoN 2008:Rule 10 e) and f)).  
Participation in the lowest level of management institutions in the KCA, the 
UGs and the MGs, was by two of my informants regarded as almost 
compulsory (#2, #9). According to the Management Rules, household 
participation in these institutions is in fact compulsory28, and Gurung 
(2006:83) and Müller et al. (2008:386) report that each household was 
                                              
28 The unfortunately poor translated version of the Rules available at the Nepali Law Commission’s website, 
reads as follows: ”A consumer group or consumer groups [user groups] shall be formatted by making 
representation of each household which has been resided under concerned Village Development Committees 
within the conservation area, to make active participation in the protection activities of the conservation area and 
get direct benefit from that area” and mother’s groups “shall be formatted by making representation of women 
(…) to ensure the active participation of women in the protection and management of conservation area” (GoN 
2008: Rule 13.1 and 13.2, respectively).  
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represented in each group by at least one member. However, research 
conducted in 2008 reports that only about three-quarters of the households 
participated in such groups (Parker and Thapa 2011:891). Moreover, the 
dominant groups households participated in were the MGs (71% of the 
surveyed households participated in MGs, with only 8% of households 
maintaining memberships in other groups) (ibid.). Two of my informants 
participating in MGs reported that the number of households represented in 
these groups had been increasing recently (#4 and #5), because more people 
had realized the benefits of membership and that the membership fees were 
put to good use. This is in line with Auld and Gulbrandsen’s (2010:100) 
argument that transparency about decision-making can facilitate buy-in from a 
broad base of participants in voluntary arrangements.  
Membership in the MGs entitles the members to apply for micro-credit loans, 
and the MG also caters for funerals to members (#5). This corresponds to 
findings by Parker and Thapa (2011) on distribution of benefits based on 
household participation in management bodies. Their study investigates the 
relationship between participation in management bodies and distribution of 
benefits, understood as access to savings accounts, loans and capacity building 
training (ibid:892). Their findings suggest that access to big loans is a function 
of participation: non-participants were excluded from access, and households 
holding leadership positions in the institutions were granted bigger loans than 
those with ordinary membership positions. Moreover, these households also 
participated more in capacity development training programs (ibid:894). Thus, 
there is a strong instrumental motivation to participate in the lower-level 
management groups. Although I have no data on increase in participation in 
the UGs, the other lowest-level body where “all” households supposedly 
participate, there is reason to believe that participation has increased also here. 
I was told in an interview (Shrestha: interview 19.05.2012) that there are now 
46 UGs and 35 MGs in KCA, an increase compared to the 44 UGs and 32 
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MGs reported by Gurung (2006). The KCAP and KCA-MC accountant I 
interviewed in Lelep (#2) confirmed this information.  
Parker and Thapa (2011:896) argue that if equal benefit-sharing is a priority 
for KCA management, then increased promotion of participation is important. 
Khadka and Nepal (2010) report that the overwhelming barrier to participation 
reported in Annapurna Conservation Area (ACA) was lack of free time to 
participate in conservation activities because of other obligations, and 95% of 
the informants reported availability of free time as what was needed for them 
to participate or participate more often. I did not record complaints about lack 
of free time as a hindrance, although substantial amount of work is done in 
these groups. For instance, one interviewee told me how the MG she was 
involved in come together every month to decide on which projects related to 
trail renovations, village cleaning and tree plantations to undertake next (#8). 
This is in line with White’s (1996) view on instrumental participation as 
viewed as cost for the “beneficiaries” of development programs, but in the 
case of KCA, benefits are clearly seen as outweighing the costs of 
participation. For instance, the interviewee referred to above did not have any 
negative things to say about the conservation area at all, despite the workload 
she undertakes in the MG. This was the predominant view of the female 
informants in Locher (2006:276) as well, but she also noted that women from 
poorer and geographically marginalized households participated less in MGs 
because of their existing heavy workloads.  
The fact that I did not record complaints about time-consuming activities 
among the female interviewees can be due to the fact that I only interviewed 
people already involved in the management at some level, who thus 
supposedly have decided that participation is to their benefit (White 1996:12). 
One MG member informant told me that it was “worth it” to be part of the 
group (#5), while many others expressed their satisfaction with the 
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conservation area in more general terms. Of the 14 informants I interviewed in 
KCA, only one explicitly told me that the workload related to being a member 
of the KCA-MC was too much, when I asked him why he initially decided to 
become involved in the CFUG:  
He thought it would be an opportunity to work, because they didn't 
have many job opportunities. He thought he could earn some money. 
But after spending ten years he found out that it's just voluntary work, 
and to be able to do it, he has to leave other work in the house. He got 
busy, spent ten years but earned nothing, so that's why he wants to 
leave and give the responsibilities to someone younger (#10)29. 
One possible conclusion to draw from this is that the current management 
system rewards participation in management (but not through direct payments, 
as management is based on voluntary work). This has positive effects in terms 
of increasing participation, which in turn can be an explanatory factor for the 
relative effectiveness of KCA management compared to other PAs in the 
region, as measured by Oli et al. (2013). The negative effect of this is that 
benefits accruing from the projects (micro-credit and capacity 
building/training opportunities) are not equally distributed in the population, 
as ascertained by Parker and Thapa (2011). This “system” of rewarding 
participation encourages participation for instrumental reasons for the 
“beneficiaries” in KCA, and it has obvious instrumental benefits for the 
DNPWC and WWF Nepal as well, related to reducing costs and tapping into 
local labor resources, for instance. It seems thus to be a trade-off between 
instrumental efficiency and equitability. This trade-off could tip further in 
favor of efficiency if Council members start to receive payments for their 
voluntary work. This was suggested by Gurung in my interview with him, 
because he was concerned about the long-term viability of a voluntary system 
(Gurung: interview 8.5.2012). 
                                              
29 This quote illustrates the role of my translator in sometimes mediating the answers of the interviewees, seen in 
the use of pronouns in the transcription. 
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A related, but separate discussion is the role of women in the higher-level 
management bodies, especially the KCA-MC. Today, female participation is 
ensured through the quota of one female representative from each of the four 
VDCs. The quota has been considered to “not count for much” by Locher 
(2006:226-7), because it only ensured one sixth of the seats for women. Now, 
however, the female quota has doubled, and the minimum number of women 
is thus four out of 15. I interviewed two of these four women, and they had to 
some extent diverging opinions on the ability of women to actively take part in 
discussions and influence decision-making there. The younger of the two 
(#13) did not regard her status as a (young) woman as a hindrance at all, while 
the older interviewee felt that there was still a long way to go before women 
could participate on an equal footing. She said that the other women in the 
KCA-MC were shy and did not easily participate in the discussions, but she 
also conceded that this state of affairs was rapidly changing:  
But now they [the women] think they are equal, and have started 
talking, making demands. We, the women, can even do better than men, 
but if we keep silent, we will continue to be backward. One of the 
reasons why we are shy and don’t speak up so much might be because 
of lack of education30 (#3).  
I will return to the issue of female participation in the sub-section on 
accountability mechanisms in KCA.  
6.2.1 Decision-Making 
Another important feature of the management system in KCA is how 
decisions are taken in the different institutions. Ribot (2002, 2004) claims that 
democratic decentralization is contributing strongly to local democracy. But 
this, I would argue, depends to a large degree on the actual processes of 
                                              
30 Note that the exact wording stems from my handwritten on-the-spot transcription of the interview, as I did not 
tape-record this interview. 
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decision-making in the empowered institutions. In fact, the degree of 
“democratization” stemming from decentralization would depend on the 
decision-making in the institutions, but also on characteristics of electoral 
accountability, which I return to in 6.4.1. With regard to decision-making in 
the management institutions, my findings point in different directions, and it is 
difficult to conclude strongly that decisions are either democratic or un-
democratic. In this sub-chapter, I discuss my findings related to decision-
making in two instances – how decisions are made in the Management 
Council, and how the 5-year Management Plan is put together.  
Management Council Decision Making 
The Management Rules have clear procedures for meetings of the User 
Committees, which shall be presided over by the Chairperson and in his/her 
absence by the vice-chairperson. Decisions are to be made by simple majority, 
and if the vote has been equally divided, the person chairing the meeting has 
the decisive vote (Rule 17.4 and 17.5). Strangely enough, no such formal rules 
prescribe meeting procedures in the Users’ or Mothers’ Groups, and the 
Management Council meeting procedures “shall be as determined by the 
council itself” (Rule 12.2). A straight-forward reading of the rules regarding 
KCA-MC meeting procedures thus opens up for a diverse range of decision-
making procedures, and this ambiguity might explain why it was difficult to 
get clear answers as to how decisions are being made in the Council. 
The general procedure in the meetings seems to be to come to an agreement 
about decisions and priorities through discussions/deliberations, in line also 
with the decision-making procedures in the MGs I was told about by MG 
member informants. But if an agreement could not be reached, the role of the 
Chairman seemed to be quite powerful. One informant told me that if the 
Council could not agree, the Chairman would force his opinion through, and 
  
91 
the other members could not but agree with his final decision (#3). A quote 
from another interview illustrates the same feeling:  
 Q: What do you do if there is a big disagreement in the Council?  
A: They sit down and discuss about it, and act according to the 
discussion: What should be implemented early, what can wait for some 
time. So they figure it out after discussion. During his period up till now, 
they have solved everything by discussion, no voting has been necessary 
so far.  
 Q: What is the role of the chairman in these discussions?  
A: Whenever there is a discussion in the Council, the chairman forces his 
opinion to be implemented, or so he feels. In most of the cases he forces 
his opinion through, whenever there is disagreement (#14).  
This quote points to a potentially important challenge in the KCA-MC, namely 
the degree of democratic decision-making. It is not a problem as long as 
consensus-based decisions can be made, but it is reason to believe that in a 
system where the members are elected from geographically based 
constituencies, all with their different priorities, such consensus-based 
decision-making will not hold very far. This issue is especially crucial to 
address as the Council is the most important local institution in KCA, 
delivering in the conservation field, but equally importantly as a local 
development institution. 
The Management Plan 
The other issue of decision-making I analyze here is related to the process of 
creating the Management Plan. The Management Plan is a five-year plan that 
encompasses the whole conservation area. The Management Rules give a 
detailed account on what is to be included in the plan, listing 15 components 
in “Schedule 1”. In addition to physical and demographic descriptions of the 
conservation area, including details in forest land and potential community 
forests, the plan shall include details on conservation and forest development 
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programs, programs related to the protection of indigenous and traditional 
knowledge and skills, a program on “community conservation area tourism 
development, protection of wildlife, vegetation and environment, Historical 
and Natural heritage preservation”, an annual program for collection and use 
of forest products, and details on collection and utilization of herbs. 
The Management Plan has to be approved by the DNPWC, and the Council 
can also draw on technical support from the Department as it sees necessary. 
The Management Rules spell out how the Plan is to be put together, 
emphasizing the central role of the KCA-MC, while noting that the Council 
shall “[coordinate] with the concerned consumer [user] group and committee 
for the protection and management of the conservation area” and “make 
discussion on drafting of management work plan and collect the opinions by 
calling meeting of chairpersons of the groups and committees and the 
management plan shall be drafted on the basis of the opinions collected as 
such” (GoN 2008: Rule 6.1 and 6.2).  
All interviewees discussing the Management Plan agreed that there is a strong 
emphasis on participation from the grassroots organizations. This participation 
is however mediated by the User Committees, which in this regard function as 
gate-keepers to the Council. This was explained as a way of not over-burden 
the Council with too many suggestions, by rather taking some discussions and 
making priorities in the UCs, before deciding on which proposals to bring 
forward to the Council. The informants had diverging opinions on the 
proceedings of the drafting of the Plan. One informant (#2) said that the 
management plan preparations start with discussions in the MGs and the UGs, 
and then the Council has a workshop with submissions from these meetings as 
starting point. This view was supported by another informant (#14) who stated 
that the process starts at the grassroots level, then the discussions continue in 
the User Committees before the Council drafts the Plan. A third informant 
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(#3) said that the Council makes a proposal first, and then discuss it in a 
meeting where all the members of all the management groups are invited (as 
well as the DNPWC and WWF). The Council also has social mobilizers 
walking around in the villages collecting information before they have a 
meeting in the Council. This happens before the first draft is made. #3 also 
mentioned the role if the UCs in deciding upon which proposals to bring 
before the Council. One informant articulated the role of the UCs thus:  
The Committee will see all those problems and they will decide which 
can be sent to the Council to discuss and which cannot. Because when 
you get so many views and problems, it would not be appropriate to take 
all those issues to Council and discuss about it. So the Committee is the 
one working as a coordinator with the villagers as well as the Council 
(#12). 
 Informant #9 provided a slightly different story than many others: he said that 
the Council decides on different discussion themes (5 themes), which the 
grassroots organizations then can discuss. Again, the role of the UCs as 
gatekeepers was emphasized: “The User Committees decide on the 
suggestions coming from the UGs and MGs, which ones are good, and which 
ones can be omitted”(#9). This is done by mutual understanding (i.e. 
consensus) in the UCs, according to the interviewee. 
WWF has no formal role in the preparations mentioned in the Rules. There 
were different opinions regarding the involvement and influence of WWF and 
DNPWC on making the plan, but in general, the interviewees were of the 
opinion that this influence was rather limited. The subtle influence of WWF as 
the most significant donor was emphasized by one informant (#13), who stated 
that although WWF has no influence in making the plan, they figure out after 
the plan is made what they can support. One informant also conceded that the 
KCA-MC is not independent at the moment, because of its dependence on 
financial and technical support from KCAP/WWF (#2). Another informant 
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(#12) also stated that WWF did not have a role in making the plan, but that the 
organization nevertheless have their own priorities related to species 
conservation and climate change that they were concerned about. One 
informant (#6) also noted the involvement of local politicians in the DDC, 
saying the Council also discusses the draft with DDC politicians. Interestingly, 
the interviewee claimed that the DDC politicians usually urged the Council to 
pay heed to the recommendations made by the villagers. Finally, it should be 
noted that one informant granted the DNPWC a bigger role than most of the 
interviewees:  
the DNPWC is supporting the Council in legal matters, to give legal help 
to facilitate them to work. (...) Because people demand a lot. So the 
Department works to coordinate between the people and the Council, 
giving legal advice, making it easier to work (#9). 
Moreover, after the Council finalizes the plan, it is sent to the DNPWC for 
approval. The Department can then make amendments before approving it, 
albeit in consultation with the chairperson of the KCA-MC. When the plan is 
approved, “It shall be the duty of the council and all the concerned to follow 
the management plan” (GoN 2008: Rule 6.8). 
To sum up, the Management Plan is made through a collaborating exercise 
involving a range of actors. The final decisions before sending the Plan to the 
DNPWC are however squarely in the hands of the Council, and the DNPWC 
has the power to approve it. The hierarchical structure of management 
institutions in KCA functions as a way of mediating and censoring the 
proposals from the local population, thus enhancing the capacity of the 
Management Council to handle the process of drafting the plan. This 
illustrates the importance of viewing the decision-making in all the institutions 
in KCA. The role of WWF in the deliberations could moreover be interpreted 
as a form of “hidden power” (Gaventa 2006); the organization’s conservation 
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interests might be subtly protected by Council members who have frequent 
and direct contact with both WWF and the representative of the DNPWC.  
6.3 Decentralized Conservation Management in KCA 
Ribot (2002:8) notes that it is difficult to measure outcomes of 
decentralization, as a host of other factors usually also affect the outcomes of 
institutional design. Moreover, he asserts that it requires historic base-line data 
for before-and-after comparisons. I do not intend to measure or “judge” the 
outcomes of decentralization in KCA; I have neither access to historic base-
line data nor necessary quantitative data on current social and environmental 
issues to perform such an analysis. It is perhaps also too early to do so, even if 
data was available – Ribot (2004:72) urges to give decentralization reforms 
time before judging them as good or bad. I conducted my fieldwork in KCA 
five and a half years after management handover, which meant that I for 
instance could not investigate the succession of elected members in the KCA-
MC, as most terms were about to expire while I visited, and the process of 
succession had yet to take place. In this sub-chapter I rather look at some of 
the characteristics of the decentralization of management in KCA. I look at 
accountability mechanisms as stated in the Management Rules (GoN 2008) as 
well as accountability linkages observed while I conducted fieldwork. I then 
discuss the decision making powers and resource property rights devolved to 
the various bodies in the KCA institutional system, relative to each other and 
to the DNPWC, also discussing to what extent they are secure powers or not.  
6.3.1 Accountability Mechanisms 
Accountability is always relational (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). In the context 
of decentralization in KCA, several accountability relations are relevant, and 
the picture is complicated by the intricate system of management in KCA 
itself. To start at the top of the hierarchy, there is the relationship between 
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KCA-MC and DNPWC. Then there are the various relationships between the 
different management bodies in KCA, and finally between these bodies and 
the constituency, i.e. the inhabitants of the conservation area. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, effective political decentralization requires downward 
accountability, while delegation of power to upwardly accountable institutions 
is in fact deconcentration, not political decentralization (Ribot et al. 2006). 
Therefore, to consider whether the delegation of powers to local institutions is 
a case of decentralization or deconcentration requires a critical look at the 
accountability mechanisms in and between these institutions.  
Downward Accountability 
The most important downward accountability mechanism in KCA is the 
election process in the different institutions31. This means that whether this 
channel of accountability is effective or not hinges on those elections and their 
degree of democratic character. Critically, if the downward accountability 
mechanism of elected representatives in the various bodies ensured through 
electoral accountability is to be effective in terms of enhancing local 
democracy, then the election processes must be democratic and ensure 
representation of different strands of society. If not, those bodies are more 
likely to reproduce existing local inequalities, be it along gender, socio-
economic or ethnic/caste lines. Here, the danger of elite capture is present, 
because several factors might hinder broader participation in the higher-level 
institutions (the UCs and the Council). The issue of hindrances to participation 
has been explored elsewhere in Nepal (Baral and Heinen 2007:527, Khadka 
and Nepal 2010:356, Dahal et al. 2014), but to a lesser extent in KCA. Dahal 
                                              
31 Agrawal and Ribot (1999) note that electoral accountability is only one of a wide range of accountability 
mechanisms, and claim that elections in itself is not sufficient to ensure that actors are accountable to their 
constituencies. Transparency understood as openness about e.g. decision-making and adjudication can be another 
mechanism that enhances accountability of decision-makers (Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010). However, I focus 
discussion in this thesis on this specific mechanism as the most prominent. An interesting question, which I have 
not posed in this thesis, is whether the elaborate institutional framework created in KCA actually inhibits the 
growth of an independent civil society that could enhance constituencies’ ability to hold their local leaders 
accountable. This is a possibility because the invited spaces, to use Gaventa’s (2006) parlance, perhaps subdue 
possible action in created spaces.   
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et al. (2014:227) write that female participation in Management Committees in 
Annapurna Conservation Area (ACA) is hindered by their low levels of 
education and a subsequent lack of confidence to speak up in meetings, while 
Khadka and Nepal (2010) consider lack of time to spare to be the most 
important barrier. In an analysis of three CFUGs in Nepal’s middle hills, 
Lachapelle et al. (2004) identify inferiority (based on caste, gender and 
literacy skills), vulnerability and lack of transparency as the perceived reasons 
for lack of ability to exercise power by the community forest users32.  
As noted, it is too early to tell whether succession processes are functioning 
well, but several remarks can nevertheless be made. Several of my 
interviewees in the KCA-MC whose terms were about to expire at the time of 
research conceded that they would have to go through the elaborate election 
processes again if they wanted to stand a new term in the MC. Several 
interviewees explained the procedure for me, and their answers were fairly 
well in line with the processes described in the Management Rules (GoN 
2008). As noted elsewhere, most households participate in one or more of the 
lower-level bodies, the MGs and UGs. Elections of Chairpersons in the UGs 
were presented to me as de facto elections to the UCs (#6), although this is not 
in line with the Rules’ description of formation of the UCs, which states that 
chairpersons of the UGs are to select five persons among themselves to the 
UC of their groups (GoN 2008: Rule 15). In most cases, there are more than 
five UGs per UC, as there are 46 UGs and seven UCs. Elections of 
Chairpersons of the UCs are however de facto elections to the Council; this 
finding is clear both from my interviews and the reading of the Rules. 
Interestingly, the Rules (ibid: Rule 15.5) state that selection procedures in the 
Committees are to be determined by the Committees themselves (but 
interviewees referred to the process as an election process). 
                                              
32 In this regard, they use the understanding of power provided by Agrawal and Ribot (1999), discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
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As the evidence from other parts of Nepal cited above suggests, despite a 
formally functional electoral system in the KCA institutions, the informal 
barriers both to stand as candidates in these elections, and to speak up in the 
institutions in which one is represented, can be quite substantial and in fact 
hinder broader popular participation. One of my female informants (#8) said 
that she was not capable of doing the job in the Management Council if she 
was to become a member there, because she would have to speak up, to speak 
Nepali, and to be educated. Another female informant (#5) said she would like 
to stand for election in the MC, but she saw lack of education as a hindrance, 
and she did not know how to proceed. She would like to join a literacy 
program. The informal, and sometimes self-imposed, restrictions on who can 
participate in the higher echelons of management in KCA can be understood 
as aspects related to Gaventa’s (2006:29) invisible form of power. 
At the time of research, the only four female members in the Council were 
those voted in through the quota of direct representation of one female 
member from the MGs in each VDC. The Rules state that three MG 
chairpersons should be members in each UC; they are in principle eligible for 
leadership positions in the Committees and thus for Council membership 
(GoN 2008: Rule 15.1b and 15.4). However, one interviewee (#6) stated that 
no more than four women could be members of the Council, although he later 
qualified his statement by saying that it is unlikely that female participation 
will increase beyond the quota, due to the low female participation in UGs and 
UCs. Another interviewee (#3) said that the Chairperson of the Council must 
be elected from the seven UC chairpersons in the Council, although this is 
wrong according the Management Rules (all Council members except the 
DDC representative and the person nominated because of his or her special 
contribution to conservation are eligible (GoN 2008: Rule 10.2)). These two 
statements could be interpreted as signs of a lack of understanding of the 
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Management Rules, even among Council members33. Although the KCA 
management system by some is regarded as progressive in terms of female 
participation (Locher 2006, Locher and Müller-Böker 2007), there is 
obviously still a way to go before men and women are equally well included in 
the management structures. Although there are no formal barriers for women 
to go through the normal election procedures in the UCs to become MC 
members, the statements by the female informants referred to in the paragraph 
above point to some important barriers to this.  
Mothers’ Groups are considered the most effective of the local groups (Locher 
and Müller-Böker 2007:1131, Müller et al. 2008:391), and female 
participation in natural resource management in general often have positive 
effects (Locher 2006). Therefore, it could be argued that donors and managers 
alike should promote the further enhancement of female participation in the 
institutions higher up in the management hierarchy, also for the sake of 
efficiency.   
It should be noted that there are no downward accountability links between the 
Department and the Council, as the Department is the overarching government 
institution of all protected areas in Nepal, and a sub-division of the Ministry of 
Forests and Soil Conservation (MoFSC). Thus, the power relationship 
between the Council and the DNPWC is unambiguously tilted towards the 
Department. As I shall discuss in the next chapter, this is one of the factors 
that can be interpreted as influencing the balance of development and 
conservation in KCA.  
                                              
33 Moreover, they also point to a potential downside of creating gender-specific groups and quotas; it can limit 
female participation to those specific arrangements made to enhance such participation. One informant (#5) stated 
that those who participate in the Mothers’ Groups usually are only concerned about that group.  
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Upward Accountability 
As explained above, elections of representatives in the various institutions in 
KCA is one important downward accountability mechanism. However, there 
is an important upward accountability mechanism as well, namely the 
possibility of dissolution of the various institutions that goes through the 
managerial hierarchy from DNPWC to the grassroots groups. Although this 
was not mentioned as a concern by any of my informants, a reading of the 
Management Rules suggests that it puts important limits on what activities the 
different groups undertake. Rule 60 explains the circumstances when the 
DNPWC can dissolve the Management Council; if the Council has conducted 
activities contrary to the Management Plan, has failed to perform the functions 
and duties prescribed in the Rules; if it is found that it has misappropriated 
funds; or if two thirds of the Council asks for its dissolution (GoN 2008: Rule 
60.1 a – d). The KCA-MC in turn has the right to dissolve the User 
Committees in similar circumstances; if functions are performed without 
approval in the work plan or against the work plan; if functions, duties and 
responsibilities of the UCs as laid out in the Rules has not been performed; if 
funds are misappropriated; if any other assigned responsibilities have not been 
performed; or “If any actions has been performed against the interest of the 
local consumers [users] or failed to protect the interest of the consumers 
[users]” (GoN 2008: Rule 20.1 a-e)34. The Council also has the power to 
withdraw community forests from CFUGs (GoN 2008:Rule 37). In all the 
above circumstances, the Rules spell out the procedures for investigations and 
possibilities for clarifications, but it is the power-holding institutions that have 
the final call. This is an example of how institutions at different levels have 
clear, visible power (Gaventa 2006) over institutions further down in the 
managerial hierarchy, and that this power at least potentially can be used to 
                                              
34 The last possibility in fact constitutes an additional downward accountability mechanism between the 
Committees and the inhabitants of the conservation area. 
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force these institutions to undertake activities according to decisions taken 
further up in the system. However, the Rules does not spell out how or 
whether User Groups or Mothers’ Groups can be dissolved. Moreover, the 
wording of the Rules suggests that these groups are self-constituted, while it is 
clearly the KCA-MC that is responsible for constituting the UCs.  
The figure below provides a graphic illustration of the relationships between 
the different bodies. The green arrows signify downward electoral 
accountability between local management institutions. The bended red arrows 
illustrate the upward relationship established by the powers to dissolve 
institutions further down in hierarchy, while the straight red arrow signifies the 
upward accountability relationship established by the regulatory framework 
that permeates the management structure in KCA. The stippled arrow 
illustrates WWF’s donor influence (discussed further in the next chapter). 
Figure 2: Accountability relationships in KCA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author, inspired by Agrawal and Ribot (1999), Ribot (2004), Gaventa 
(2006), Gurung (2006), and based on information obtained in interviews and in GoN (2008). 
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Relationship to Other Local Bodies 
Ribot (2002:11) writes that “In many instances governments, donors, and 
NGOs avoid local elected bodies as being too “political”, or as being 
inefficient or lacking in capacity”. He goes a long way in arguing for the 
establishment of local resource use committees that are accountable to elected 
local government, to ensure (indirect) downward accountability to the local 
population (ibid:12). However, the accountability mechanisms within the 
KCA institutions circumvent local government – as lower level institutions are 
upwardly accountable to higher level institutions within KCA, and the KCA-
MC being directly accountable to the DNPWC. The DDC and VDC 
representation in the KCA-MC and UCs is limited, and the officials from these 
local government intuitions are not eligible for leadership positions in KCA 
institutions. In the case of Nepal, however, the accountability of local 
government itself could be seriously questioned, and thus Ribot’s proposal to 
use such government as an accountability link between the local population 
and the management bodies should be regarded with caution here. In Nepal, 
local elections have not been held since 1997 (Dhungel et al. 2011:163), and 
the terms of those officials elected then were terminated in 2002. Since then, 
the VDCs and DDCs have been managed by government employees with 
advice from a so-called all-party mechanism (ibid:52)35. Dhungel et al. 
(2011:17) note that the  
absence of elected representatives in the [local bodies] is widely 
believed by all categories of informants to be the main reason for their 
poor functioning. Although local politicians through [the All-Party 
Mechanism] are involved in decision-making processes, no mechanism 
exists to hold them accountable to the population for those decisions. 
                                              
35 Since the successful November 2013 elections to the national Constituent Assembly, there has been talks of 
new local elections in Nepal, and according to newspaper articles, the Nepali election committee is now preparing 
for such elections (New Indian Express 2014, 9 March). The Nepali newspaper República noted excitement and 
expectations for local elections in the districts already in December last year, following the national Constituent 
Assembly elections (Bhattarai 2013, 12 December). 
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In other words, the lack of downward accountability mechanisms in local 
bodies (VDCs and DDCs) is considered the main reason for these bodies’ poor 
performance in delivering development and social services. A recent report 
conducted by the Nepali NGO MIREST Nepal, referred to in the newspaper 
Rebública, finds lack of accountability and absence of local elections to be 
important reasons for the poor service provision and inefficient management 
of local bodies in the country (Rawal 2014, 28 March). Interestingly, one of 
my informants (#1), himself VDC Chairman in one of the VDCs I visited, was 
of the opinion that the KCA-MC now conducted much of the work that 
otherwise would have been the responsibility of the VDC. This was attributed 
to the lack of funds in the VDC and relative wealth of the Council. Thus, in 
KCA one can observe a tendency to sideline those local bodies that in other 
circumstances could have been the most important local institutions. However, 
since these bodies overall in Nepal are regarded as ineffective, and since the 
electoral accountability mechanism is non-existent, at least for the moment, 
this is unsurprising (see also the discussion on security of rights at the end of 
the next section).  
6.3.2 Powers and Rights of the Institutions 
In Chapter 5, I examined several theoretical contributions related to 
decentralized powers and rights. A summary of some of these contributions is 
represented in the table below.  
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Table 4: Aspects of decentralization 
Decision-making powers 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999) 
Property rights over 
resource use  
(Agrawal and Ostrom 
2001) 
Conditions for successful 
decentralization  
(Ribot 2002) 
Power to make rules Withdrawal Downward accountability 
Power to make decisions 
over resource use 
Management Discretionary powers 
Power to implement and 
ensure compliance of rules 
Exclusion  Secure rights 
Power to adjudicate 
conflicts  
Alienation 
 
I shall in the following look at how these resource use rights and decision-
making powers are entrusted to the various institutions in KCA. It makes 
sense, in assessing the overall degree of decentralization, to give most weight 
to the powers devolved to the KCA-MC. After all, the KCA-MC is supposed 
to represent the inhabitants of the conservation area, ensured through elections 
of the officials. Moreover, these powers embody the extent of willingness of 
the central government authority (in this case the DNPWC as well as WWF) 
to relinquish their powers, which is a central feature of the definitions of 
decentralization presented elsewhere in this thesis. A second task can then be 
to see how management is decentralized within the institutional hierarchy in 
KCA. However, as the Management Rules (GoN 2008), which are imposed to 
a large degree externally on the KCA institutions, shape the formal power 
relationships between the institutions, decentralization within KCA does not 
necessarily stem from a willingness to relinquish power from the KCA-MC’s 
side.  
It is not easy to provide a clear overview over the rights and decision-making 
powers devolved, because of the intricate system of management and the 
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elaborate (but poorly translated) Management Rules. Moreover, the 
Management Rules more clearly states what is not allowed than what is 
required to do, and the lists of functions, duties and powers of the KCA-MC, 
the UCs and the UGs/MGs, laid out in Rule 11, 16 and 14, respectively (GoN 
2008) are arguably more focused on functions and duties than on powers. In 
sum, the different responsibilities and rights show a clear prioritization of 
conservation responsibilities, rather than user rights. 
It is also difficult to assess whether the rights that can be observed today are 
outcomes of decentralization reforms related to the management system of 
KCA, where rights are allocated to individuals or institutions as part of a move 
towards more decentralized management, or if they constitute some pre-KCA 
usufruct rights remaining also after the imposition of new rules and 
regulations following the establishment of the conservation area. Such 
remaining user rights could be of a nature that opens up for interpreting them 
as a result of a decentralization process (customary access rights to grazing 
areas that are upheld, for instance), while the opposite, centralization of 
control, could have happened (Ribot 2004:134). There are examples in the 
literature on how central governments and power-holders use the expansion of 
the PA system to enhance for instance territorial control (e.g. Peluso 1993 and 
Neumann 2001).  
If WWF Nepal was still in control, one possible interpretation of the 
establishment of KCA could have been to denote it as privatization to a non-
commercial actor (in this case an NGO) (Ribot 2004:52). However, in the 
following I shall investigate the property and decision-making rights in the 
context of decentralized conservation management, which makes sense 
especially when investigating a case where the initial manager of the protected 
area (WWF Nepal) has relinquished its control to such a great extent. I will 
not initiate a wider historical discussion around rights existing pre- and post 
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the establishment of KCA, but it can at the outset be worth noting that Gurung 
(2006:85) holds that none of the traditional institutions existing prior to the 
establishment of the conservation were dissolved, and that for instance kipat36 
and grass-cutting institutions continue to function within the framework of the 
new institutions. To further investigate the indigenous institutions and the 
consequences for these of the establishment of new protected areas goes well 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
In KCA, the power to create new rules is vested in the Management Council, 
but this power is limited to creation of new prohibitions (GoN 2008: Rule 31). 
The power to make decisions over resource use is vested to various degrees in 
different bodies, but it is the KCA-MC that is the strongest authority, as this is 
the institution that can allocate national (government-owned) forests as 
community forests to be entrusted to CFUGs, for instance37. According to one 
informant, the KCA-MC also makes decisions related to which areas to open 
up for collection of herbal products, which areas that should be restricted from 
grazing to be restored and so on: “In the summer anyone can graze their 
animals everywhere above 3700 meters except in the restricted areas. In the 
winter, the Council has separated the land in patches” (#9), but according the 
Management Rules, this is a power held by the UCs (GoN 2008: Rule 16 e) 
and f)). UGs and MGs can make decisions among themselves on how to 
allocate and prioritize funds for development activities, and interviewees often 
mentioned this as an important topic of the meetings in these groups. This can 
                                              
36 Kipat is a traditional system of land ownership dominant among Limbus in Eastern Nepal. Although officially 
abolished in 1968, it has been practiced also since then, especially for regulation of grazing rights and collection 
of forest products  (Regmi 1976, Müller et al. 2008).  
37 This is according to Rule 36 and 37 of the Management Rules, and these rules has in effect sidelined the 
District Forest Office, who by the Forest Act (HMGN 1993) has legal powers to declare new areas as community 
forests and help establish new CFUGs. According to Ananta Bhandari, program officer in WWF, the KCA-MC 
also has the power to endorse the operation plans of the CFUGs, usually the power of the government (Bhandari: 
interview 25.04.2012). Moreover, if the grant is withdrawn, and the concerned group complains, it is the DNPWC 
who adjudicates the dispute, not the Regional Forest Director as is the case for such disputes in other CFUG 
matters (as per §27 in the Forest Act).  
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be interpreted as decentralization of fiscal powers, one aspect of 
decentralization of powers to make decisions (Agrawal and Ribot 1999:477).  
The Management Rules allocate a host of duties related to management, 
conservation and local development work to the UGs/MGs, but no specific 
powers related to natural resource use. Despite this, one of my informants told 
me that her Mothers’ Group taxed use of grazing land in the area, thus 
wielding what can be interpreted as exclusion rights over those resources: 
“Whoever takes their livestock to graze within Olangchung Gola who comes 
from outside, sometimes from Tibet, they charge them some money for the 
grazing. They keep the money in the MG fund” (#8).  
Right to withdrawal of certain types of natural resources for household 
consumption is in principle allocated to all the inhabitants of the area, but such 
rights have been regulated since the establishment of KCA. Collection of 
herbal and other non-timber forest products is the right of any member of the 
community, but in community forests it is regulated by the CFUGs. 
Elsewhere, it is regulated by the UCs who “prescribe the procedure of 
consumption of the required forest product for the daily use of the residents” 
(GoN 2008: Rule 16f). Oli et al. (2013:30) report that the local people are 
satisfied with its management and mechanisms for distribution of benefits 
seem to be satisfactory (however, recall Parker and Thapa’s (2011) concern 
about unequal distribution of benefits).  
Several of my informants were of the opinion that access to resources have 
become more equitably distributed since the conservation area was 
established: “Before it was the powerful people’s right in terms of access to 
timber, herbal products and other forest products”, one informant told me (#1), 
while another said “In the past there were no rules or regulations, so it was the 
mighty's right to get whatever they felt like, because there was nobody to look 
after these things. But since KCAP started, this has changed.” (#9). Another 
  
108 
informant (#14) provided a slightly different view on the matter, simply 
stating: “Before conservation, people had access to the jungle at any time, and 
they could get whatever they felt like, as there was nobody to look after these 
things. When KCAP and the Council started, they implemented rules and 
regulations to collect woods and herbal products”.  
Naturally, fear of losing access to natural resources was one reason for initial 
skepticism mentioned when I asked interviewees about what people thought at 
the time when KCA was established (#12, #7), in addition to fears about the 
prospect of army deployment (#7) (these fears turned however out to be 
unfounded, as the Nepali army is not used for patrolling CAs). The restrictions 
imposed caused resentment in the beginning, especially with regards to the 
lucrative timber trade; the decision-making powers over one important 
resource, namely timber, is heavily restricted in the conservation area. Two 
interviewees (#9 and #10) recounted how timber exportation to Tibet used to 
be an important source of income for people living close to the Tibetan border. 
Timber exportation had been completely stopped following the establishment 
of KCA, and this still caused some resentment among those who before relied 
on this as a source of livelihood, according to one interviewee (#9), despite the 
promotion of carpet-weaving as a substitute livelihood option38. Private 
owners of forestland can obtain permission from the Council upon 
recommendation from the relevant UC to export timber out of KCA, but under 
no circumstance out of Nepal, according the Management Rules (GoN 2008: 
Rule 40). It seems to be no openings in the Rules for out-of-area sales of 
timber from Government-owned land, be it managed as community forests or 
not. This policy was confirmed in an interview with Gurung, who said that the 
main difference between community forests within and outside conservation 
                                              
38 The concerns about the timber trade illustrate how geophysical variations and implications for livelihood 
options and opportunities influence how different communities are affected in different ways by the same 
restrictions and regulations. It underscores the importance of not using “the community” lightly raised by various 
authors referred to in Chapter 5.  
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areas is that CFUGs outside conservation areas can sell timber, whilst this is 
not an option for CFUGs located inside conservation areas (Gurung: interview 
08.05.2012).  
Powers to take decisions over resource use is an important feature of 
decentralization, because it enhances the discretionary authority of local 
bodies and affects the use of resources (Agrawal and Ribot 1999:477). 
However, whether the resource use decision-making power of for instance 
CFUGs can be regarded as discretionary powers, important for the 
effectiveness of decentralization reforms (Ribot 2002, 2004, Ribot et al. 2006), 
could be questioned. For instance, one informant held that the MGs had to 
consult with the KCA-MC about the use of the funds they get from the 
Council, and that the Council can give advice and direct the MGs if they plan 
to conduct activities the Council disagrees with (#1). For household 
consumption of forest products, the CFUGs seem to have such powers, but for 
any exportation of forest products outside the conservation area, a written 
approval from the Council must be obtained (GoN 2008: Rule 42 and 
Schedule 12). 
The right of alienation, i.e. the right to sell or lease withdrawal, management, 
and exclusion rights, is to some extent allocated to the KCA-MC, as it can 
give such rights over patches of forest to local institutions in KCA, but as 
noted elsewhere, the alienation right over the whole area is controlled by the 
DPNWC (as of the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act (HMGN 
1973)).  
Finally, the powers to enforce compliance of new or altered rules and to 
adjudicate disputes arising around such rules (Agrawal and Ribot 1999) need 
to be briefly commented upon. Legal power to prosecute people having 
breached the NPWCA (e.g. poaching) is still the power of the warden, the 
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representative of DNPWC39. The MC can dissolve the UCs if they breach the 
Management Regulations, after investigations. If any person conducts 
operations in community forests that are contrary to the work plan of the 
concerned CFUG, the User Committee covering the concerned community 
forest may take action against this person as prescribed by the work plan (GoN 
2008: Rule 54).  
Monitoring and the Making of Environmental Subjects 
Several informants told me about how the Council is responsible to monitor 
the forests to deter poaching and irregular harvesting of forest products, and 
one MG informant explained that her group was involved in awareness-raising 
activities to combat poaching and forest fires. Many informants also noted that 
conservation issues in general were high on the agenda in the various fora in 
KCA. However, since the rule-making powers of KCA institutions are fairly 
limited, the power to enforce rules necessarily mainly involves rules created 
externally. Importantly, the power to create rules and regulations for the whole 
conservation area resides with the Government of Nepal, as of section 33 of 
the NPWCA (HMGN 1973), recalled in the preamble to the KCA 
Management Rules (Gon 2008). It is doubtful whether this can be understood 
as a feature of decentralization; rather, it can be interpreted as a way of 
external actors, in this case central conservation authorities (DNPWC) and the 
WWF, to ensure compliance with conservation regulations with minimal 
costs.  
Neumann (2001:326) holds that local participation in buffer zone management 
in protected areas in Tanzania, especially as it relates to monitoring and 
surveillance duties, internalizes introduced ideologies of wildlife conservation 
and shifts the burden of wildlife protection towards the villagers. Agrawal 
                                              
39 This is in line with one of Ribot’s proposed environmental subsidiarity principles, to separate and balance 
judicial, excecutive and legislative powers (Ribot 2004:81). 
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(2005:14-15) writes that in a wide range of countries “national and state 
governments are striving to make rural populations accomplices in 
environmental and their own control”. He moreover argues that 
decentralization policies are about new technologies of government, among 
them making of “environmental subjects” (ibid:7). According to Agrawal, the 
success of the different forest councils in Kumaon in northern India partly 
depended on the production of environmental subjects, defined loosely as 
“individuals who see the generalized need for environmental protection of in 
some form and whose practices and words bear the mark of this acceptance, if 
not of personal conversion” (ibid:18). 
The making of environmental subjects is a necessary condition for successful 
decentralization according to Agrawal, because “Attempts to change how 
people act, when based solely on coercive threats in hierarchical organizations, 
are either formidably expensive or evidently impractical” (2005:17). Several 
of the instrumental arguments for decentralized PA management can be seen 
as at least partly depending on the creation of environmental subjects or the 
internalization of values related to environmental protection imposed from 
outside. If one accepts such a line of argument, the empowerment of local 
institutions and their participants coupled with upward accountability links is 
an effective means of controlling local behaviour for the benefit of 
conservation objectives. Pimber and Pretty (1997:308) write about how 
participation for material benefits (e.g. encouraging local people to sell their 
labor in return for food, cash or materials) in conventional rural development 
can “give the misleading impression that local people are supportive of 
externally driven initiatives”. Another interpretation of the lack of dissenting 
voices, in my data evidenced by the unanimous support for the conservation 
area, can be that this is due to the internalization of dominant views and values 
(Gaventa and Cornwall 2006:126), part of the successful creation of 
Agrawal’s (2005) “environmental subjects”. 
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Arguably, the creation of environmental subjects, or at least WWF’s continued 
focus on capacity-building and training, can be related to invisible power, if 
the reader recalls that invisible power influences “how individuals think about 
their place in the world” (Gaventa 2006:29). Thus, whether one understands 
the devolution of monitoring responsibilities as decentralization depends on 
one’s understanding of power, and different observers can therefore have 
widely different interpretations of this issue.   
Are the Rights Secure? 
As discussed in Chapter 5, it is important that those achieving rights and 
powers over natural resource management issues regard such rights as 
secure40; if not, chances are that resources will be over-exploited as the local 
population do not trust that they will keep rights to withdraw or sell resources 
for long (Ribot 2002:16). Insecurity can also discourage local people from 
investing in decentralized rights or related institutions. Ribot (ibid.) 
distinguishes between three different means of transfer of rights, each with 
different levels of security. These are constitutional, legislative and transfer 
through ministerial decree or administrative orders (ibid:15). Recalling that the 
rights and powers discussed in this chapter stem from the Management Rules 
(GoN 2008), these rights are arguably transferred by means of ministerial 
decree (the least secure transfer in Ribot’s distinction), as the power to create 
rules is held by the Government of Nepal as of the 1973 Natural Parks and 
Wildlife Conservation Act (HMGN 1973:§33). Thus, no legislative decision is 
                                              
40 The proposed withdrawal of management rights previously regarded as secure caused much tension when 
Gaurishankar Conservation Area was to be established in Nepal in 2010. The opposition came mainly from the 
Federation of Community Forests User Groups Nepal (FECOFUN), who feared the establishment of the area 
under the authority of NTNC, and based on the Management Rules applicable to the other NTNC-run 
conservation areas in the country (Annapurna and Manaslu) (HMGN 1996), would deprive the CFUGs in the area 
of their rights and responsibilities to manage the community forests (Paudel et al. 2012). The reliance of these 
rules constitute decentralization to a much lesser degree than what is achieved in KCA, as the apex body is not 
envisioned to be local in the former rules. The protests and ensuing political process led to the negotiation of new 
Management Rules, assuring the status of CFUGs and establishment of a management council similar to the one 
in charge of KCA. The process moreover challenged the ”conservation hegemony” in Nepal wielded by NTNC 
and the central Nepali government (ibid.).  However, the new rules has so far not been endorsed and approved by 
the Government, and civil society organizations are worried about the slow response of the Government in 
implementing the agreed-upon rules (Khatiwada 2014, pers. comm.) 
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needed to make such rules; they can be regarded as executive powers of the 
government. Moreover, it can be argued that the security of rights in practice 
also is influenced by the upward accountability mechanisms discussed above. 
The possibility to dissolve local institutions by other institutions further up in 
the administrative hierarchy can be interpreted as increasing the insecurity of 
rights. However, mechanisms of adjudication exist, presumably to avoid 
arbitrary or unfounded dissolutions, and my findings suggest that this has not 
so far had detrimental consequence for the management of the conservation 
area. 
Another issue related to the security of the transferred rights is the overlap of 
natural resource management rights and obligations held by managing 
conservation organizations vested in the NPWCA and the Management Rules 
on the one hand, and parallel rights and obligations held by local government 
bodies such as the DDCs and VDCs vested in the Local Self-Governance Act 
(HMGN 1999) on the other hand. The Act entitles the Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) to tax commercial exploitation of natural resources and 
heritage within the village development area (HMGN 1999: §55j). It also 
requires the VDCs to prepare programs related to conservation of forests, 
vegetation, biological diversity and soil conservation, and on environmental 
protection in general (ibid: §28h 2 and 3, respectively). This has created 
conflicts between local governments and conservation organizations (Gurung 
2006:46), and difficulties in coordinating effective management of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services at the local level, according to IUCN 
Nepal’s 2013-2016 program framework (IUCN Nepal 2013:5). Gurung 
(2006:46) argues that there is a need to resolve legal conflicts and reform 
policies to allow for effective and efficient management of natural resources, 
especially in protected areas, as well as creating a collaborative management 
framework at the local level between KCA-MC and the DDC (ibid:84).  
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As long as the service provision and accountability-induced legitimacy of the 
local government bodies are found to be lacking, the management institutions 
in KCA will have the upper hand. But if/when local elections are held, it can 
be reason to believe that the newly elected political officials in these bodies 
(the DDC and the four VDCs in KCA) will want to re-establish themselves as 
significant actors both in the development field and in natural resource 
management. As long as legislation is not aligned, it remains to be seen what 
consequences this might have for the effective exercise of the so-far 
uncontested, but not very secure, rights of the KCA institutions.  
6.4 Participation Typologies in KCA 
As I argued in the introduction to this chapter, participation and 
decentralization are interlinked to the extent that it is difficult to assess the 
degree of participation without an understanding of the decentralized 
framework, as the former depends on devolution of power. Having analyzed 
the degree and nature of power devolution through the decentralization of 
management in KCA, I shall now discuss participation as it is practiced in 
KCA in relation to the typologies I discussed in Chapter 5. 
If one aims at placing participation in the typologies presented in Chapter 5, 
some clarifications are necessary. The first is that the typologies themselves 
necessarily are mere abstractions of a much more complex reality, where 
participation in development projects, decision-making and political processes 
cannot be readily placed in either category. Following from this, real-life, non-
abstracted participation is likely to have aspects of more than one typology 
(Cornwall 2008:273). The second is that talking about “participation in KCA” 
as one coherent concept has little meaning or value. This is because the 
powers of the different institutions differ widely, and thus the power devolved 
to the individuals participating in them also varies, depending on which 
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institutional level one is participating in. In fact, it could be argued that the 
different “levels” in the hierarchy of management in KCA could be described 
as the different levels where power is exercised in Gaventa’s (2006) 
“powercube”. As it makes little sense to discuss power and power-struggles 
solely at the local level if the important decisions are being taken at the 
national or global level, so can it be equally unfruitful to solely analyze the 
power-struggles and decision-making at the grassroots level (in the UGs, MGs 
and CFUGs) in KCA, if the important decisions are taken further up in the 
system (e.g. in the Council). The participation in decision-making, 
management and implementation corresponds with the different management 
levels in the hierarchical structure of management in KCA; the most important 
decision-making and distribution of resources take place in the KCA-MC 
(Müller at al. 2008), and powers in the lower levels are conditioned by those 
further up in the managerial hierarchy. Some general observations related to 
the participation typologies can nevertheless be made.  
Participation in KCA involves taking part in both management and decision-
making in addition to implementation, thus complying with White’s (1996) 
necessary level for a fully participatory project. This depends however on 
which institutional level of management the individuals participate in, and the 
decisions one can make are limited by the Management Rules. For example, 
the grassroots level institutions in KCA have quite extensive autonomy in their 
planning and implementation of local development work (for example through 
fiscal decentralization as discussed in 6.4.2), but less control over decisions 
regarding local conservation issues or resource use. In fact, much of the 
conservation work in all the institutions in KCA is imposed on those 
institutions through the management plan and the Management Regulations, as 
they put extensive duties on the shoulders of the different institutions. Also, as 
the institutional set-up of KCA was envisioned by KCAP and put into place 
through extensive capacity-building, the “spaces” that has been created for 
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participation in PA management in KCA is arguably of the invited type in 
Gaventa’s (2006) parlance. As a comment on degree of autonomous decision-
making in KCA, I quote White (1996:13):  
however participatory a development project is designed to be, it cannot 
escape the limitations on this process that derive from the power 
relations in wider society. That people do not express other interests 
does not mean that they do not have them. It simply means that they 
have no confidence that they can be achieved. 
Participation in the MGs and UGs can be interpreted as instrumental 
participation to use White’s (1996) typology. Instrumental participation in this 
regard refers to participation as means to increase efficiency and reduce costs 
of achieving the pre-determined goals of a project (recall the reasons stated for 
ensuring participation in UGs and MGs in the Management Rules cited in 
footnote 28). It can be interpreted as instrumental on behalf of the 
“beneficiaries” as well, as participation in management comes with certain 
benefits (Parker and Thapa 2011). However, this instrumentality is only one 
aspect and motivation for participating in KCA management; as White (1996) 
discusses, there are usually more than one motivation behind participatory 
arrangements, and the participation in KCA has both representative and 
transformative aspects as I see it. Representative participation allows the 
participants a voice in the making of a project, thus ensuring sustainability 
through avoiding inappropriate or dependent projects (ibid:8). Transformative 
participation aims at empowering the participants, and requires an honest 
willingness on behalf of the organization in control (WWF Nepal in this case) 
to relinquish power. This willingness was clear from my interview with the 
conservation director in WWF Nepal, who stated that “For us it is not about 
control (…) WWF as an institution believes in people’s power, and their 
ability to manage their own resources” (Gurung: interview 08.05.2012).   
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Pimbert and Pretty (1997) claim that functional participation is the minimum       
sufficient type of participation if the objective is to achieve sustainable 
conservation. I argue that at least this level of participation has been achieved 
in KCA since management responsibility was devolved to the Council, but it 
is important to differentiate the analysis to the different institutions in the 
hierarchy. For instance, participation in MGs can be said to be interactive, as it 
involves people that make priorities and take decisions of their own, if 
analyzed in itself, not related to the broader institutional framework, but it is 
always limited by the overarching framework of KCA as an ICDP imposed 
externally. Using Arnstein’s (1969) typology, I argue that KCA has moved 
above the “partnership” ladder, as both the KCA-MC and lower-level 
institutions have decision-making powers over various aspect of management 
adjusted to the managerial level. Her ladder called “delegated power” is 
characterized by such independent decision-making power. Participation in the 
decentralized management structures of KCA does not however amount to 
Arnstein’s highest ladder, “citizen control”, since the independence of KCA 
institutions is limited by the regulatory framework granting the DNPWC the 
power to dissolve the institutions and amend the management plan.  
Participation in protected area management as practiced in KCA does not 
amount to the “highest” level in either of the typologies presented, as I see it. 
For this, the structures in which people participate are too strictly set by 
external actors and rules, and the importance of attracting continued donor 
funding for activities limits, consciously or unconsciously, what activities or 
agendas people choose to pursue. But it is still fair to characterize KCA as a 
conservation area with an innovate and meaningful participatory approach to 
management, with substantial benefits ensuing from this approach with 
regards both to those participating in the projects, and for the achievement of 
conservation goals. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have showed how the local population in KCA participates in 
the management of the conservation area they live in, with specific focus on 
decision-making and representation of the various institutions. I have 
moreover analyzed the decentralization of this participatory management 
framework, with a focus on accountability mechanisms and the powers and 
rights that are devolved. The discussion has shown the importance of paying 
attention to the various levels of management when analyzing participation 
and decentralization, as well as to see participation and decentralization as 
interconnected phenomena. This also has implications if one aims at placing 
participation in KCA in the typologies I presented in the theoretical chapter.  
It can rightfully be claimed that KCA is the most decentralized and locally 
managed protected area in Nepal, because of the unique management structure 
where a local body have become the top-most institution in the local 
management hierarchy. Nakul Chettri, Program Coordinator in ICIMOD for 
the Kanchenjunga Landscape Initiative, regarded KCA overall to be a 
successful model in terms of decentralization of conservation activities at the 
local level, and also in empowering people to be responsible for conservation 
(Chettri: interview 29.06.2012). However, I argue that all the time the central 
authority in charge of protected areas in Nepal has unilateral powers to 
dissolve the Council and amend the locally negotiated management plan, it is 
not a fully decentralized protected area. In the next chapter, I discuss the 
implications of the management structure for the balancing of conservation 
and developmental concerns. There, I argue that a certain level of control on 
behalf of the central government might be necessary to ensure continued 
protection of conservation interests. 
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7. A Fine Balance? 
In Chapter 2, I discussed how sustainable development and the emergence of 
new approaches to protected area management have evolved together. I also 
pointed to the inherent problem of ICDPs in trying to bridge or integrate the 
two goals of conservation and development, by some regarded as 
irreconcilable. In the following, I look to some potential problems for the 
integration of conservation and development related to human-wildlife 
conflicts I KCA. I also discuss some factors influencing the balancing of 
conservation and development in KCA, as they relate to the decentralized 
management framework.  
7.1 Development and Conservation in KCA 
To provide a comprehensive assessment of development and conservation 
goals and achievements in KCA is beyond the scope this thesis, and would 
have required access to written sources I do not have41. However, some broad 
observations based on available literature can be made, before I turn the 
attention to the links between the management framework and the balancing 
of development and conservation concerns.  
Gurung (2006:82) lists two overarching objectives for the initial phase of 
KCAP (1998-2005), namely nature conservation and sustainable development. 
Research, awareness raising and programs focusing on forests and wildlife 
protection, such as encroachment control and monitoring and anti-poaching 
activities are main features of the former objective. The latter objective, broad 
in scope as it is, features gender mainstreaming and sustainable development 
                                              
41 For instance, I was initially hoping to compare the current Management Plan (covering the years 2012-2017) 
with the former, and identify possible changes in priorities between development and conservation issues. 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible for me to obtain a copy of the current management plan (it is also 
uncertain whether it has been translated to English), and I only have a summary of the former. 
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awareness, capacity building and technology transfer, as well as improvement 
of central social services such as infrastructure, health and education services, 
income generation (alternative livelihoods), promotion of tourism and 
alternative energy (ibid.). The education system in KCA has vastly improved 
since establishment, according to Parker and Thapa (2011). Local people 
express that their economic wellbeing has improved since establishment (Oli 
et al. 2013). This corresponds to my findings; my interviewees in KCA 
expressed that they were in favor of the conservation area, many stating that 
their lives had bettered since the establishment.  
Oli et al. (2013) report that User Committees in KCA have been active in 
conservation activities that have helped reducing the over-harvesting of 
resources and wildlife poaching. This is also in line with interviewees’ views 
on the matter – most interviewees reported on conservation activities being 
implemented, and nothing in my findings suggests that conservation is no 
longer a priority in the management of the area. Perhaps surprisingly, the 
conservation director in WWF Nepal seemed satisfied with the status of 
conservation work in KCA – he was of the opinion that conservation work 
was going well, but lamented the status of the health and education sector, 
(Gurung: interview 08.05.2012). He also echoed the concern of many of my 
informants in KCA that the tourism industry and associated infrastructure was 
still poorly developed. Tourism development is often regarded as a way of 
integrating development and conservation, and was framed as such by officials 
from DNPWC and WWF visiting the area prior to the establishment of KCA, 
according to one informant (#7). The logic is as follows: if the local people 
participate in the protection of nature and wildlife, the area will be more 
attractive to tourists and tourism business can become an important livelihood 
option for the inhabitants. However, so far tourism influx has not lived up to 
its promise. 
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7.1.1 Human-wildlife conflicts 
Conservation practitioners recognize human-wildlife conflicts to be an 
increasing challenge in achieving conservation goals, especially those 
concerning the conservation of large, dangerous animals (Nyhus et al. 2003), 
such as the snow leopard in KCA. Indeed, several interviewees mentioned 
typical human-wildlife conflicts such as depredation of livestock and crops as 
significant problems in the communities, and it has also been recognized as a 
challenge by other researchers (Gurung 2006, Müller et al. 2008). However, 
increasing problems related to wildlife depredation is also a sign of successful 
conservation of the wildlife in the area; it is linked to the reduction of hunting 
and retaliatory killings of wild animals and corresponding increases in wildlife 
populations (Gurung 2006:119). One informant (#7), himself heavily involved 
in snow leopard conservation and monitoring work, explained that numbers of 
snow leopards most likely have increased since the establishment of the 
conservation area, as they witness increasing numbers of domestic livestock 
killed by snow leopards. The number of yaks killed by snow leopards had 
reportedly increased from around 10 a year in his community to around 30.  
While depredation of livestock is the most important problem in high altitude 
areas, the depredation of crops by other animals is the main issue in lower 
areas42. In Tapethok, crop depredation by for instance deer, bears and 
monkeys was considered a major concern (#12, #13). Moreover, despite crop 
depredation becoming more and more common, a compensation scheme was 
seemingly still not in place at the time of research. Information on this was 
diverging, some claimed in informal talks that a system was in place, but not 
functioning well, while an interviewee from KCA-MC said that such a scheme 
was not in place and probably would not be established either, because it 
                                              
42 Crop depredation was not mentioned as a significant issue by informants in Ghunsa and Olangchung Gola, 
because in these higher altitude villages they grow potatoes and vegetables inside the villages, not in areas in or 
close to forests (#7 and #8). 
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would be impossible to find a system that could establish whether claims are 
false or genuine (#13).     
In contrast, four Snow Leopard Conservation Committees (SLCCs) have been 
established in various high-altitude communities, to administrate livestock 
insurance systems and monitor snow leopard populations. Compensation for 
livestock killings was regarded as one important factor for the reduction of 
retaliatory killings, in turn contributing to increasing numbers of snow 
leopards (Shrestha: interview 19.05.2012). However, the system is not fully 
developed yet, and the financial sustainability of the system is a concern – as 
with other conservation and development activities in KCA, the Council is still 
dependent on external financial support (ibid.).  
Wildlife depredation is a good example of the inherent problems of trying to 
integrate conservation and development – good conservation practices directly 
cause problems for those depending on core livelihood activities of KCA: 
livestock herding and farming. For conservation and local livelihood needs to 
be reconciled, complicated and costly compensation mechanisms seem to be 
needed. If tourism takes off in KCA, it can become an example of an opposite 
dynamic, namely that successful development initiatives cause problems for 
nature conservation. The environmental downside of massive tourism is 
witnessed in the Annapurna (Nyaupane and Thapa 2006) and Everest regions 
(Stevens 2003, Whelpton 2005:150).  
7.2 Balancing Decentralization 
Norwegian experiences with decentralized protected area management suggest 
that when local municipalities are entrusted with management responsibilities, 
they tend to prioritize the interests of landowners, resource users and the 
tourism industry higher than what is usual in protected areas traditionally 
managed by central authorities (Falleth and Hovik 2008:9). But in Norway, 
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the local management boards that have been established due to the 
decentralization of PA management are composed of local politicians, and not 
of local stakeholders or professional expertise. This has led to a politicization 
of nature conservation, as management is moved from the bureaucratic to the 
political arena (Fauchald and Gulbrandsen 2012:215). In KCA, however, the 
management council is predominantly made up of local stakeholders, with 
limited membership from the VDCs and the DDC. The prioritization of 
resource user interests witnessed in Norway as a consequence of the 
politicization of PA management is thus not likely in the management of 
KCA, but this is however not to say that local user interests are not prioritized 
higher by local-level decision-makers in KCA than by national authorities 
(considering that they are downwardly accountable to their constituencies).  
The direction of accountability relationships might be an important factor 
when it comes to balancing conservation and development concerns. The 
regulatory framework described earlier works as a check on the empowered 
local institutions’ presupposed drive to prioritize local development over 
national or global conservation interests, as does the accompanying upward 
accountability relationships such as the threat of dissolution and the extensive 
reporting requirements and pre-set themes in the Management Plan. This 
retention of some control by the central conservation authorities can be seen as 
a security measure to uphold the “wider public interest”. A second factor is the 
continued dependence on WWF Nepal as the major donor43, sometimes 
witnessed as visible power, as WWF decides which proposals laid out in the 
plans of the local institutions they can support, and sometimes as hidden 
power, where the recognition of the donor dependence frames what decision-
makers in KCA regard as possible and thus shapes the agenda of the 
                                              
43 WWF Nepal spending on KCAP in NRs: Fiscal Year (FY) 2008-09: 34 288 539; FY 2009-10: 28 464 039; FY 
2010-11: 28 930 309; FY 2011-12: 42 925 107; FY 2012-13: 51 043 864 (WWF Nepal 2013:41). The increase in 
KCAP expenditures in the last two fiscal years corresponds with substantial increases in WWF Nepal’s general 
expenditures.  
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institutions (Gaventa 2006:29). Also within the management framework of 
KCA, the financial dependence of for instance the MGs upon the Council was 
mentioned by one interviewee (#1) as a way for the council to control the 
institutions further down in the hierarchy.  
Moreover, the balancing of conservation concerns and development needs is 
also to some extent depending on the mitigation of human-wildlife conflicts, 
which when not tackled can pose fundamental challenges to the reconciliation 
of human and conservation needs immanent in ICDPs. As discussed above, 
several systems are established or are planned to be established to tackle 
human-wildlife conflicts, but it remains to be seen whether these systems are 
sustainable in the long term, or whether an increasing level of conflict might 
be witnessed in the future. A final issue that might influence the balance is the 
change in perceptions among the villagers themselves, what Agrawal (2005) 
calls the making of environmental subjects. However, it is too early to tell 
whether such a change in perceptions has happened among most villagers in 
KCA or not (and if so for, for which reasons), and in view of the sampling 
methods I used in the research process, it would be reckless to generalize my 
findings on environmental values and perceptions to the wider KCA 
population.  
It can perhaps be argued that the two last issues discussed in the paragraph 
above might lessen the burden on the regulatory framework and upward 
accountability relationships in sanctioning behavior in KCA. If human-
wildlife conflicts increase, with huge impacts on people’s livelihoods with 
insufficient compensation systems, it is possible that enhanced capacity of 
monitoring groups, external or locally organized, will be needed to check 
poaching activities for instance. Likewise, if the perceptions of the local 
inhabitants do not change despite the efforts of capacity building and “buying 
in” on local inhabitants by financing local development work and promoting 
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tourism, or if funding for development projects dry up and income from 
tourism does not materialize, sanctions might be needed. This is a risk as the 
participation in and positive attitudes towards the conservation area discussed 
in the former chapter is linked to the development improvements that has 
materialized as a consequence of WWF Nepal’s heavy investments in the area. 
It is moreover enhanced as the expectations for further improvements of local 
infrastructure and livelihood opportunities increase among the local population 
(Müller et al. 2008).  
Chances are that sanctions, if imposed by the local institutions, might create 
local-level conflicts. Despite the promises of ICDPs to reconcile local 
development aspirations and conservation goals, whether established by 
national policy goals or international commitments, it is a fair assumption that 
conflict can arise between these two interests. Fauchald and Gulbrandsen 
(2012) hold that public policy implementation studies assume that the local 
governance institutions’ ability to implement national policy goals depend on 
the type and content of policy, and moreover the degree of conflict over the 
particular policy. They expect that policy fields with high levels of conflict 
require more centralized control if national or international policy goals are to 
be implemented (ibid:204-5). This can be related to the discussions on 
appropriate levels of decentralization reforms raised by Ribot with his 
“environmental subsidiarity principles” (2004) and the ecosystem approach as 
a framework for implementing the CBD (SCBD 2004). The ecosystem 
approach acknowledges many different communities of interests, at different 
levels, with different capacities to take action. It also acknowledges a 
difference between local and wider public interests. Because of a broader set 
of acknowledged stakeholders, and more concern for the public good (parallel 
to Fauchald and Gulbrandsen’s (2012) concern for the protection of public 
goods in PAs, in contrast to the management of CPR goods), the ecosystem 
approach, when applied, is likely to be less radical in its decentralization 
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recommendations than Ribot’s environmental subsidiarity principles. After all, 
the corresponding principle in the ecosystem approach (principle 2), is only 
one out of 12 principles, while the motivation to decentralize management and 
decision-making power is very central to Ribot’s principles. 
7.3 Conclusion 
At the beginning of Chapter 6, I presented two initial propositions I had before 
visiting KCA. This discussion has provided some possible explanations for 
why conservation efforts have been upheld despite the assumption that the 
opposite would be expected. However, as the discussion has shown, it is too 
early to state that development and conservation have been reconciled in 
KCA; only future observations will tell whether the decentralized and 
participatory management framework is financially sustainable and can 
manage to deliver on all its promises.  
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8. Concluding Remarks 
Throughout this thesis, I have explored the gradual move towards more 
inclusive approaches in protected area management parallel to the emergence 
of sustainable development as the dominant discourse on developmental and 
environmental issues, the increasing focus on local participation among those 
involved in both development and conservation work, and the move towards 
decentralization of natural resource and conservation management. I have also 
analyzed the internal political shifts in Nepal that facilitated this change in the 
Nepali context, while noting the considerable external pressures that moved in 
the same direction. However, I have also discussed the opposition towards the 
“new” approaches in PA management by some conservation practitioners and 
scholars who see this as detrimental to the core objectives of PAs to conserve 
wildlife and biological diversity, and some inherent problems of reconciling 
development needs and conservation goals in PA management.  
I have further provided a detailed analysis of various aspects of local 
participation in the management framework of Kangchenjunga Conservation 
Area. I have shown how participation is linked with and partly dependent on 
decentralization reforms, as the latter opens for devolution of powers and 
rights to local stakeholders and decision-makers, devolutions that give 
participation in the management substance and meaning. Although the 
participatory approach to the management of KCA does not amount to the 
highest levels of the various typologies of participation, analysis has showed 
that participation in KCA is substantial. Further attention should however be 
afforded to the issue of power within the various institutions, and the degree to 
which equal opportunities to participate also in the higher levels of 
management are ensured. Some problems related to this have been identified.  
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Further, analysis of the extent of decentralization of management in KCA has 
illustrated the importance of looking at the different levels of management and 
the power relationships between the local bodies and external institutions such 
as the WWF and the DNPWC. Although substantial powers and rights have 
been devolved to local actors in KCA, significant limits are specified in the 
Management Rules of KCA, and upward accountability relationships further 
condition the freedom of action of the local institutions. Although KCA 
arguably is the most decentralized PA in Nepal, I would not describe it as 
being “fully managed through participatory conservation approaches by local 
people” (Oli et al. 2013:29) or having a “complete devolution of management 
authority” (Parker and Thapa 2011:880).  
Lastly, I have discussed how some aspects of management in KCA affect the 
balancing act of conservation and development inherent in ICDPs. Overall, 
KCA in my view represents a good example on how to balance conservation 
and development at the local level, through participatory conservation and 
development efforts, but it remains to be seen if the good practices witnessed 
so far in KCA are sustainable in financial and managerial terms. The 
reservations noted in the above paragraph notwithstanding, the responsibility 
to conserve biodiversity and natural resources is to a large extent handed over 
to the local communities in KCA, in line with Ribot’s (2002, 2004) 
environmental subsidiarity principles as well is with one of the principles of 
the Ecosystem Approach for implementation of the CBD (UNEP 2000). More 
research is needed to assess the overall achievements in biodiversity 
conservation since the establishment of KCA, the results of which might shed 
more light on the issue of finding the “right” level of decentralization as it 
relates to balancing different and diverging interests in KCA. 
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8.1 Prospects for Further Research 
KCA is part of a wider transboundary Kangchenjunga landscape, 
encompassing parts of India, Bhutan and China (Tibet Autonomous Region). 
In Nepal, it also forms part of the Sacred Himalayan Landscape (SHL) 
(GoN/MoFSC 2006), under which WWF Nepal continues its financial support 
to KCAP (WWF Nepal 2013). Concerns about the viability of isolated PAs 
(“conservation islands”) in ensuring long-term protected conservation of 
species have led to an increased focus on regional cooperation and a 
landscape-level approach to conservation, inspired by the Ecosystem 
Approach adopted by CBD States Parties and discussed elsewhere in this 
thesis (Chettri et al. 2008, Shakya and Joshi 2008, Chettri: interview 
29.06.2012). What implications the emergence of transboundary cooperation 
and a wider landscape approach to conservation in Nepal might have for the 
participatory approach and decentralized management structure in KCA is one 
potential interesting focus for future research in KCA and PA management in 
Nepal and the wider region generally.  
In this thesis, I have briefly discussed the notion of “environmental subjects”, 
coined by Agrawal (2005). As noted, no firm conclusions could be drawn on 
the basis of my empirical material whether a change in perceptions and 
environmental values has taken place among the local population in KCA, but 
this constitute another potential subject for further research. How are 
environmental norms spread among those living in or close to protected areas? 
What implications can this have for the management of PAs, and for the 
degree of decentralization appropriate when different interests and concerns 
are to be protected and taken into account? 
A third issue of interest for further research is the motivations behind 
decentralization, why central authorities choose to pursue decentralization 
reforms and relinquish power. Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) regard the lack of 
  
130 
attention to the political motivations behind decentralization reforms as a 
lacuna in much research on decentralization. An especially interesting case in 
this regard is the recent establishment of Gaurishankar Conservation Area 
(GCA), where NTNC has been granted management responsibilities for 20 
years (NTNC 09.06.2010). Established in 2010, when Nepali conservation 
authorities had had several years of experience with decentralized 
conservation in KCA to learn from, it is a puzzle worth further investigation 
why the central authorities regarded a 20 year tenure to NTNC to be an 
appropriate way forward for one of the newest protected areas in Nepal. Api 
Nampa Conservation Area, established in the same year, is managed by 
DNPWC (DNPWC 2014c); this is also a potential case for research into the 
political motivations behind choices to decentralize or not to decentralize.  
As this thesis has shown, KCA has proved that participatory decentralized 
conservation management, although far from perfect, is a viable strategy to 
ensure politically feasible and socially just conservation programs, to 
paraphrase Wilshusen et al. (2002:36). Speaking on behalf of the women 
participating in management groups in KCA, one of my interviewees urged 
me to tell friends and family about the women performing important 
conservation work in the communities in the far north-east of Nepal: “We are 
happy and feel pride about our work” (#3). It would be a pity if KCA were just 
a single outcome of a short window of opportunity; therefore, further research 
into the political motivations behind the management choices made for the 
new PAs in Nepal is warranted.  
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Appendices 
Appendix I: List of Professional Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of 
interviewee 
Organization Background of 
Interviewee 
Date Place  
Gurung, 
Ghana 
WWF Nepal Conservation Director 8 May 2012 Kathmandu 
Bhandari, 
Ananta  
WWF Nepal Program Officer, Sacred 
Himalaya Landscape 
25 April 2012 Kathmandu 
Chettri, Nakul  ICIMOD Program Coordinator, 
Kanchenjunga Landscape 
Initiative 
29 June 2012 Kathmandu 
Malla,Yam  IUCN Country Representative 30 April 2012 Kathmandu 
Shrestha, 
Sujeet, and 
Singh, 
Gangaram  
WWF, DNPWC Program manager, Warden 19 May 2012 Taplejung 
Bazaar 
Limbu, 
Kulbahadur  
Himali 
Conservation 
Forum 
Field Technician 10 June 2012 Taplejung 
Bazaar 
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Appendix II: List of Interviews in KCA 
Number Gender Location Role of interviewee Date 
#1 Male Lelep Lelep VDC Chairman 22.5 
#2 Male Lelep Accountant for KCAP 
and KCA-MC 
23.5 
#3 Female Lelep MC member, Lelep 
VDC MG 
Representative 
23.5 
and 7.6 
#4 Female Lelep MG secretary 24.5 
#5 Female Lelep MG treasurer 24.5 
#6 Male Lungthung  MC member 25.5 
#7 Male Ghunsa Chairman of SLCC 
Ghunsa, Sekathum-
Ghunsa UC and 
Ghunsa hydropower 
project 
29.5 
#8 Female Olangchung 
Gola 
MG member 1.6 
#9 Male Olangchung 
Gola 
MC member 3.6 
#10 Male Olangchung 
Gola 
MC member, CFUG 
representative 
3.6 
#11 Male Lelep Former MC treasurer, 
UG member 
7.6 
#12 Male Thapetok MC member 8.6 
#13 Female Thapetok MC member, 
Thapetok VDC MG 
representative  
8.6 
#14 Male Thapetok MC member 9.6 
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Appendix III: Interview Guide 
1. Please tell me about your role in [the institution you participate in] 
a. How long have you been active in [the institution you participate in]?  
b. What are your responsibilities? 
c. What issues do you raise?  
2. Can you describe the development of KCA activities over the last six years, 
since the handover? (or for as long a period as you have 
information/experience on)  
a. What kind of activities do you conduct?  
b. Has it changed since 2006?  
3. How is the Management Council put together?  
a. Who gets to work/volunteer there?  
b. How do the different members cooperate with one another?  
4. How are decisions being made?  
a. Does everyone speak during the meetings?  
b. Are there any barriers for participating in the discussions?  
5. How is the management plan for KCA put together?  
a. Who are involved in the process?  
b. What is the role of WWF in the process? 
c. What is the role of the DNPWC in the process? 
6. How would you describe the relationship between the Management Council, 
DNPWC and WWF? 
7. Has the financing of KCAP changed since 2006? (If so, how? Does it affect 
the independence of the KCAP administration?) Where are the main bulk of 
financial inputs coming from?   
8. What challenges/problems do you face in your community? 
9. Do you remember anything regarding the establishment of KCA?  
10. I am now finished with the questions I wanted to ask you. Is there anything 
else you want to add? 
 
I also recorded the gender and age of the interviewee, and asked about education 
level, mother tongue and how long the person had been involved in the relevant 
institution.   
 
 
 
